M.D. Nalapat
Manipal, India — Thanks largely to India's
first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who shared with his leftwing British
friends a dislike of the Yanks, the geopolitically senseless alienation between
the United States and India continued for five decades after India's
independence in 1947.
What seems finally to have convinced the
British to leave India was the seepage of loyalty from the Indian component of
the armed forces. More than 2 million Indians saw action on the Allied side
during World War II. Yet during the war, their loyalty to the Crown was tested
by the discriminatory treatment meted out to Indians in the services. British
personnel dominated the higher reaches of the military and were given
perquisites and privileges far beyond those enjoyed by Indians.
Several thousands of soldiers joined the
pro-Axis Indian National Army during the war. Within the ranks of those who
remained on the Allied side, there was visible sympathy for those Indian
officers and men who switched sides and refused to fight for the British
monarchy that denied them the privileges enjoyed by soldiers from the
Australian, New Zealand, U.S. and Canadian complements. The possibility of
widespread revolts within the armed forces concentrated minds in London and
speeded up the withdrawal from India.
During World War II, the Muslim League
under M. A. Jinnah backed the Allies unreservedly, and was later rewarded with
Pakistan, a Muslim state carved out of Hindu-majority India. Jinnah's effusive
backing for the British was matched by his successors' similarly emollient line
toward the United States. As a result, Washington joined London in regarding
Pakistan as a reliable ally, in contrast to the "undependable"
Indians -- a tilt that continued until 9/11.
Even as late as the 1990s, the U.S. was
pressuring India to surrender the Kashmir valley to Pakistan. At the same time
the Clinton administration was covertly backing the jihadi elements that
finally took power in Kabul in 1996 as the Taliban. Interestingly, as yet the
U.S. Congress has not opened an enquiry into the 1994-96 policies that resulted
in Osama bin Laden's patrons being given charge of Afghanistan, with consequences
that have been disastrous for international security.
Relentless U.S. and British pressure since
the 1950s on the Kashmir issue, and lavish military and civilian help given to
Pakistan, caused New Delhi to gravitate toward the Soviet Union. Even in its 1971-1977
heyday, however, the strategic relationship between New Delhi and Moscow never
resulted in a single Soviet soldier coming to India for basing or training.
Nowadays the U.S. military routinely
undertakes joint exercises and training sorties in India. Fear of international
jihad and worries over a fast-developing Chinese military have made the United
States and India de facto military allies.
However, within both countries strong
lobbies are still at work to abort this alliance. Within the United States
these anti-India groups have coalesced around two poles. The first comprises
those who take a Euro-centric view of the world, seeing it in terms of the West
and the Rest. Such individuals see little value in a full-fledged alliance with
India that might divert focus from NATO. According to this school, the only
core international partners of value to the United States in worldwide
conflicts are the other NATO countries.
The other lobby hard at work within the
United States to sabotage the India-U.S. military alliance comprises backers of
the Pakistan army. Recent efforts by officers who seek to forge a comprehensive
military relationship with India to offer the USS Kitty Hawk carrier to the
Indian Navy -- as the USS Trenton was a few years ago -- seem to have foundered
on opposition from pro-Pakistan and NATO-centric elements in the U.S. military.
They see the move as potentially alienating the Pakistan military.
Such a transfer would link the United
States and India in a military supply relationship that could lead to the
displacement of Russia as the primary supplier to India of defense equipment.
Yet both the NATO and Pakistan lobbies within the U.S. military are working
overtime to scuttle the plan to offer the USS Kitty Hawk to the Indians.
Within India too there has been resistance
to the induction of the USS Kitty Hawk. It comes from the segment within the
Indian Navy that is in favor of Russian or French platforms, both being
lucrative sources of patronage. Their efforts at downplaying the force multiplier
effect of the U.S. carrier focus on its "obsolete" catapult
technology and the expenses involved in a refit.
That their primary interest is to prevent a
reversal of the Indian decision to induct the Russian carrier Gorshkov (now
estimated to cost US$1.6 billion in place of the $500 million quoted earlier)
is clear from the primary argument used against the U.S. naval vessel, which is
the age of the four-decade-old ship. However, unlike the Gorshkov, which is
unable to sail at all, the U.S. vessel is operational, and was recently in the
news for its attempt to dock in Hong Kong over the Thanksgiving weekend.
The fear among those within the Indian
defense establishment with financial ties to Russian and French defense
suppliers is that acquisition of the USS Kitty Hawk would result in New Delhi
purchasing U.S. aircraft for the carrier, and later for the air force, in place
of Russian ones. As such purchases could amount to US$22 billion over the next
five years, the stakes are substantial even in purely financial terms.
Eager to get India to pay an extra US$1.4
billion for the Russian carrier, the pro-Russia lobby in India has ignored the
fact that the modified Kiev class aviation cruiser was earlier mothballed due
to a collapse of its propulsion systems. After nearly $500 million was paid
toward a refit by India, it has been pulled out for a very expensive
refurbishment and rechristened the INS Vikramaditya. The effectiveness of the
multidimensional firepower it could unleash after such a $1.9 billion refit is
yet to be tested.
The French and Russian lobbies were alerted
by the Indian Navy's procurement of the former USS Trenton LPD-14. This ship,
rechristened the INS Jalashwa in 2006, has a long record of operational
performance with the U.S. Navy's carrier and amphibious groups. The Indian
Navy's amphibious expeditionary capabilities have been significantly enhanced
with the Jalashwa, the induction of which has helped familiarize naval
personnel with U.S. systems.
The Indian Navy will add at least another
45 vessels in the next decade to maintain a 140-ship navy for operations. The
focus is to reinforce sea control and sea denial capability that spans the
Persian Gulf to the China Seas. The induction of the USS Kitty Hawk could be
the trigger for the switchover from Russian-French to U.S. platforms in first
the navy and later the air force and the army.
Indeed, the Kitty Hawk was the lead carrier
along with the USS Nimitz CVN 68 in the recently concluded Malabar 07-02 in the
Bay of Bengal, which significantly enhanced interoperability between U.S. and
Indian forces. If it beats back hostile lobbies in both the U.S. and India and
is rescued from oblivion by joining the expanding Indian Navy, the USS Kitty
Hawk may serve as a force multiplier in the U.S.-India defense relationship.
-(Professor M.D. Nalapat is
vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and
professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
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