So rapidly is the momentum for a free Balochistan and a free Pashtunistan developing that GHQ Rawalpindi is proving itself unable to alter the situation to its advantage.
VISHAKAPATNAM: Since the 1960s, GHQ Rawalpindi has been supported enthusiastically by the United States and China. Despite the two having drifted apart since the takeover of the CCP by Xi Jinping in 2012, the two continue to indulge the Pakistan military. While in the past, it was the US that played Santa Claus, not to the people of Pakistan but to the men in khaki. Around 2011, it became obvious even to its most ardent backers in Washington that the Pakistan Army was sabotaging efforts by US forces to finish off the Taliban. The consequence was that the US, in effect, after a decade of seeking to eliminate the Taliban, began seeking a deal with that collective of armed zealots, a process that it was expected could be carried out with the help of GHQ Rawalpindi. Despite a few pungent words every now and then directed at the men in khaki, in practice US assistance continued to be directed towards that force in an ultimately futile effort at securing a respectable peace agreement between the NATO-backed Afghan government and the Taliban. In the manner of an arsonist taking along a fire truck without water, each disaster in which it had played a significant role presented an opportunity to showcase GHQ Rawalpindi as necessary to put out the fires of terror strikes and the killing of Afghan and Coalition forces by the Taliban and its associate groups. The Santa in Beijing continues to shower the army, navy and air force of GHQ Rawalpindi with assistance, following in the footsteps of the US by not bothering about the people of Pakistan. For both Washington and Beijing, only GHQ Rawalpindi counts and not the rest of the population, least of all the civilian leadership of the country.
In the US calculus, the Pakistan Army offered a pathway to an exit from Afghanistan in a manner different from the abandoning of South Vietnam in 1975. For China, that military is a useful instrument to keep India focused on its western border, thereby having to pay less attention to the much greater threat that the country is facing across the Himalayan massif from a PLA that had been given the same freedom under Xi that it had enjoyed under Mao the early years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Much effort was lavished within the higher ranks of the Pakistan military on ensuring an accommodative and bountiful attitude from the US and China. From the start, given his with soldiery, Xi in particular has poured money into Pakistan, including by coming up with a project that had no chance of success from inception, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It was the initiation of the CPEC that convinced many analysts in India that it was a futile quest to chase after a collaborative relationship with China, at least so long as Xi was in charge of the CCP. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army had what it thought was a stroke of luck, when a US politician, who had been a stout backer of the men in khaki throughout his three decades as a Senator took over in 2021 as President of the US. Joe Biden did not disappoint such hopes. His White House reopened channels that had been shut under Donald Trump. Once Biden became the principal architect of the NATO proxy war against Russia by early 2022, the White House saw a cosying up to GHQ Rawalpindi as enabling the US to withdraw from Afghanistan through the deal brokered by Trump between the US and the Taliban at Doha the previous year. Despite his tough guy exterior, Trump is a pacifist at heart who abhors war, and he was prepared to cut and run from Afghanistan in the same way as he had earlier abandoned the Kurds to the non-existent mercies of R.T. Erdogan. Fortunately for him, it was Biden and not himself that actually carried out that surrender, ostensibly to focus on China, but in reality to concentrate on kneecapping not China but Russia. In a pattern that ought to have become familiar since the 1990s, the 15 August 2021 handover by the US of Afghanistan to the Taliban saw GHQ take the bounty offered but failing to deliver the outcomes expected. Those in the White House, State and NSA, who had been credulous enough to trust Pakistan to keep their interests in mind any negotiation with the Taliban, saw the inevitable take place. That collection of militias systematically hunted down and killed or imprisoned NATO-leaning Afghans after the 2021 takeover, assurances of their safety notwithstanding. The Taliban had indeed changed since they had been turfed out of power by US and Afghan forces in 2001, but for the worse.