India and the U.S. as Allies (Beijing Review)

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently visited the United States, where his country won a strong endorsement as a rising power. The two countries issued a joint statement, pledging that they will cooperate in hi-tech and space exploration industries. In an interview with BEIJING REVIEW, MD Nalapat, professor of geopolitics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education in India and UNESCO Peace Chair, commented on the closer ties between India and the United States.

BEIJING REVIEW (BR): Could you give your comments on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the United States and the development trends in India-U.S. relations?

MD Nalapat (MN): Although there have been many favorable comments these days on the “rise” of India, the fact is that it is still a very weak country. More than 300 million citizens are close to starvation levels, and around that number are still illiterate. The physical infrastructure in India—roads, airports, energy, ports—are still of very low standard, while several bureaucratic obstacles to development continue. In India, the media and the courts consider it suspicious if quick decisions are taken. As in the case of every big project, there are interested individuals who make allegations of corruption, even when the project is in the public interest. As a result, big monopolies and dishonest business groups bribe officials to delay or even destroy new proposals floated by rival companies. Crooked politicians and bureaucrats can collect a lot of illegal cash for blocking projects, while at the same time, nobody will bring them to account. In India, delay is seen as normal.

The fact is that even in 2005, India has not reached the level of economic reform that China, under the wise leadership of Deng Xiaoping, enjoyed by 1985. Despite this, I am highly optimistic about India’s future. The reason is that both the sources of wealth as well as the geopolitical situation have at last moved in favor of India.

Increasingly, services and “knowledge industries” are displacing manufacturing as engines of prosperity. These do not need the same amount of physical infrastructure as manufacturing, so India’s handicap does not matter so much. Secondly, although some unwise minds in the Union Finance Ministry are seeking to place constraints on the information technology, services and knowledge sectors, they have not been affected by a slowdown in growth, the reason being the expanding demand for services that the highly trained, English-speaking Indian people are well equipped to provide.

In my view, relations between the United States and India are likely to develop into a full alliance, such as what the United States has with Japan. Although some political parties in India oppose this, the rising middle class in India welcomes such a development and will give it strong support. The new “Cooperation in Farming” announced by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Singh will help convince farmers also to support this, while industrial workers will be happy at the extra jobs that will come when New Delhi and Washington become close allies. Hence, in my view, those opposing an India-U.S. alliance will not be able to succeed in stopping what geopolitical changes are making possible

(BR): It seems that the United States is now aiming to boost India as a counterbalance against China’s rise. However, Singh said at the end of his U.S. visit that close India-U.S. ties would not come at the expense of Pakistan or China. How do you evaluate the U.S.-China-India triangle?

(MN): Rather than stand by and do nothing while a single power grows in Asia to a level where it becomes as influential as the United States in the Americas during the 19th century, many policymakers in several countries would like to see India reach as close to China as possible, and would be ready to help such a process. Thus, while China will have the disadvantage of a “headwind” caused by a negative reaction to its rise, especially military, India is beginning to get the benefits of the favorable “tailwind” caused by a desire in many to see that the country does not lag behind China.

In my view, it is the “China factor” that has played the biggest role in the increasing international attention given to India by the United States, although this will be denied by the officials of both countries. You will remember that when the United States and Pakistan were active against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, they denied to the end that they were in fact doing what they were doing, ensuring the defeat of Moscow. Of course, there are other reasons as well, including the importance of India as a source of skill for the Knowledge Economy. Has the fact that India is the world’s most populous democracy played a key role in the transformation of attitudes by Washington toward New Delhi? I do not think so. India has been a democracy since 1947, and yet has been discriminated against by the United States repeatedly, including the transfer of technology. Prime Minister Singh has got the benefit of the shift in U.S. attitude and priorities in favor of India, though it is a fact that he himself is a brilliant scholar who recognizes the substantial benefits that India can get out of partnership with the United States.

About statements, I always look at “facts on the ground” rather than statements. The facts on the ground are that India is trying to compete with China in markets such as the United States, seeking for example that Wal-Mart source more of its supply from India, securing energy supplies and technology and attracting foreign investment. The relationship between the two countries is more competitive than collaborative.

(BR): The U.S. policy toward India’s nuclear ambition has changed a lot. Opponents said that Bush’s proposal would undermine global nuclear safeguards. What are your comments?

(MN): Global nuclear safeguards have been shown to be ineffective in stopping proliferation. Both North Korea and Pakistan have shown that the existing non-proliferation regime is often unable to stop the flow of dangerous material and technology across borders. India has an indigenous nuclear and missile program that cannot be affected by sanctions. The United States has understood this, and has cleverly decided to work with India in order to stop New Delhi from selling nuclear technology or developing its own “fast bred thorium-based” reactors without any U.S. leverage. Although some scholars say that the Bush-Singh nuclear accord is a defeat for the non-proliferation lobby, the fact is that the United States has no other option. Thirty years of sanctions have failed to stop India from developing nuclear technology. It is good that they have accepted this reality rather than behave like Don Quixote tilting at windmills on his donkey, which is what the non-proliferation “experts” are doing in the case of India.

Both Washington and New Delhi will, I expect, work closely together to ensure that cross-border proliferation gets stopped. All sincere friends of India should welcome getting India on board as an ally in the battle against the spread of dangerous technologies.

(BR): How would India balance its relations with Russia and the United States? Is there a preference or a priority?

(MN): Russia will always remain a close friend and brotherly ally of India. There is no contradiction between a new alliance with Washington and the old alliance with Moscow. In my view, as India develops as a result of the favorable international situation, Russia will find it of more value as a partner than if New Delhi were to remain backward and isolated.

(BR): How do you view India’s role in the UN? What are your opinions on India’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat?

(MN): Frankly, I find it difficult to understand why the government of India is spending so much money, time and attention on becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. India has risen despite the fact that it has only a very small formal position in the present UN structure. Of course, bureaucrats will be happy [if India becomes a permanent member of the Security Council] because a few more of them will get high-paying UN jobs. But this will be of no relevance at all to the population of India, especially the poor. Of course, if France, Russia and Britain can be members, India too deserves a seat. However, to me the expansion of India-U.S. cooperation or the greater understanding between India and China are much more important than a UN seat, and I wish the government of India would pay more attention to such issues than spend so much effort begging the international community to accommodate India in the Security Council.

(Beijing Review, Vol.48 No.31, 4 Aug 2005) [Interview]

http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/En-2005/05-31-e/w-3.htm

India and the Tsunami (Beijing Review)

New Delhi has clarified that assistance is welcome, “provided it is given in a form that is politically acceptable to the broad masses of the people and not just to the section directly affected by the disaster.”

By M. D. Nalapat

Unlike the other countries hit by the last December’s tsunami, India refused foreign assistance even as New Delhi was sending relief to two of its three stricken neighbors, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives. Many international commentators have viewed India’s reaction as a symptom of “great power arrogance” and an attempt to use the disaster and the accompanying “tsunami diplomacy” to reinforce India’s “big country” image. The reality is that it is only the continuation of a geopolitical philosophy that goes back to the struggle against British rule. It lies in the concept of swadeshi (self-reliance), or depending on oneself as much as possible for as long as possible.

The records on foreign aid to different countries will show that the 57-year-old republic has been among the lowest recipients of external assistance throughout its existence. Both per-capita and total foreign aid have been substantially lower than countries that are much smaller in size, such as Egypt. In fact, more than 87 percent of the foreign “aid” accepted by India has come in the form of loans that need to be repaid or grants that are tied to the purchase of goods from other countries. New Delhi has a record of never defaulting on a loan repayment, even in situations when the country had to mortgage a part of its gold reserves to pay back interest on foreign debt. India has shown that progress is possible without foreign giveaways.

In the scientific and technological field, India-though not by choice but by circumstance-has developed substantial capability in critical fields such as space applications and nuclear research. The United States, in particular, has a powerful lobby of “non-proliferation” activists who have targeted India for sanctions. As a result of the influence of this vocal group on U.S. policymakers, Washington has led the effort among the major powers to deny India access to high technology, a process it continues. If there seem to be moves now to relax the restrictions, it is because the United States realizes that it has only succeeded in ensuring that its target country has developed a strong base of scientific talent and institutions that owe nothing to other countries. While the former Soviet Union had a history of helping India, once it disintegrated, Moscow has largely gone along with U.S. desires concerning India, and even today are refusing to sell more atomic power plants to India, clearly under U.S. pressure.

In the economic field as well, the share of foreign trade in India’s total output is much smaller than for its giant neighbor, China. The flow of foreign capital into India is not even 10 percent of the amount flowing into China. In fact, for many years it was less than 1 percent of China’s level. It is therefore clear that “going it alone” has become second nature to India, and the stance taken by the Indian Government after the tsunami disaster is in line with this longstanding policy

In view of the decades-long U.S. activism in blocking technological cooperation with India and the massive assistance being given to the military in Pakistan, it is not possible for India at present to consider Washington a country that is friendly to India’s security interests. In the period ahead, the United States will need to choose between military assistance to Pakistan and a defense alliance with India. The two cannot coexist so long as the Pakistani army seeks to change the status quo by the use of force. Only by the Pakistani military removing the threat of conventional, asymmetric and nuclear force from the table can India accept a situation where one of its own military allies arms Pakistan.

Unless the United States were a full military ally of India, it would have been risky to have exposed two very sensitive parts of India-the Tamil Nadu coast and the Andaman Islands-to hundreds if not thousands of U.S. military personnel and equipment, coming into the area under the guise of “tsunami relief.” While several analysts would like to see a strategic partnership between the United States and India, it is a destination that has not yet been reached and may never be in view of the intense attraction that so many U.S. policymakers have toward the Pakistani military. Under such circumstances, it would be reasonable to assume that Washington may-in the hypothetical situation of another India-Pakistan war-seek to even the odds between the two sides by sharing information with Islamabad, the way the United States did with Baghdad during the 1980s war between Iran and Iraq. Only as a full military ally can the U.S. military be given the access and freedom it has in locations where it is involved in “Tsunami relief” operations. This is because of the fact that, along with the noble endeavor, it would be possible to gain information on terrain and population that would be of immense help in a future conflict, either to the United States directly or to its ally Pakistan.

While the risk of the Washington preferring Islamabad to New Delhi in a future conflict might be small, policymakers in the Manmohan Singh government will need to keep all deadly options in view and respond to each. Wisely, the Indian Government decided not to take the security risk of opening sensitive zones to foreign troops. Washington is now trying to have it both ways by continuing to give Pakistan the means to harm India, even as it attempts to strengthen defense links with Asia’s second-biggest country. Until New Delhi is certain that one country will desist from arming another that it holds as hostile, there will not be a military alliance between the two. And until there is such an alliance, the type of operations conducted by military units in the disaster zones pose a risk. Of course, this can never be directly stated officially.

Another reason why the situation in India is different from that of Sri Lanka and the Maldives is that while India had a powerful liberation movement that finally succeeded in removing British colonialism, the local population in Sri Lanka has never participated in a similar movement. In fact, relations between the British and the Sri Lankan elite were excellent throughout the period of colonization, unlike those in India. In the Maldives, too, there has never been an anti-colonial movement of the kind seen in India, Indonesia or Iraq.

It is this undercurrent of anti-colonial sentiments that has made the U.S. policy in Iraq so self-destructive. By setting themselves up as the overlords of the Iraqi people, resentment has been created that will affect the security interests of the United States for decades. The anti-colonial sentiments in India are still too strong to tolerate such a presence. The same situation applies to China as well, where the Chinese would never accept the presence of foreign soldiers on their territory. As for Indonesia, the new administration there is taking a calculated risk by permitting foreign troops to come to the affected areas, I would like to warn my old friend, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, not to test the patience of the Indonesian people by permitting the presence of Australian or other soldiers in Indonesia for too long. Otherwise, the same type of radical element that gained in influence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s will emerge in Indonesia.

Of course, unlike Indonesia, India has the good fortune of having a strong disaster relief machinery in place, which was created after the cyclone in Orissa and the earthquake in Bhuj five years ago. Since then, a disaster management program has been implemented in India, with district officials being given special training in handling calamities. However, a suggested coordination committee on disasters has not been formed, although during the tsunami havoc, an informal inter-departmental group was formed to coordinate action. Apart from the government, private institutions in India are now paying attention to disaster relief. For example, the Manipal Academy of Higher Education is in the process of setting up a disaster management center that will have the capability to intervene in health, earthquake, flood and nuclear disasters. It is because of such a well-knit indigenous anti-disaster capability that the ambassador of India to China was able to thank the many Chinese friends who offered to help, but requested them to focus their attention on countries with a greater need for foreign help.

Indonesia, however, will need to balance the benefits of foreign assistance with the important condition that anti-colonial sentiments not become inadvertently ignited. Fortunately, because of India’s strong capacity, the government in New Delhi did not need to confront the dilemma that faced policymakers in Jakarta. Those commentators (especially in the Western media) who show surprise at the “ungratefulness” of the Indonesians need to understand the anti-colonial sentiments there that result from memories of centuries of oppression. Indeed, while the British in India took about 1.5 percent of the country’s wealth each year, the Dutch removed as much as 12 percent each year from Indonesia. It is instructive to note that in the early 1800s, India accounted for a quarter of world output and China for a third. By the end of that century, both countries had been weakened by outside forces so badly that their share dropped to less than 5 percent. A similar decline afflicted Indonesia.

In countries with a history of resistance to colonialism, such as China, India and Indonesia, it would be politically risky to accept the presence of foreign troops, even those engaged in the noble task of disaster relief. Under the circumstances, the comments of some scholars that the decision of the Government of India to refuse foreign assistance, which would have come in a military form, was a symptom of “arrogance” are wrong. Indeed, New Delhi has clarified that assistance is welcome, “provided it is given in a form that is politically acceptable to the broad masses of the people and not just to the section directly affected by the disaster.”

Countries such as the United States, France, Germany, Japan and Britain need to keep in mind local sentiments so as to avoid the mistakes that have been made-and are being made-in the Middle East. France, for example, has become a country of controversy in Africa by its frequent military interventions there. Hopefully, the peoples of Africa will not go the way of some others in fomenting violence within France in retaliation.

An interesting offshoot of the Tsunami Crisis was the announcement by U.S. President George W. Bush that a “Core Group” was being set up comprising of India, Australia, Japan and the United States to coordinate relief. This was a public acknowledgement by the most powerful individual in the world about India’s capabilities, as even today, many within the U.S. establishment seek to downgrade New Delhi to a level far below Tokyo, while others-especially those in favor of an Asian NATO-accept that India is the only country that can form the southern prong of such an alliance the way Japan holds up the north. However, because the United States and India are not yet full military allies, the Indian forces did not coordinate with U.S., Australian and Japanese units the way these three did with each other in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

(Beijing Review, Vol. 48 No. 6, 10 Feb 2005)

http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/05-06-e/World-2005-2.htm

An Indian Eye On the World (Beijing Review)

M D Nalapat, Professor of Geopolitics at the Manipal Academy of Higher Education of India and also a UNESCO Peace Chair, has become well known for his proposal to form an “Asian NATO” led by the United States and India. A year ago, BEIJING REVIEW interviewed him about his thinking on an “Asian NATO” and the new world order. Last month, Mr. Nalapat visited China again and had a frank talk with BEIJING REVIEW reporter Zan Jifang on current international issues.

BEIJING REVIEW (BR): Last time, we discussed your proposal of an “Asian NATO.” What’s been the reaction to the proposal so far? Can Asia accept such an organization?

MD NALAPAT (MN): I think a lot of discussions are going on about the Asian security system. The need of Asian countries to handle their own security is under discussion among security experts and policy makers of relevant countries.

BR: India has set up its first permanent overseas military base in Tajikistan. India is the first Asian country that has opened an overseas military base. What do you think its strategic importance is to India? In your opinion, how will it affect the regional security structure? Is it out of energy concern, as analysts comment?

MN: The Indian armed forces are quite strong in Asia. The fact of the matter is that India would like to be a global power, not a sub-regional power. I think India’s policies are going to change, with this shift in the perception of India’s role. I think it will not be possible for any country in the world to bring India back into a position where it is not at the first rank of technology. Take nuclear weapons for example. No country can force India to become a non-nuclear power. I don’t think any country in the world should have a problem with this. Every country should accept that India is among the top countries of the world. India has the right to have nuclear weapons, and India has the right to have a strong defense system. I don’t think any country should worry about it.

I think the Indian army is very professional. But unfortunately, in the past, the Indian army did not accept many people from outside our borders for training, especially those from our neighborhood. This was a mistake. The Indian army should become much more active in military diplomacy, and help other armies with training. I think what you referred to is only a small first step in that direction, and I believe that many similar steps will follow.

India, like China, has got serious problems locating low-cost energy sources. India is developing new energy resources, such as natural gas, as alternatives to petroleum. And as far as natural gas is concerned, Central Asia is very important. It’s not only an energy question, it’s also a question of cultural attitude and outlook. We believe we must help countries that are friendly to us. By interacting with them, we can promote values that are good for both sides.

BR: What’s been your evaluation of India-U.S. relations in the past few years? Now, Bush has been reelected, could you forecast the future relations between the two countries?

MN: I think the relationship between India and the United States has gone very far forward in the past four years of President George W. Bush. The two militaries are no longer suspicious of each other, and our air forces and navies are getting very friendly with each other. The two armies are also holding joint exercises regularly. So, there is a very healthy development in the military field. I think Mr. Bush’s reelection is good for India. He looks at things in a very practical way. He supports outsourcing from India, from China and from any part of the world, without the tribal loyalty to Europe that other U.S. politicians demonstrate.

BR: The United States has blamed Indian scientists for helping Iran develop its nuclear program, and it also announced sanctions against two Indian scientists and recently planned to add another three Indian scientists into its so-called blacklist. What’s your comment on this? Will the issue affect the development of the relations between the two countries?

MN: There are some people in the United States who, I’m sorry to say, are not telling the truth. They know very well that India did not do this; but because of their frustrations in not stopping India from becoming a nuclear power, they tell such a lie. My information is that India has not supplied nuclear technologies of any offensive nuclear nature to any country in the world. I think the Bush administration overall is definitely very realistic to ward India, and considers India a rising power, but there are still anti-India elements in the CIA and the State Department.

BR: What do you think of current India-Pakistan relations?

MN: I think it’s in a better position. I don’t see any big changes taking place, such as any change on the map. We should all stop drawing or redrawing maps. We have enough problems in our region without also trying to change maps. Look at India and China, which is a good example for Pakistan. Both India and China have taken a very realistic and mature position on their boundary dispute. In my view, China will never invade India to take over land it believes belongs to it, and I can assure you that India will never invade China to take over the territory that we believe belongs to us. On both sides, we have decided not to go to war again with each other. I think the principle of peace on the borders and prosperity inside proposed by Deng Xiaoping is a very wise policy. India and China are a model for Pakistan. China does not try to change the map by force, and we hope Pakistan will take an example from China and not try to change the map by force.

BR: Many people like to compare the development of China with that of India. How do you see it?

MN: China is much more developed than India. From 1979 onward and even today, our rules and regulations are not as flexible as China’s, for example, in terms of inviting foreign capital and making foreign investors feel more comfortable. China’s economic policy is more advanced than that of India, so I think China is far ahead of India in the economic field.

But what is good is that now we are slowly getting economic freedom in India, as the new sectors of economy are developing a lot. China is an inspiration to India. I think there will be 20 years to go before India is as advanced as China. In my opinion, if there is peace on its borders, in 35 years’ time, China will be the world’s biggest economy, the United States, the second and India, the third.

BR: How do you foresee the tone of future relations of the two countries? Will it be competitive or cooperative? How do you think the surge of India and China will affect the regional geopolitical structure?

MN: I think even in a family, there’s competition and cooperation. So, I don’t think competition is bad. In some sectors, India and China will compete, such as the textile industry. But in other sectors, we will try to do things together. There is a lot of scope for cooperation. But the problem is we are not used to cooperation, because of the suspicions of each other. In my view, India and China should shed their hesitation about each other. Chinese companies should go to India and Indian companies should go to China. Today, we have only come to the start of cooperation. The trade volume between India and China has increased from around $1 billion to more than $10 billion within five years, and I forecast that in three years, bilateral trade will more than double.

I think that better India-China relations will help significantly improve the geopolitical situation in Asia, as the two countries have the two largest economies in Asia and are growing very, very fast.

BR: What’s your opinion of the Iraq war?

MN: I believe that Saddam Hussein should have been removed from power, and I believe it is important for democracy in the Middle East. But I think the way that the United States has dealt with Iraq after the 2003 war is wrong. They became the masters of Iraq. I don’t think any country should intervene in a country and take it over. I hope the American army will come back from Iraq very quickly and allow the Iraqis the freedom to decide their own systems by themselves. So, I agree with what was done in Iraq, but after it was done, Americans should have left administration to the locals. Now Iraqi people are not the masters of their own country, which is a very negative development and has very harmful aftermaths. I am very worried about the future of Iraq, because, you know, foreign troops have a very negative influence in any country. The big mistake the United States has made is that it has totally dismantled the Iraqi army and administration. When even the followers of Hitler and Tojo were largely left untouched in Germany and Japan after World War II, there was no need to destroy the Iraqi army and administration. Both should be rebuilt.

BR: What’s your prediction for the counter-terrorist effort after Bush’s reelection?

MN: I believe George W. Bush has been very successful in the war against terrorism. Success is hidden and failure is public. Bush has been very successful in preventing other terrorist attacks upon the United States. He has stopped money from flowing to those terrorist organizations. He also helped other countries fight terrorism.

BR: What’s your perspective on the future world order in the context of your counter-terrorist background?

MN: Counter-terrorism needs strong economic development, social development and cultural development. Only in such an atmosphere can we succeed in the war on terrorism. People should be given more rights. I think it is the responsibility of big countries like China, India and the United States, to work together to promote peaceful values and against the violent values of terrorists.

(Beijing Review, Vol 47 No. 51, 23 Dec 2004) [Interview]

http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/200451/World-200451%28B%29.htm