Two to Tango - A Partnership with China

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

While Gandhi’s teachings were ignored in India, there has

been no repudiation of his concepts. Despite first socialism

and then liberalisation, the armed liberation of Goa and then

Pokhran, this country still professes to take Gandhism seriously,

so much so that "liberals" worked overtime to ban a play that

gave a politically incorrect view of India’s greatest 20th century

son.

The Chinese, however, seem less hypocritical. Since the

1980s, the name of Communist China’s founder, Mao Zedong,

has become increasingly less acceptable. In particular, Mao is

faulted for having instigated the Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution in the 1960s, that led to the humiliation of many

senior leaders at the hands of teenagers. The conventional

wisdom in Beijing is that the Cultural Revolution period

represented a "lost decade" during which China could more

usefully have embarked on economic modernisation rather than

the social and political engineering its leader attempted.

A contrary argument can be made, which is that the Maoist

tactic of “Bombard the Headquarters” resulted in a collapse of

the Confucian ethic that had held back progress for centuries

because of an unquestioning obedience to authority. During the

period of the movement, all (italics) dogmas became subject to

re-examination, and the effect was to free the Chinese people

from the tendency to unquestioningly accept received doctrine.

It can be argued that but for the shifts in mindset generated by

the Cultural Revolution, the moderniser of China—Deng

Xiaoping—would not have been able to rally his party behind a

total overthrow of Marxist orthodoxy in the economic sphere.

Geopolitical Realities

Unlike India, which has often been half-hearted about pursuing

its interests, the Chinese government has been clear about the

course that it needs to take in order to retain the social compact

between the Han people and the Chinese Communist party. In

the 1970s, Mao himself welcomed President Richard Nixon to

Beijing. Thus, there are grounds for optimism that the Communist

Chinese government will adjust to the geopolitical realities

demonstrated by Pokhran II, and seek to build a friendly

relationship with India in the 21st century. On the Indian side,

there needs to be a re-examination of the paradigms that will

underpin such a partnership.

The bottomline will naturally be an acceptance by Beijing

that India is a strategic power. Second, that no future efforts will

be made, whether directly or through surrogates, to develop

strategic capability in third countries. It is not in China's interests

to export nuclear and missile technology outside its borders.

However, should Beijing continue to do so, New Delhi may be

tempted to follow suit. Thus, India can play the same game as

the Chinese have been with Pakistan, unless Beijing restrains

both itself and its satellites from transferring strategic technology

and material to countries hostile to India.

Papal Status

On New Delhi’s side, it can be made explicit that political

changes within China are matters solely for the Chinese people

to decide. Unlike Washington, New Delhi has worked closely

with members of the Communist parties in several countries,

and, therefore, does not share a commitment towards eradicating

this philosophy. Indeed, in Central Asia, for example, former

Communists are playing a positive role in holding back the

growth of religious fundamentalism. In China and Vietnam, the

Communist party has itself taken several bold initiatives towards

encouraging private enterprise.

New Delhi has always accepted Tibet as a part of China, and

it will not be a reversal of policy to state explicitly that there is

a difference between cultural and political autonomy. There

cannot be a reversion to the pre-1950 system in which the Dalai

Lama exercised both spiritual and temporal power over Tibetans.

Hopefully, there will be an agreement between Beijing and the

Dalai Lama, in which His Holiness can return to Potala Palace.

However, this will have to be as a purely spiritual head, akin to

the Pope of today, rather than the Popes of yore, who were in

effect heads of states and not merely religious figures.

It would be unreasonable to expect the Chinese to interpret

"autonomy" as control by the Dalai Lama over the administration

in Tibet, and New Delhi needs to make this stand clear, especially

when a contrary view is being expressed in other major

democracies. Simultaneously, India needs to continue to ensure

that no element within the Tibetan refugee community in this

country gets trained in violence or prepares an attempt at armed

rebellion within Tibet. As for demonstration and agitations, as

long as these are non-violent, they need not be banned. Regarding

Taiwan, there needs to be a reiteration of the One China policy,

and also that future unification should be peaceful. Meanwhile,

New Delhi needs vigorously to conduct business with Taipei

that does not have military connotations.

The India-China border has remained quiet since 1986, and

care needs to be taken by both sides to prevent incursions across

the line of control. The deployment of troops on both sides needs

to be of a defensive nature, and over time must be thinned to

insignificant numbers, with frontier police replacing soldiers.

The goal should be an eventual settlement of the Sino-Indian

border dispute on the basis of existing ground realities, analogous

to the one informally suggested to Pakistan over Kashmir: We

keep that we control, you retain the rest. However, it will require

a cooling period before such a solution becomes politically

feasible. This process must be begun now.

Asia’s Stability

Within the Chinese Communist party, as with any other large

organisation, there are differing points of view. While some

aspects of policy appear moderate, others—such as the transfer

of strategic technology to Pakistan—appear to be the handiwork

of hardliners with an ultra-nationalistic perspective that seeks to

block India from emerging as another Asian giant. This group

needs to be kept in check by the moderates, and this is possible

only if it is clear that hardline policies will not pay. Thus,

together with an imaginative policy of engaging China, New

Delhi needs to develop cooperation with Japan, South Korea,

Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia so that closer economic and

other linkages are formed along this arc. Myanmar too needs to

be engaged more intensively, as part of a plan of developing the

North-east through cooperation between Yangon, Bangkok and

New Delhi. Friendly cooperation between the world’s two most

populous countries are essential for stability in Asia, but for this

both hands need to clap.