By M D Nalapat
Kim Jong Un is strengthening clandestine networks in Japan, the United States and South Korea.
Policymakers and analysts across both sides of
the Pacific Ocean, who are familiar with and involved in policy
formulation in both segments of the Korean peninsula, say that North
Korean supremo Kim Jong Un “admires the way a much smaller Pakistan is
keeping India on tenterhooks” through GHQ Rawalpindi’s Zia-era “Thousand
Cuts” strategy. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi—at that time focused on a
peace treaty with Pakistan because of his close relationship with PPP
chief and later Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto—declined
secret approaches by Israel, which continued up to the initial months of
1989 to jointly carry out a ship and air-based missile strike that
would destroy Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. Till around 2003, it
was possible for India to take out Pakistan’s nuclear assets, given that
these were not militarily operational until that period, despite hype
from Islamabad. However, neither P.V. Narasimha Rao, nor any of his
successors had the will to act decisively against GHQ Rawalpindi, until
the window of opportunity passed. It was not a coincidence that 1989,
the year the Israeli approaches were finally rebuffed, was also when
Pakistan sharply accelerated its non-conventional war on India by openly
lighting the fires of insurgency in Kashmir and set up terror
infrastructure throughout India for future action, soon witnessed in
locations such as Mumbai in 1993.
“Pakistan’s trajectory against India has inspired Kim to follow the
same path, which is to strengthen clandestine networks in Japan, the
United States and South Korea to, in future, launch a ‘thousand cuts’
strategy on the three powers”, of course “once immunity is secured
through a credible nuclear deterrent” on the Pakistan model. Unlike his
father Kim Jong Il, “who was hesitant to reach out in a systematic
manner to Washington, preferring to focus his attention on Seoul”, the
younger Kim is “open to a significant increase in contacts with the US,
as he is not committed to a traditional state-monopoly model of the
economy”. According to those familiar with the thinking within the
higher echelons of the Pyongyang leadership, the youthful Kim Jong Un
“understands the benefits that Pakistan gained as a consequence of
skilful diplomacy towards the US”, in particular, “by gaining the space
needed in order to build up nuclear assets to a critical level”.
Further, “as in the case of Pakistan”, the primary sponsor and
protector of the North Korean military, China, “ favours a policy of
conciliation on the surface, combined with vigorous prosecution of
necessary action below eye level”, as was the case between the US and
Pakistan throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, those who were close to
Rajiv Gandhi, say that an important reason why he did not accept the
Israeli offer was that the US frowned on any such action against
Pakistan. The other was fear of retaliatory bombing raids on Mumbai and
even Delhi, “although these would have been unlikely, given the
certainty of retaliation by India on Karachi and Rawalpindi”.
Interestingly, these sources add that General Sundarji’s military
manoeuvres on the Pakistan border during that period were to ensure
combat readiness in the event of an India-Israel strike against
Pakistan’s nuclear assets.
THE THINKING IN NORTH KOREA
According to individuals familiar with the thinking of the higher
echelons of the North Korean leadership, “if the DPRK is Pakistan, then
Japan is India”. In other words, the primary target of a future
non-conventional war by a North Korea made immune from significant
retaliation by its nuclear weapons capability would be Japan. “The DPRK
would show its teeth to South Korea and the US, but not with the
intention of biting”, a policymaker across the Pacific shores revealed,
adding that “the intention of a display of offensive capability would be
to gain concessions” from Seoul and Washington. However, in the case of
Japan, Kim “sees himself as the Korean leader, who will perform the
historical task of humbling that country” through a ceaseless and
escalating campaign of non-conventional warfare that Tokyo would be
powerless to directly retaliate against. Such a campaign would be
designed to “slow down the Japanese economy and remove any sense of
safety and balance in the lives of citizens, especially in Osaka and
Tokyo”, two cities where, according to several sources, networks have
already been set up that can be made operational at short notice.
However, “should there be war, there will be no limit to the
response” of the DPRK towards its foes as “Supreme Leader is aware that
this will be a battle to the finish” and therefore “we have nothing to
lose” in a context where “the only choice will be to either perish
tamely, or after a bitter and deadly struggle”. They add that “Supreme
Leader (Kim) is very smart and spends a lot of time in private study,
contemplation and in discussions” about the overall situation from his
close associates and from scholars, “whom (Kim) treats with great
respect”. In particular, “Supreme Leader has studied the recent
experience of Iraq, Libya, Syria and even Egypt” and seems to have
reached the conclusion that “promises made by western politicians are
written on water”. They claim that under the cover of removing WMD,
“extensive investigation was done of the vulnerable areas of defences in
Iraq and Libya”, information that was subsequently put to use in
attacks directed against Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. They have
also seen how “help for anti-Assad fighters was increased by several
times” after Syrian, i.e., Assad’s WMD stocks were removed “because of
the agreement forced by Moscow” on Damascus. Hence, they add, Kim Jong
Un will not allow roaming inspections of military facilities as a
consequence of any agreement. Only the sites agreed upon and which
relate to the nuclear forces under discussion will be made accessible,
“after a comprehensive agreement has been reached”. The individuals
contacted claim that over the past year, several North Koreans and
others suspected of passing on information to enemy forces have been
discovered and are being subjected to questioning in facilities set up
for the purpose in the northeast of the DPRK.
‘INTEGRATION NONNEGOTIABLE’
Given the lessons of Iraq, Libya and Syria, the individuals located
on the other side of the Pacific Ocean say that the integration of
DPRK’s administrative and military structure within any future unified
state is “nonnegotiable”. They add that contrary to the personal views
of his father and predecessor Kim Jong Il, “who was not eager for
unification and disliked the ways of the south”, Kim Jong Un has an
“open mind on the issue and has no animosity towards the societal
construct in the south”. Hence, they claim that the best chance for
peaceful unification is the present dispensation in Pyongyang, although
“agreement must be based on mutual respect, rights and benefits”. Also,
that any intra-Korean talks towards such an outcome “must follow an
agreement (of Pyongyang) with the US that protects the personnel” of the
DPRK administration from future retaliation of the kind that took place
in Iraq and Libya and which is now being pursued by the US and its
allies in Syria.
However, absent any “honourable and co-equal” peace agreement, the
DPRK will seek to develop its nuclear and missile technologies to a
stage when “these can be used with deathly (sic) effect on cities in
Japan, the south and the US west coast”. That would, in their view,
strengthen the position of North Korea in any future negotiations.
According to those familiar with the workings of the ruling group in the
DPRK, “the military wants to, in all situations, go ahead with the
nuclear program” as the army’s belief is that “the US is not interested
in serious negotiations, but in putting the tiger (North Korea) to sleep
by honeyed words before killing it”. However, the same sources add that
Kim Jong Un believes that President Trump will keep his part of any
deal made “as he is a businessman and not a politician”. According to
the policymakers spoken to, “the aim of the DPRK leadership is to work
towards a summit meeting (between Kim and Trump) that would result in a
breakthrough in the negotiations. Only “intervention at this level would
create the confidence within Supreme Leader’s high state council that
would enable confidently to make the concessions required for honourable
peace”. According to the individuals spoken to, Supreme Leader Kim has
spent “much time going through speeches and events featuring President
Trump” and has “developed respect for President Trump’s honest talk and
unwavering focus on US interests”, in contrast to his predecessors, who
are seen as “insincere and liars”.
THREE OPTIONS
There appear to be three possible options evolving within the Korean peninsula:
(1) The most likely scenario appears to be a massive first strike by
the US and its allies, designed to neutralise the DPRK military machine,
followed by occupation of the country and the creation of a sanitary
zone 20 kilometres from the border with China, so as to ensure that
Beijing’s security interests are taken account of in any deployment.
(2) The Trump administration goes the way of the Clinton, Bush and
Obama eras and in effect permits the incremental progress of North Korea
towards an operational nuclear strike capability that threatens not
just Japan and South Korea, but parts of the US as well. This would be
followed by the DPRK’s activation of a “thousand cuts” strategy,
particularly against Japan, but very likely partially against the US and
South Korea as well, the aim of actions against the latter being the
wresting of concessions on trade and finance. The campaign against Japan
would be with the same objective as that of the ISI’s war on India, the
weakening and disruption of the country.
(3) President Trump enters into “breakthrough diplomacy” with Kim
Jong Un and succeeds in mentoring a peaceful unification of the Korean
peninsula that would result in a unified state that would be neutral
between China and the US, the way Austria was for a time neutral between
Moscow and Washington.
Success in Options (1) and (3), and ensuring failure on the part of
the DPRK in Option (2), hinges on Beijing fully complying with a policy
of sanctions against Pyongyang that would deny that country the present
plentiful access to energy and food stocks from the PRC. While a “Bright
Sunshine” policy needs to be followed towards North Korea, such a phase
should come about only after a verifiable peace agreement has been
reached that would begin the rollback of the nuclear and missile
program. Should China refuse to impose such curbs, Option (1) may become
inevitable.
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