By M D Nalapat
Despite triumphal assertions from capitals such as Baghdad that the Islamic State has been "defeated" in Iraq and Syria, and that its self-professed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
 is on the run, the organization has in reality mutated into a form that
 is on the cusp of creating severe security challenges to the major 
powers, including the United States and India.
In fact, these countries have been given priority in recruitment 
efforts, in view of their large and technologically educated 
populations. Embracing a "recruitment lite" model that involves minimum 
contact and assistance from ISIS Center, the terror organization has 
made attacks directed against the globe's two largest democracies a 
priority. IS itself is a mutation of al-Qaida that formed in the
aftermath of the 2011 "Arab Spring," when the perception took root 
within Wahhabi extremist clusters that long-dominant traditional 
rulership structures in Arab countries were disintegrating, and that 
this was their opportunity to move toward direct control of populations.
Around $13 billion in cash and weaponry flowed during 2011-13 to 
those who were described by intelligence agencies within NATO and its 
allies as "freedom fighters." The bulk of this went to groups that 
subsequently melded and outed themselves as IS. The assistance given to 
IS elements ensured the takeover of extensive territories in Iraq and 
Syria, especially during 2014. To date, these advances have not been 
fully rolled back, and as a consequence, IS has gained in traction and 
thereby won over several tens of thousands of committed fighters across 
the globe, with many more acting as auxiliaries and sympathizers.
Among the reasons for its continuing lethality is the fact that to 
NATO and its allies, in effect the Shiite alliance (and its Russian 
partner) is regarded as representing a bigger threat than IS. And to
the regional partners of the United States, the Kurds are more worthy of
 military action than IS.
Toxic 'idea of ISIS'
More than exploding across some regions of Iraq, Syria and pockets in
 North and other parts of Africa, a worrisome factor is that the "idea 
of ISIS" is not only still strong, but is gaining in potency across the 
globe. A cousin of Nazi philosophy, the creed inverts cruelty as virtue 
and exalts the outing of sadistic tendencies within its followers. The 
theology of the organization is minimal in a scholastic sense, with the 
emphasis being on the celebration of grotesque killings and the
sanctification of acts of terror.
During 2015-16, the self-willed absence of a knockout blow against IS in the Mideast by the Obama
administration led to a spread of the belief among impressionable minds 
worldwide that the organization is the seat of power of a new "caliph," 
who will lead the war against the "crusaders." The primary method of 
indoctrination used by IS is the Internet, especially the "deep web." 
This still remains an attractive, and largely undisrupted, channel. 
Video and other radical content may
have declined in quantity and frequency, as declared by some IS 
watchers, but more than numbers, what counts for the organization is the
 fanaticism and confidence of those still signing up, and this
is building up with each terror attack
Al-Qaida used as cannon fodder those individuals with only a 
rudimentary familiarity with theology, such as the 19 who carried out 
the 9/11 mass terror attacks on the United States in 2001. However, many
 of those who have been involved in acts traceable to IS have in the 
past shown almost no interest in organized religion, and have thereby 
escaped the radar of security agencies until it was too late. Since 
mid-2016, when cyber interception of IS websites and chats intensified, 
the deep web has become the platform of choice for key associates and 
affiliates, as well as the use of extensively
accessed websites, including those of a pornographic nature, where chat 
traffic easily gets disguised in a flood of "adult" commentary, 
especially when disguised in language that does not reveal the meaning 
and intent of the chats and messages sent and received. These are by 
users who operate from public Internet facilities and are therefore 
difficult to track down.
Winning recruits
An intelligence community estimate is that only about 300 Indians 
have shown "active interest" in IS and that even fewer have participated
 in its campaigns. In the United States, the figure quoted is less
than a hundred. However, these are underestimates.
Ominously, IS-al-Qaida's social media campaigns have begun acquiring 
sophistication. The videos are of better quality and are released more 
frequently and over a broader geographical area than before. Such 
programs are winning recruits that are seldom from ultra-religious 
backgrounds. Indeed, many come from moderate family backgrounds, yet get
 drawn to IS because of the confidence and simplicity of its message. 
Also, clever use is made of standard religious concepts to
change the import. These include frequent references to:
-- Tawhid, which rejects democracy as it is a "man-made"law.
-- Jihad, defined exclusively as an armed struggle.
-- Taqfir, the call to expel and expose unbelievers.
-- Hijrat, migration in the cause of jihad.
IS began its global campaign of terror four years ago by declaring 
itself the first truly Islamic country since the medieval age. This 
assertion added to the belief among impressionable individuals bred on
a diet of hatred and contempt for non-Wahhabis that the time had come 
for volunteers to undertake "hijrat," but not necessarily to 
IS-controlled territories. This has instead come to mean not physical, 
but "thought migration" to the concepts and commands of the IS 
leadership. As a consequence, IS is shifting its focus from 
concentrations in specific territories to small (sometimes a single 
individual) groups that are dispersed across the globe and get into a 
mode of readiness to carry out "lone wolf" (or "wolf pack") attacks in 
target states.
The process of radicalization across the Internet includes:
(a) Online phishing: identifying those who are repeatedly making 
comments on violent posts or liking such posts, even though 99 percent 
of attempts to recruit don't work.
(b) Grooming a selected target via encrypted chat and message apps 
and through direct contact. Once trust is established, instructions are 
mostly on apps such as WickR, with messages self-destructing in 1 
minute. After trust has begun to be established about bona fides, the 
recruiter asks
the target to produce a video or audio so that he can legitimately claim
 that the potential terrorist is an IS soldier. Thereafter, orders are 
given to attack in ways that have now been noted as the
signature of IS terror strikes. The actual execution of the attack is 
usually through knife and vehicle attacks where guns are unavailable. 
While there is sometimes live streaming of terror attacks on Facebook, 
Periscope, Twitter, etc, this is often dispensed with by fighters for 
fear of capture, even though the IS top command favors such methods as a
 means of demonstrating its continuing lethality. It has even claimed 
control for the recent Las Vegas shootings, but as yet no data has been 
released by U.S. authorities about the Internet-surfing habits of the perpetrator or whether he had recently been in locations known to host clusters of IS facilitators and motivators
A study of about 900 IS fighters' data from online social media 
platforms was carried out six months ago by analysts expert in the 
Middle East. The "likes" and "mentions" on tweets were tabulated in
order to understand the influencers. The most influential of such hidden
 recruiters of IS were from the online world. The most important such 
recruiter was an Indian, based in Bangalore. The profile Shami Witness 
was a major cheerleader at the age of only 20. Seventy percdent of those
 who went to Syria from all over the world relied on what Shami told 
them, only because he was continuously tweeting about the latest events.
 The presence of such individuals is why India needs to keep its 
resources focused on IS and al-Qaeda.
Interestingly, less than 15 percent of jihadists in India, be they of
 the SIMI, Indian Mujahideen or other ultra-Wahhabi fronts, were 
educated in Islamic religious institutions. This trend is similar to 
that in the rest of the world, where numerous criminals and drug 
dealers, with zero association to religion, joined IS and overnight 
became practitioners of terror and its plots, more because they were 
discards
in regular European society and had no hope of resurrection.
How to counter the idea
The idea of the self-declared caliphate, even if IS gets subjugated 
in the territorial war, can be fought only with a better idea, based on 
tenets revealed in the Holy Koran. Such a move is of immediate
relevance in India, where action needs to be taken before the idea of IS
 gains in acceptance. Theology as preached by IS essentially posits that
 a Muslim is not a Muslim if he does not follow the
organization's ultra-Wahhabi line. A grounding in the moderate practice 
of Islam can prevent Muslims from straying to Wahhabism and Salafism. 
The need is to popularize the true religion (rather than its
extreme interpretation) in local languages and not just allow the main 
vehicle for such dissemination to be Arabic.
IS is conducting propaganda in 11 languages, hence the need to 
disseminate counter-content in multiple world languages. The fact is 
that the extremists are winning because of the Obama administration's 
willful failure to eliminate the territory controlled by IS when it had 
the chance to. Sufi and moderate tendency continues to remain that of 
the mainstream in India but these are losing ground in Indonesia and 
seems to have largely lost the battle to Wahhabi extremism in Pakistan, 
as also in several radicalized patches in the Middle East and elsewhere.
 Along with guns, what is needed to be deployed are ideas, and on this 
front, the Trump administration in the United States still
seems to be searching for strategies.
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