Sunday, 14 July 2019
Sunday, 7 July 2019
By M D Nalapat
Pandering to those who misused the name of religion for divisive purposes led to India’s partition. That warning from history ought to be heeded by Congress leaders.
Saturday, 6 July 2019
By M D Nalapat
Those looking towards a financial market in India that rewards not insider traders and ‘fixers’ but the retail investor are hopeful that justice will be done during Modi 2.0.
Saturday, 29 June 2019
By M D Nalapat
If the U.S.-India relationship is to move into high orbit, there will be need for India to begin a process of replacement of Russian weapons platforms with U.S. alternatives, now accessible to India where they were out of bounds in the past.
By M D Nalapat
Bernie Sanders-Kamala Harris ticket would energise the Democratic Party base.
Saturday, 4 May 2019
Several other purchases, such as the planned acquisition of another Akula-class nuclear submarine, may also attract US sanctions. But would the Trump administration be willing to give India access to nuclear submarines, air defence systems, etc? According to senior officials spoken to, the reply is in the affirmative.
Saturday, 3 November 2018
By M D Nalapat
Trump’s aim is to reverse Xi’s drive to overtake the US in technological innovation.
“America First, and Donald J. Trump first in America”, at least for the next six years. This is the evolving Trump Doctrine in a single sentence. No other US President during the post-1945 period has sought to so ignore the recommendations of the Washington DC bureaucracy as the nation’s 45th President has, although as yet the Beltway has prevented his plan of distancing Moscow from Beijing, thereby leaving the world’s second most powerful economy without the support of what remains a potential Great Power, albeit severely diminished since the Brezhnev-Gorbachev-Yeltsin years. However, he is trying to break free on North Korea in a manner not yet emulated by National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, both of whom remain anchored to the establishment view that North Korea must render itself defenceless before any sanctions against it can be relaxed. As the practical New York businessman who is now Commander-in-Chief knows, such a policy would only snuff out any hopes that the DPRK would desist from going any further in accumulating deadly weapons, technologies and operations than is already the case. It is illustrative of why US policy in the 21st century has substantially destroyed the very countries it intervened to rescue (such as Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and Iraq) that the Washington Beltway sees it as “extreme and illogical” that Kim Jong Un would not agree to surrender his most potent defences against a US attack in the absence of a formal end of the 1950-53 Korean war. The present occupant of the Blue House in Seoul, Moon Jae-In, does not suffer from such delusions, and seems increasingly in a mood to ensure that conditions get created that would end in at the least a mutual non-aggression pact between Pyongyang and Seoul. The thought of Koreans killing Koreans, as happened during the blood-soaked conflict 68 years ago, has entered the Korean psyche with such force that public opinion in South Korea would be thrown into violent protest and turmoil against the elected authority, were Moon to agree to join hands with Trump and Abe in a pre-emptive war on the DPRK. In any such war, the North would be almost completely obliterated, while the South would be damaged to an extent that would reduce it to something close to the pitiable condition that Syria is in today, after a “War of Liberation” was accelerated in 2012 against Bashar Assad by NATO and the GCC. And while Japan would suffer significant damage, the US is likely to escape relatively unscathed, barring perhaps Guam. It will take some more time for North Korean scientists to fashion bombs and projectiles sufficient to reach the US West Coast, and each time any policymaker in Washington demands full disarmament without any corresponding concession or even gesture on the US side, those North Korean scientists and technicians must be working at an even more feverish pace than usual. The North Korean regime has to feel confident that Kim will not meet the fate of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi, and thus far both the words as well as the body language of the Pompeos and the Boltons (not to mention the “Attack North Korea” crowd in the US Congress) emanate no such assurance. It is only Trump who, on occasion, talks in a manner that could get results, but the North Koreans are as avid readers of the Washington Post and as eager viewers of CNN as the writers and anchors in these media outlets, hence, Kim Jong Un cannot be faulted for believing that Donald Trump may soon get deposed, so that all the promises and progress made through engagement with him would be lost.
In contrast to his policy towards both North Korea as well as Russia, which are still “work in progress” as a consequence of bureaucratic recalcitrance, President Trump seems to have secured sufficient support within the Beltway to ensure that he implement the first stage of his policy towards China, the aim of which is to ensure (through lower growth and stunted technologies) that Beijing remain well behind the US during the present century. In other words, Trump’s aim is to reverse Xi’s drive to overtake the US in technological innovation by 2035 and by 2049 make China the world’s leader in the manufacture of hyper-tech items now dominated by the US. The ten sectors specified by the Chinese leadership include aerospace, robotics and Information Technology. As Hiroyuki Akita has pointed out, Beijing is within reach of Xi’s tech targets. Recently, China—albeit briefly—even had a faster supercomputer speed than the US, while the PRC is second only to the US in the number of companies active in Artificial Intelligence and in the use of supercomputers. As for international patent applications, China is second only to the US and on track to catch up with the US within three years. Although Trump has talked about the mammoth trade deficit with China, it is not that figure which is creating anxiety within America Firsters, but the fact that tech breakthroughs such as the 5G technology rolled out by Huawei may be 30% cheaper than that of its nearest US competitor, giving the company a global edge sought to be blunted by recourse to “national security” prohibitions. The only credible way those seeking (naturally for reasons of “national security”) to prevent a Huawei 5G rollout in India will succeed is if they offer 5G alternatives that are cheaper and better. That seems much too big an ask at present. Given the slow pace at which India’s governance system operates, expecting the Modi-Abe Alternative Intelligence and Advanced Technology Tokyo partnership to challenge Chinese competitors seems a faraway goal. Given Trump’s “Can Do, Must Do” mindset, there is unlikely to be an end to severe US-China frictions until either the US succeeds in preventing Beijing from displacing Washington as the “Tiger on the global mountain of economy and technology”, or President Xi is able to beat back US attacks and succeed in his objective of ensuring Chinese leadership in cutting edge technologies within a fistful of years. Given that Trump is capable of using any means at hand, including possibly attempting to inflict a short but humiliating military defeat on China in air or sea in the Korea, Taiwan or South China Sea theatre so as to humiliate Xi, expect “interesting times” in the Sino-US dynamic. When America First meets China First, only one will prevail.
Is a US-China conflict in the near future? US-India-Japan-Austalia Quadrilateral alliance and its role should a conflict with China happen. A hangout with Prof. M D Nalapat
By M D NALAPAT
To many, a US-China conflict may seem to belong to the domain of fiction or Hollywood movies. But such optimism may be an illusion.
The mood in the capital city of Japan is sombre, and while the majority of his people cling to the hope that military conflict involving Japan is impossible or at least avoidable in the modern age, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe knows otherwise. The risk of conflict between US and Chinese forces is rising, and Abe is, therefore, working to ensure that the post-1945 legal limits on the Japanese military get removed, so that a robust defence or attack may speedily get carried out by his forces when and where needed. The “Self-Defence Forces” of Japan are a formidable force, especially the Navy, and Abe is fast-tracking operational congruence with India, so that the ease of joint operations becomes as smooth as that between the United States and Japan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was handed over a $75 billion currency swap agreement in Tokyo this week, so that he would be in better political shape to ensure closer working relations with Japan in a context where relations between Washington and Beijing are entering storm levels. The South China Sea; the Taiwan Straits; and the Korean peninsula are just three of the theatres in which an accidental or impulsive move by local military commanders on either side could trigger an exchange of fire between ships and between aircraft. As for the Himalayan frontier, Washington is impatiently waiting for the bureaucracy in India to go ahead with the signing of BECA (a geospatial data agreement) so that the legal decks get cleared for full scope cooperation between Washington and Delhi in the exchange of input on the activities of countries that both regard with suspicion. Subsequently, the question will be taken up of ensuring that the Indian Army be given the equipment needed to take on any comer in combat. The US is moving towards shifting some of its defence production facilities to India, but this is running up against opposition within the Lutyens Zone that is fanned by weapons dealers from countries such as France and Russia, who would lose out were India to source a high and rising proportion of its defence import needs from the US, a development that would make geopolitical sense. Another US effort could be to expand the “Five Eyes” signals intelligence alliance into the Six Eyes, so that India gets added to the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Among the locations which are suitable for the setting up of tracking facilities capable of covering the Indian Ocean are some of the islands in the Andaman chain, while facilities on the west coast of India could keep a watch on the Arabian Sea.
INDIA MUST CHOOSE
In this militarily binary world, India needs to choose between the US and China as its preferred security partner. Beijing appears to have foreclosed the matter by continuing to expand its hugely expensive “all weather” relationship with the Pakistan military, while knowing from the start that the only two enemy targets of that force are Afghanistan and India. That Pakistan was for long a treaty ally of the US was of no concern to China even during the 1960s, well before the 1972 Nixon-Mao rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US. This was because Beijing was confident (through understandings reached in secret with GHQ Rawalpindi) that at no time—and despite Pakistan’s frequent promises to the US to “fight communism”—would the Pakistan military go on attack mode against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, Pakistan did provide facilities for US snoop mechanisms designed to look into China, on the condition that it would simultaneously be given data collaterally collected on India by such methods. Also, Pakistan army officers visiting the PRC would, on occasion, debrief their US counterparts on what they saw and heard in China, which at the time was a country judged as hostile to US interests. Thus, through being an “eye on China”, GHQ Rawalpindi was given a free pass by the CIA and the Pentagon in its increasing closeness with the Central Military Commission (CMC) in Beijing. Simultaneously, the Pakistan military routinely briefed the PLA on what they saw in the US, and in particular on training methods and equipment used by the world’s most powerful military in its exercises. By playing both sides for decades, GHQ Rawalpindi derived a double benefit (from both Washington and Beijing), a free ride that ended with the onset since the Trump Presidency of what is certain to be a period of prolonged hostility between the US and China.
Although both US commanders as well as their Chinese counterparts have publicly warned the forces under their command that the chance for war is no longer negligible, as yet a US-China conflict seems to many to remain confined to works of fiction or Hollywood movies. Such optimism may be an illusion. It needs to be remembered that during the five years prior to the 1914-1919 World War, at the close of which Germany was emasculated and Russia became Bolshevik, there were only stray (and almost invariably ignored) indications of the coming conflict. German, Russian and British elites met and partied together, while the Royals of all three countries were frequently in touch, being friends and relatives of each other. It was a stray event, the assassination by a Serbian group of an Archduke of the Hapsburg monarchy that tipped the balance towards war. Well before that, tensions that were being neglected by policymakers continued, in consequence, to fester. Finally, the perception that there was need for a “swift and decisive” war took hold, resulting in a conflict lasting five years, with global consequences, including for Asia. In many ways, the existing situation in Asia resembles that which was present in Europe during the years immediately preceding 1914. These days, both US President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) meet several times a year, and both Commanders-in-Chief of the two biggest militaries in the world take care to be as pleasant to the other as Tsar Nicholas was to Kaiser Wilhelm during their pre-1914 meetings. Around them, however, swirl disagreements and dissonance, based on the reality that the US administration (especially under Trump) will not accept falling behind China in matters of GDP and technological prowess, a situation that seems inevitable given the present trends. Actions get taken by government agencies that are logical only in the context of the other country being factored in as an enemy and not simply a rival. Given that the hold of the Chinese Communist Party over the administration and the people of the world’s other superpower is at the heart of China’s success, the Trump administration is making no secret of its efforts at weakening that hold to ensure through a multiplicity of means that the PRC’s growth rate falls to below 5% and counting. High growth rates over three decades have ensured social stability in China, and a decline as steep as what is planned could result in turmoil. That is, unless the people of that country believe that the hardships they may face are because of the hostile actions of countries jealous of China’s rise, specifically the US. And that armed conflict may be the only way forward in a situation where other methods seem devoid of results. Paradoxically, the weaker the Chinese economy and the more at risk the hold of the Xi-dominated “leadership core” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the country, the higher the risks of military conflict. Such a situation would be certain to dissipate emotions directed by the Chinese people towards the CCP as a consequence of disappointments and frustrations, and would make them endure hard times with patience and fortitude. As Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee discovered in 1999, even a war caused by one’s own errors of judgement (in this case, the decision of National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, together with Army commanders to abandon winter quarters along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector till weather conditions improved, thereby giving an opportunity for Pakistan’s irregulars to occupy the abandoned shelters) leads to a boost in popularity. The Kargil conflict ensured the return of Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha polls, for a fresh five-year term.
It needs to be stressed what the core objectives of India should be. An obvious desideratum would be that no South Asian country act in a manner that degrades the core interests of India. Another would be to ensure that no single power become empowered enough to dominate the Eurasian landmass, for such a power would then be a short step away from world domination. In the decade ending 1945, Japan sought to dominate East, South and South-East Asia and was defeated. The US sought to become the dominant power in Eurasia during the 1960s the way the British Empire had been in the past, but confronted obstacles that it lacked the methods and resources to overcome. Washington is now a much diminished power, and needs new allies in order to ensure not dominance but primacy, especially in the most consequential theatre of the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific. Within the Indian Ocean segment of this body of seawater, India is an indispensable partner for the US, hence the outreach to Delhi. However, this country’s 19th century colonial-minded bureaucracy has a very expansive view of itself coupled with contempt for the people of India, and hence routinely misses not just opportunities, but opportunities for opportunities. Surprisingly for those who believed he would act on the “Minimum Government” pledge made during the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi is as respectful of the bureaucracy as his idol Sardar Patel was, with the consequence that the many speed brakes placed by well-placed babus along the path to fulfilment of the Prime Minister’s plans have ensured that several have moved ahead at much slower speed than anticipated by those who voted for Modi in 2014. A full scope defence and strategic relationship with the US is essential for both that country and India, if they are jointly to ensure primacy over the Indian Ocean and subsequently, retain primacy in the Pacific Ocean as well, a task in which Japan would be key, while a friendly Taiwan would be an incalculable asset. In such a process, it is clear that countries such as the Seychelles, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Myanmar should ensure that the core interests of the US-India alliance not get adversely affected through their actions. Of course, such moves will meet with opposition from China, which is focused on keeping the US out of the oceans to the maximum extent it can, so that a vacuum gets created that can get filled by the PRC and its powerful military. While continuing to make purchases of petro-products from Iran makes sense for India, the purchase of S-400s from Russia in place of seeking a combination of THAAD and Patriot Pac 3 missiles from the US does not. It is not a question of narrow technicalities, but of broad strategy, as the US-India defence relationship will approach its potential only when India sources most of its defence imports from that country, while at the same time ensuring that hotheads in the US Congress not succeed in imposing conditions that would wreck the US-India military relationship and thereby open the door to Chinese primacy in the Indian Ocean Region. Certainly, any Senator or Representative seeking sanctions on India will become the toast of the powerful PRC lobby in Washington. Apart from the seas, the US and India need to partner against the more violent manifestations of Wahhabism, wherever these be found, although the latter must take care to ensure that it does not get embroiled in Team Trump’s repeat of Ariel Sharon’s 1982 Lebanon blunder. By inserting the Israeli Defence Forces against the Shias on behalf of a Maronite Christian armed group, Sharon made Israel the only country in the world which Shia terror groups routinely target. Given its grievous errors while dealing with the Shia situation in several locations, the US is likely to be the second. India must not go down that path, and Modi should make it clear to Trump that good relations with Tehran will remain a priority for Delhi even while mil-mil ties with the US get ever closer.
Primacy and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; joint operations against Wahhabi terror groups and to safeguard the stability of the GCC; prevention of any single country gaining dominance over the Eurasian landmass; the promotion of the values of tolerance and inclusion that are the foundation of democracy. Such are among the objectives of an India-US defence and security alliance, and it is hoped that progress in this direction will be much faster in the coming years than it has been since the previous decade. This will take place in a context where the US will ignore what it sees as China’s efforts to have a veto over policy over matters such as Taiwan. It may even be that in 2019 Vice-President Mike Pence may visit India, perhaps early in the new year, and may even make a brief refuelling stopover in Kaohsiung in the Republic of China (Taiwan) en route back to Washington. President Tsai Ing-wen of RoC (Taiwan) may be permitted by Prime Minister Abe to make a refuelling stopover and thereafter another in a US city while on her next visit to the Vatican. The Hudson Institute speech by Vice-President Pence (which has been compared to the Fulton speech of Winston Churchill about the Soviet Iron Curtain across Europe) indicates that Team Trump is determined to use the tools at its command to reverse what seemed before his 8 November 2016 victory to be an inexorable climb to the top by the PRC. Armed conflict often begins by accident and thereafter may take on a momentum difficult to restrain. The good news is that even a brief military encounter between the US and China is likely to push southwards not just stock but commodity markets, thereby once again sharply lowering the price of oil. The bad news is that the all-powerful bureaucracy in India seems clueless as to how to navigate the country’s way through increasingly choppy times, and seems destined to repeat mistakes of the past that we in the present are still suffering the consequences of.
Saturday, 27 October 2018
By M D NALAPAT
Defence should not be left to generalist administrators or to purely military users who may not factor in India’s overall geopolitical needs and vulnerabilities.
Not surprisingly for an election season, there continues to be a rising crescendo of comments and counter-comments about the agreement entered into with Avions Dassault to get 36 Rafale fighter aircraft. Some explain the difference in price as being the consequence of the 36 aircraft needing to be configured to carry a nuclear payload on deep-strike missions in enemy states. Technical experts could testify as to how much more it would cost per aircraft to configure it to carry a nuclear rather than a conventional payload in terms of the weapons loaded, and as there are several such individuals in India, it is time that they revealed their financial and technical calculations, so as to give greater clarity to the debate. The per aircraft cost for 36 seems much more than for 126. Can the argument be made that this was because the configuration needed to carry on board non-conventional weapons required a much more expensive refit than what is needed for aircraft carrying only conventional weapon payloads ? We do not know. The unit costs being substantially more for the specially-configured 36 aircraft than for the 126 may be the consequence of the French supplier needing additional funds in order to finance an upgrade of the existing M 88 engine of the Rafale. This is relatively underpowered when compared to other fourth generation fighter aircraft. Also, the present model of the Rafale does not have stealth capacities. Does the pricey variant supplied to India include this additional feature? The reality is that any boosting of the capability of the Rafale engine is an expensive process, and Dassault has been in a parlous financial situation. It needs to be remembered that in modern warfare, any air rather than missile attack by the IAF on a major military power would run the risk of being exposed to the air defence network of that country. Should the target country have systems such as the Russian S-400 that India is also purchasing, the risk to attacking Rafale fighter aircraft would be substantial. Even cruise missiles can get intercepted by the Russian system. The S-400 is a superb anti-aircraft system, especially if the country that is the target of an IAF attack has been given a system that features the latest Russian missiles. It is not clear that India too will get the latest Russian missiles for its S-400s or will acquire only older models for the air defence systems that are being purchased for an initial cost of $5 billion. There was a time when Moscow and Delhi were as close as Beijing has long been to Islamabad, but that era has long passed, which is why the continued heavy reliance on Russia for critical defence needs requires a relook.
The problem facing the defence procurement system in India is that the users (i.e. the wings of the military) seem not to be given financial parameters and limits while designing their specifications for weapons systems. As a consequence, they may configure specifications in such a manner that only the most expensive models would be eligible, as took place in the MMRCA process. This would be analogous to a motorist being asked to choose the vehicle he wants, irrespective of cost. He would naturally choose a Ferrari or a Maserati, rather than a Volvo or a Toyota. The MMRCA program is designed to replace the MiG 21s, of which over 400 have been in service for the IAF. In order to have both an effective defence as well as credible attack capabilities, at least around 200 more aircraft are needed to be acquired in the near future. A mere 36, no matter how magnificent each fighter aircraft may be, is not sufficient. In such a context, the offer by the US to transfer the entire F-16 assembly line to India should be seriously considered. The F-16 variant being offered to India is the latest, and contains weapons systems and avionics far superior to the aircraft supplied to Pakistan. Locating assembly lines in India would ensure that the IAF get the 200 additional fighter aircraft it needs to be a potent strike force, while additional aircraft could be sold to other countries so that such sales subsidise part of the costs of making and equipping the F-16s destined for the IAF. Without the offer to relocate production lines to India, the offer of F-16s was rejected in the past, and correctly so. However, entering into the manufacture of the airframes for such aircraft would open the way for future manufacture (jointly with the US) within India of more advanced models, thereby adding to both local jobs as well as skills. It may also be possible to persuade corporations such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and BAE to set up facilities in India to manufacture radar, electronics and weaponry for the F-16s that are locally manufactured. The airframe accounts for only around a third of the total cost of production of a frontline fighter aircraft, and the rest comprises other items, most of which can be made in India. Our country and the US need to enter into a much closer defence and security relationship, which is why it would make sense in geopolitical terms to acquire the THAAD anti-missile system on the same terms as offered to South Korea, as well as Patriot PAC 3 anti-aircraft systems. Hyper-reliance on a Russia that is today closest to a China that is still much too cosy with Pakistan seems a risk.
India’s defence is way too important to be left to generalist administrators or to purely military users who may not factor in the overall geopolitical needs and vulnerabilities of the country. Just as China makes a necessary partner for India in commerce and economics, so does the US in defence and security. The IAF needs a minimum of 200 frontline aircraft to ensure sufficient attack and defence capabilities. The transfer of F-16 production to India, followed by the transfer of part or whole of production facilities for more advanced fighter aircraft and subsequently their equipment, makes more sense than looking at every critical defence need and corresponding purchase in isolation.
Friday, 26 October 2018
UNESCO Peace Chair & prominent Indian academician & columnist, Prof M D Nalapat at the RSYP (Inventure Academy)
UNESCO Peace Chair and prominent Indian academician & columnist, Prof M D Nalapat, in his address to the students at the Round Square Youth Parliament, spoke on the role of media as an organ that cleanses and purifies the government system. He spoke about minimum government and maximum governance for growth and development and how today’s youth and technology are the key factors towards a brighter future Currently Editorial Director of The Sunday Guardian and Itv network (India), Vice-Chair of Manipal University's Advanced Research Group, and Director of the Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University. He has been the Coordinating Editor of the Times of India and editor of the Mathrubhumi. He is the son of renowned author and poet Kamala Das. The inaugural Inventure Academy Round Square Youth Parliament - Our World, Our Voice was launched with Prof M V Rajeev Gowda and Dr Sumer Singh as Guests of Honor at the opening ceremony. This five day event from 15 to 19 August 2018 was held at Inventure’s campus on Whitefield-Sarjapur Road, Bangalore. The conference was conceptualised by Inventure Academy to equip children with the Right to Participate (guaranteed by Article 12 of the UNCRC) in the world that they are inheriting and to enable them to be positive change makers. This was achieved by exposing our youth to different perspectives, dialogues between nations and the process of decision-making through a blended platform of the Model United Nations (MUN) and Model Parliament (MP). The conference exposed students to the process of how laws are created and implemented through the interplay between various stakeholders, including international organisations such as the United Nations, National Parliament, Media and Civil Society. This helps to demonstrate how citizens (including children) can have an impact and be a part of the solution. The focus of this Parliament was our children contributing to the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 by 2030 - “Ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and lifelong learning for all”. The specific sub areas of focus included the quality of education and funding, child and cyber safety, and the impact of conflict on the healthy development of youth.