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Monday, 1 October 2012

Introduction to M. D. Nalapat's Anthology 'Indutva' (1999)

In 1999, Har-Anand published Indutva an anthology of MD Nalapat's 1990s columns from the Times of India. The individual columns are posted here, in 1998 and 1999 of the blog archive, though the exact dates of publication are uncertain. This is an introduction to the anthology. 


Conventional wisdom has it that India was colonised for a 
millennium, from the time when Mahmud Ghori finally succeeded 
in defeating Prithviraj Chauhan and establishing Mughal rule on 
the subcontinental soil. In fact, while formally the country was
ruled by its own inhabitants before then, the fact is that even 
before the Mughals, the majority of the population was living as
subject. The caste system in India was a form of social oppression 
that was the equal of colonial rule. In such a system, those  
belonging to the "lower castes" had no incentive to help the
"forward castes" battle the invader. For them, rule by the 
Mughals meant only the exchange of one form of subjugation by
another. 

Inequality is a fact of existence. Differences in attributes and 
incomes will be present in any society. However, this is not the
same as oppression, whereby the underprivileged are denied a 
reasonable chance to improve their condition. Where pre-Mughal  
India failed was in perpetuating a system with few safety valves; 
a system in which the "lower orders" got their rank determined 
from birth, and consequently had no opportunity to escape. It is 
I ironic that those who (correctly) point to the exploitation of 
India's colonial masters over a millennium are mostly silent on 
the social conditions that fragmented subcontinental society, and
fatally weakened its defensive capabilities.

The defeat of Prithviraj Chauhan came out of two fundamental 
causes. First, the fragmentation of his social milieu, which 
resulted in less than 10% of his subjects forming the pool from 
which his officer cadre got created. As a consequence, the
motivation of the rest would have been weak, in that they were
not fighting for the continuation of their liberty, but to preserve
the privileges of the ruling easiest They themselves were given
no freedoms under such a system. 

The other reason for the failure to resist the invasion was the
defensive mindset of the subcontinent’s rulers. Rather than wait
passively for each invasion by the persistent Ghori, Chauhan
needed to mobilize other rulers in the region and launch a
surprise attack on the base areas of the invaders. Such a move
may have changed the course of India’s history, and pushed the
subcontinent’s footprint further westwards. However, this
fatalistic mindset ensured that any such strategy was not tried.
Indeed, even today such an approach holds sway, with the result
that national security gets compromised.

If the schism was between the "forwards" and the "backwards"
during the battle against the Mughals, it became a Hindu-
Muslim one during the struggle against the British. While
condemning Mohammed Ali Jinnah for vivisecting the
subcontinent, many of our historians ignore the mistakes made
by the then Congress leadership in dealing with Jinnah, and
more broadly with the communal question. From giving oxygen
to the fanatic Khilafat movement to adopting a song that had 
negative connotations in the Muslim mind, Congress leaders
alternately pandered to and then condemned the rise of
exclusivism in the subcontinent’s second largest religious group.  
The term "Nationalist Muslim" became a term of abuse, almost
as much as the expression "Hindu Nationalist” is politically 
incorrect today.

Despite its size and resilience, India took much longer to
secure its freedom than it should, Sometime during the interwar
period, the, country ought to have been given Dominion Status,
placing it on par with Canada or Australia. That never happened,
partly because of Colonel Blimps in Britain, but also because of 
the tactical errors made by the Congress leadership in dealing
with both British as well as international opinion, crucially in the
United States. This strengthened those who regarded Hindus as
"shifty" and gravitated towards the pinstriped Jinnah, who
made no secret of his support to the British war effort;

There is the story of a soldier who was ordered to bear a
hundred lashes or eat a kilo of salt as punishment. He first took
a bit of the salt, and then asked for the lashes. After getting a few,
he changed his mind and asked for the salt instead. Finally, he 
ended up absorbing both the punishments. This was the Congress
attitude during much of the 1930s, when the party appeared to
have two heads, both giving contradictory orders. There would 
be a bout of attempted reconciliation with the British, followed 
by a violent lunge in the opposite direction. Indian historians
have either not cared — or not dared — to analyse such
dissonances, though a consensus is emerging that the core of the
aggressive lobby was lawaharlal Nehru. By succumbing to his
line, the Congress got distanced from both the British and Jinnah, 
leading to a 'delay in self-rule and to the Partition. 

Many of those active in the freedom struggle behaved as
though their objective was the securing of ministerial berths for
themselves, no matter what consequences these entailed for the 
country. Instead, had their subliminal — as distinct from the  
stated — objective been freedom and prosperity for the 
subcontinent’s population, they would have factored in the
ground realities while working out their strategies. These would
have argued in favour of policies that made the British
establishment accept the inevitability of a free India, and reassured 
Jinnah’s significant constituency that they would be co-equal
sharers of power in a united country. However, as in many other
instances in the past, emotion took precedence over reason. 
Glands, in other words, were more decisive in policy formulation  
than brains. 

Despite partition, the residue that calls itself the Republic of 
India is on track to emerge as a great power early in the next
century, and a superpower thereafter. Had vivisection been 
avoided in 1947, such a process may already have taken place.
Hopefully the lessons of the past will get internalised, and
policies crafted that will ensure a subcontinental common market
embracing Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, 
India, Bangla Desh, Bhutan and the Maldives. It is in the 
economic interest of India's neighbours to create a "Rupee Zone"
in which the Indian currency will be legal tender. This will
enable them to access Indian capital and markets to the extent 
needed to generate a reasonable rate of growth. Given the 
poverty in the region, this has to be 9% per year.

However, such policies can only get developed in an
environment where the past gets objectively analysed. There
should be no sacred cows in history. The fact is that India got
freedom ninety years after the War of Independence began in
1857. It got divided before this, first by the detachment of Sri
Lanka and Myanmar and later by the creation of Pakistan. Those  
strategic planners in the United Kingdom who hoped to hobble 
the residual India made an error. They assumed that India 
would be hostile to the West, and hence needed to be boxed in 
by the creation of "friendly" entities. Today, Myanmar at least
is no ally of the West, while Pakistan has become one of the
primary factories for the drugesterror lobby. It is only the 
continued development of India as a moderate democracy with
a liberal economic policy that can act as a counterweight to such 
adverse tendencies. Ironically, the countries that were put in the
role of "allies" have objectively become strategically hostile to 
Western interests, while the recalcitrant, India, is emerging as a 
friend. 

Like most processes, this too is not immediately visible. At 
present, New Delhi is at odds with the United States, Japan and
the European Union, all three of which seek to give Communist 
China a strategic monopoly in Asia. They clearly expect that the
chemistry of economic liberalisation in that ancient civilisation 
will generate unstoppable pressures for political reform, and the  
consequent toppling of the Communist regime. lust as the 1940s
sums of the UK strategic experts went wrong in South Asia, such 
doomsday views on the longevity (or lack of it) of the Communist 
Party of China are likely to be proved false. At least for the next  
three decades, the CPC is likely to continue to dominate China. 
And as the country expands in muscle, it can be expected to 
assert its role as the Middle Kingdom—the true centre of world
power, displacing the United States. 

China will have three thrust areas: the East Asian-ASEAN  
region, where it will challenge the US and Japan; Central Asia,
to provide an alternative to the Gulf for securing fossil fuels; and 
Siberia, which can effectively be colonised by the movement of 
Chinese populations to the region. South Asia is of relevance  
only because Beijing, since the 1950s help given to the Dalai  
Lama by the Nehru government, sees New Delhi as hostile to its  
integrity. Thus it seeks to contain India and defang it strategically, 
a task in which it has got enthusiastic cooperation from its future  
strategic rivals, Japan, the EU and the US. So long as Sino-Indian 
tension exists, there will be an undercurrent of instability in the  
region. A policy "based on realpolitik would aim for an 
accommodation with Beijing, and an informal sharing of 
pre-eminence in Asia, with China given primacy in the South and
North China seas, and India in the Indian Ocean area. Japan,
ASEAN and Korea would over time develop as neutral between 
China and the United States, the two likely contenders in the
next century.

The United States appears to have adopted the earlier mission
of the European powers, to "civilize" the globe. Thus it is 
pushing selectively for democracy, in countries that are not
entirely within its strategic grasp. India can have no such
pretensions to such a role. For at least the next half-century, its 
attention will need to be expended on economic problems. The
core need will be to generate a growth rate of at least 9%. Ideally,
it should touch 12%. This alone can lift the Indian people from
poverty within a reasonable life span, i.e., within their lifetimes. 

Economic growth is a function not just of economic, but also
social and security policies. To ensure an internal and external 
environment for growth, India needs:
(a) a moderate social climate at home, so that energies do not
get dissipated on fratricidal conflicts, but get focused on the core
issue of growth.
(b) friendly relations with the emergent power centres, 
principally the United States, followed by China and the European 
Union. India already has good relations with Russia.
(c) improving ties with the emerging power centres, the Arab
states, Japan, the CIS, Brazil and ASEAN.
(d) rational economic policies, that promote investment, both
foreign and domestic. This will include the replacement of
several of the existing laws with legislation that does not regard
productive activity as a crime, and measures to block this as
worthy of support.
(e) a "porcupine quill" that will defend against external
attempts at destabilisation, and also demoralize likely internal 
agents of such forces. This means technological (rather than
quantitative) parity with the other great powers in the strategic 
field.

Most countries, in common with individuals, use the past as
the benchmark to evaluate the present. This leads to the
formulation of policy that has no potency in an environment that
has changed dramatically. A case in point is the "anti-foreigner"
campaign, that every once in a while erupts into demonstrations
against soft drinks or chicken outlets. These are based on the 
same feelings of inferiority that German skinheads have when 
they attack immigrants who are more accomplished than they
themselves can ever hope to be. India’s skinheads are a useful
ally to agencies such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence,
which share with them the common goal of preventing foreign
investment in India. 

Stalin once characterised Social Democracy and Nazism as
"Twins, not Antipodes". In the process, he made the German
communists take on the moderates with an equal or greater
virulence than that shown to Hitler”s followers. Partly as a 
consequence, the Nazis came to power in 1933. Very soon, they
showed how different they were from the Social Democrats, by 
destroying the structures of the Communist Party in Germany. 
By equating the foreign businessman with the security analyst
who seeks to lock India into permanent inferiority, many 
"nationalist” elements are in effect playing a supporting role to
those groups that seek to restrict India to its current marginal 
role.

Not just the foreign businessman, but the external societies 
and polity can be harnessed as allies in the task of accelerating 
the development process. With its western-influenced systems   
and language skills, India can attract a minimum of 
USD 30 billion a year in foreign investment. This is apart from the 
USD 10 billion that it can earn through tourism. To ensure such an 
outcome,the hitherto prevalent image of a tolerant society needs 
to be protected. This implies firm action against those who seek  
to hurt those belonging to other faiths. Just as the Plague Scare 
cost India hugely in terms of lost investment, the current  
Intolerance Scare may prove even more damaging. 

It is not just most Indians who are moderate, but the  
overwhelming majority of holy men, of whatever faiths. However, 
this group has perforce become a ’silent’ one, because few in the  
media care to reflect their beliefs. It is only the violent and 
bigoted few who get exposure in both the print as well as the  
electronic media. Had these made the (moderate) effort of  
locating those who believe rather than dismiss the country’s  
tradition of tolerance, it would have helped to shore up such a 
spirit from the attack of the extremists. 

Pakistan is an example of where the future will lead for India,
if the bigots continue their advance. Even before Partition, the
populations of the regions now comprising that country were
much less fanatic than their co-religionists in regions such as
what is now Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It is from these regions that
the separatist movement was provided with oxygen. Today,
sadly, even in Pakistan Punjab the fanatics are visibly dominant.
The old traditions of tolerance that characterised the subcontinent
are disappearing from that country. It is an onward march to
chaos. Should current societal trends continue in that country,
there will inevitably be fresh partitions on the 1971 model. Only
the revival of moderation can preserve Pakistan from
disintegration.

Those who were complacent about the "impossibility" of
India ever following the Pakistan example need to redo their
sums in the face of current developments. Those who bandish
the trishul and burn Christian churches, or those who condemn
Muslims, are playing the precise game of religious polarization
that Jinnah intended for the subcontinent. Hindutva has become
the ally of the ISI. It needs to be replaced by Indutva.

Religious differences are only name-deep. What counts are the
bonds of geography, history and culture that link one Indian to
another, indeed that link all inhabitants of the subcontinent.
After centuries of conflict, if Europe moved towards a common
market, why not Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bhutan, Bangla Desh,
India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal? What needs
to be done is to create a Rupee Bloc in this group of countries,
in which a single currency will get accepted as legal tender, at
least for external transactions. This will fuel the development of
industries and services that would otherwise be constrained by
shortages of "hard" currencies. India can take the initiative in
getting other neighbours to follow the example of Nepal in
making the Indian rupee legal tender within the Kingdom. There
is no need to wait for consensus solutions. It is better to adopt
a one-by-one approach, so that finally the holdouts realize that
the costs to them of obstinacy are too significant to justify.

India needs to be generous to the neighbours detailed above,
except in the sphere of national security, where concessions have
to be avoided. There needs to be a clear delineation between
national security and other spheres, so that a double-track policy
gets followed: concessions on economic and social interaction, 
but a clear India-first approach on security issues. For example,  
India can make transit concessions to Nepal, but none on  
Kalapani (which appears to be a Chinese demand put through 
the Nepal government). India can sanction the import of Pakistani 
raw materials and produce, without budging on its consistent 
stand that the Kashmir accession is a closed chapter, and that 
those who believe otherwise should focus their attentions not on  
New Delhi, but on the Mountbatten estate. 

Despite a population of nearly a billion, India is usually at the
bottom of the table in sports events. This indicates the national
disease of not identifying and then utilising our potential. A 
well-conducted search could uncover hundreds of putative 
world champions, who could then be groomed to compete. A  
country that can financially sustain a horde of bureaucrats that 
in total are larger than the entire defence forces of the top ten 
military powers, can surely sustain a few hundred athletes for 
the decade or two that it needs to get them to bring in the 
international medals. Not just the government, but even the 
private sector is guilty of doing little to uncover sports talent.
However, this field is just one of the several in which 
individuals with potential fail to get identified and nurtured. If  
the country is today developing a small army of software  
professionals, the credit goes to the hundreds of thousands of  
individuals who developed their skills, rather than to any  
organized effort. Indeed, by pricing communications beyond the  
reach of the bulk of the population, official policy is retarding me  
growth of the software industry.

Another example of suicidal policies is in education. The 
country has the brain power to man dozens of technical institutes,  
that can attract students from all over the world. If just 25% of 
the seats in each such institution can be reserved for overseas 
students (at international market rates), then 50% can be occupied  
by Indian students who would pay much lower fees. 25% can be 
reserved for the economically underprivileged, who would pay  
no fees. In this manner, overseas students will subsidize the  
education of locals. However,  a move that would certainly 
have delighted the hundreds of foreign institutions that are 
earning millions through Indian students, the proportion of  
foreign students eligible for admission in Indian institutions has
been reduced further from an already low 15% granted by the 
Supreme Court.  

Kerala is an example of how "socialist" policies in effect harm 
the interests of the poor. Most medical and engineering colleges
in the state are government-financed, which means that they are  
run through indirect taxes collected from the poor. However, 
few such individuals have the good fortune to actually study in
such institutions. Most of those admitted come from better-off 
families who can afford good education. Thus, in Kerala the poor
pay for the education of the rich. On the contrary, if private
medical and engineering colleges get freely sanctioned, these can
charge high fees to those who can afford to pay, while reserving 
25% of their seats to the poor at zero fees. Through such a 
scheme, the rich would pay for the education of the poor, which  
is the way it should be. However, in India, the "Socialist" pattern 
introduced by members of the elite in the country ensures that 
the poor subsidies the education of the better-off. 

Defence is another sector that could have been used to  
generate funds for itself, and that too without the sale of lethal 
weapons. This could have been possible by the setting up of  
institutes that can train foreign nationals, especially in the 
maritime field. The country has a pool of serving and retired  
armed forces officer who could easily staff such centres, if only 
the needed permissions were given. It is not a coincidence that  
the country is doing very well in precisely those sectors
software and jewellery export are examples—where the 
government has not paid much attention. However, India’s 
software exports are rising so rapidly that it will not be long 
before competitors abroad reach to policy circles in Delhi to set 
up roadblocks. As decision-taking in several key ministries has 
shown, many would obey alien diktats if this could guarantee 
them a sinecure in an international organisation.

Mir Jafar and Raja Jaichand, not to speak of the princes who
helped Mahmud Ghori against Prithviraj Chauhan, have
illustrated the ease with which Indians can be recruited to fight
against the interests of their own country. The reason for this is 
not that individuals from the subcontinent are particularly
treasonous or venal, but that they have very little confidence in
the countries of their birth or citizenship, and consequently are
on offer to a good Bidder. Had there been a stronger conviction   
that India, together with its South Asian partners, would emerge 
as a major factor in international politics, greater resistance   
would have been there to attempts at subornation. It is interesting   
to note that while nationals of countries such as the United   
States, Japan, Germany or France aggressively promote their  
national interests in international agencies, nationals of India are   
usually known for the reverse, adopting equidistance if not  
hostility to their country’s projects.  

Unlike other countries, that lobby to shoehorn their nationals 
into key slots in international bodies, the bureaucracy in India 
routinely shoots down requests for even elected representatives  
to travel abroad to attend conferences or discussions. As a result, 
decisions that impact on Indian interests get taken in absentia. In 
particular, those from the "higher" central administrative services 
work to reserve such slots for themselves rather than be given to
professional experts and members of the armed forces. Clearly,
the dominance of caste as a concept is still prevalent while taking
decisions in India. Sadly, many of the backers of "Hindutva" see 
Christians or Muslims as the gravest threat to Hindu society,  
when in fact the maximum harm has come from the artificial 
creation of barriers between one believer and the other. Unless 
such pernicious practices are eliminated, Hindus will continue to 
drift away from the religion, however many missionaries and 
their children/get burnt by alleged practitioners of a religion that  
venerates tolerance and non-violence. 

In fact, the fundamentals of Sanatan Dharma would be better 
served if its supporters accepted the reality that all roads lead to 
the same goal, and that India regards all her children as being 
equal, no matter what their faith. Indeed, what needs to be done  
are gestures that eliminate the differences. For example, the 
concept of the Hindu Undivided Family in taxation can be
replaced by the Indian Undivided Family, thus ensuring that  
there is no discrimination against others. Secondly, the concept
of "minority" should be exercised in a district-wise context, so  
that those districts where non-Hindus form a majority should see  
the Hindus having the same- rights as religious minorities enjoy  
in the places where Hindus form the majority. Also, linguistic 
minorities should be treated on par with other minorities in each  
district, and given the same privileges. 

In short, Indutva implies the acceptance of revised social 
norms, that conform to age-old tenets rather than to the centuries
of conflict that this country has witnessed. Such a process is
taking place in the Christian countries of Europe and North 
America. Where formerly the building of temples or the 
conversion to Hinduism was actively opposed by local  
communities, today the subculture is accepting much more of  
such deviations from the norm. A similar tolerance needs to take  
root in India. 

India's traditions and culture need to form linkages with  
neighbouring areas, not just within South Asia but across the 
much wider footprint that is her hinterland. This comprises the  
Gulf, the CIS states, the Indian Ocean Rim states and ASEAN. In  
each of these zones, efforts need to be made to exchange cultural  
impulses, such as films, dance and music. The growth of television 
across this region has made such a prospect feasible. What is 
lacking is the will among the countries involved to interchange 
their cultural matrices with each other rather than mostly from 
their former colonial masters. 

Such an endogenous interchange does not mean the rejection
of other streams. In fact, India for example needs to build upon 
the few benefits of colonial rule, the primary among which was  
the spread of the international link language, English. Rather
than restrict knowledge of this language to the economic elite, 
efforts need to be made to spread it lower down, so that
manpower in this country can access markets where the
knowledge of an international language is essential.

By not following through the actual effects of the policies that 
get introduced in the name of the poor, successive governments 
in India have created structures that inhibit rather than promote
upward mobility. An example is education in English. Many 
state governments have given low emphasis to education in the
international link language, thus giving a severe handicap to
those unable to afford private education. Why should the state
sector-whether it be in hospitals or schools or industrial units
be the worst in quality while simultaneously the most expensive 
to maintain? This question hardly appears to agitate the political  
mind, which continues to believe in myths and stereotypes. 

One such myth is the belief that utilisation of the official media
for a frankly political purpose will serve the interests of those
who are doing so. In fact, much of such propaganda is so crude    
that it puts off the voter, as has been demonstrated in election    
after election. However, as yet such empirical evidence has not   
led to the professionalisation of the official media, notably 
Doordarshan. If the private channels can get hundreds of crores 
of rupees of advertisements, Doordarshan—with its much larger    
audience—should be able to rake in thousands of crores of 
rupees. Sadly, it does not.

Pride is unfashionable. And yet, it is essential if individuals 
are to take the trouble of changing their fates. It is not just the 
penalties but the sense of pride in the city-state that prevents 
Singaporeans from dirtying their surroundings in the way that 
Indians do. Were those who fling refuse out of their homes onto 
the roads confident about the standing of the country in which 
the road is situated, there may have been hesitation at littering  
it. Unfortunately, neither the official nor the private media create  
an ambience of confidence in the country, its people and its  
future. When the US, Japan and a few other powers eager to  
retain their monopoly of power imposed sanctions on India, 
 there was a collective howl in the national press especially the  
economic newspapers — about how the sanctions would create    
a “meltdown" in the economy. For weeks the front pages got  
filled with doomsayers, with the optimists being dismissed as   
idiots. Only after a year had passed, and the Indian economy   
continued to grow stably, did external commentators admit that 
sanctions had Shot worked. This refrain was immediately picked 
up by the same domestic pundits who had - a scant year ago -  
warned of collapse thanks to sanctions. 

Confidence is part of the process of development, and the 
Indian media have worked hard to ensure that Nehru’s vision 
gets realized, and India follows the USSR into oblivion. However,
such negativism is becoming hard to sustain these days. Every  
week, international newspapers carry reports about Indians who 
have succeeded in the world outside. That India, with its  
civilisation and its heritage, carries within it the best seed in the 
world is a truism for believers in Indutva. Now, thanks to  
software professionals and indeed professionals in general, this 
fact is slowly becoming apparent to a world that had only seen
Indians through the misery and poverty of India. A misery   
created by colonial rule that ended only in 1991, when a genuine 
Indian took office as Prime Minister and was able to rule for five
years. The Nehru family are European in all but nationality.
Indeed, many European nationals are closer to India "chemically"
than they are. Thus their rule was only an extension of the earlier
stints of Mughal-British raj. Small wonder that restrictions and
prohibitions multiplied, so that enterprise was made so difficult
as to be impossible for most.

Such a system is ideal for the crook. An office on the take
welcomes tighter rules, as each turn of the screw multiplies his
chances for loot. A finance minister who has only black money,
and who is in the company of others similarly placed, will have
no problem levying very high rates of tax, because she or he will 
never have to pay it. Only the honest taxpayer suffers under such
a system, as was the case during the Nehru era. Only during the
Chidambaram years were taxes cut to sensible levels, although
Yashwant Sinha - clearly to help his former brothers in the civil
service - has been trying to raise them again. If the economy is 
showing robustness despite wars and mismanagement, the credit
should go to the Chettiar from Tamil Nadu who gave Indians a
fair deal for the first time in a millennium. Manmohan Singh was
good to the foreigner, which is why he got lavish praise.
Chidambaram was beneficial to Indians, hence is regarded with
scorn. The limited internal liberalisation initiated during the
Narasimha Rao years proved much more decisive in sparking
growth much above the Nehru rate than the repeated cuts in
customs duties resorted to by Manmohan Singh. Sadly, this
domestic liberalisation is still proceeding at a fitful pace, as
witness the constraints to investment in infrastructure and
services. 

An example of the costs the Nehru system imposes on
enterprise is the journey of a truck as it meanders from Patiala
to Sriperumbudur. Most of the roads are narrow, thus slowing
down speed and helping shorten the life of the vehicle and its
driver. Every now and again there are checkpoints that slow
down the vehicle for hours, till money gets paid. Small wonder
that a 4000-kilometre journey takes four times longer in India 
than in even median economies. No surprise that interest costs
are three times more, and power twice as expensive. The only
advantage is squeezed out of the Indian work person, who toils
for a monthly package far below that secured by those in other
economies. Those historians who extol the virtues of India's first
set of leaders need to examine the relative position of India with
other Asian economies in 1947 and now. Relatively, rule since 
much of 1947 has been an even bigger disaster than during 
colonial times.

The solution is not to change, but to become more of ourselves.
Today the Indian is a composite of Vedic, Mughal and Western 
traditions, each fusing seamlessly into the other, as music and 
dance demonstrate. The solution lies not in Hindutva or in the 
turning away from religion that "secularist" purists demand.
The solution lies in Indutva.

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