M.D. Nalapat
MANIPAL, India, Oct. 2 (UPI) -- Foreign
troops arrive as liberators, receiving a rapturous welcome from the local population. Soon
after, small forces of armed men begin to emerge occasionally from the shadows,
shooting at the occupiers -- who must respond indiscriminantly if at all
because they cannot distinguish between friend and foe.
Civilian casualties mount. The welcome
evolves into suspicion. The resistance grows bolder, thanks in no small part to
increased support from within the population. The minor attacks multiply until
the occupation force is goaded into carrying out major military operations that
cause countless civilian casualties.
Post-war Iraq? No. It is Sri Lanka, circa
August 1987, the year an Indian military force landed on the island to enforce
a peace between Sinhalese and Tamils.
Within weeks irregulars from the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched an offensive against the IPKF, using
civilian areas as cover. Liberation movement guerillas would pop up from within
a crowd, spray a passing IPKF convoy with bullets and disappear -- while the
soldiers fire back on a crowd of non-combatants.
After more than a year of this, the
Indians changed their tactics.
They began to emphasize medical and other
services to win the hearts of the civilian population, and they used used radio
and print to disseminate information about the ruthlessness of the LTTE towards
any individual who opposed it.
Instead of attempting to track down every
single guerilla fighter, the IPKF concentrated on the major population centers
and the roads leading to them, ensuring they were kept free of violence. Local
governments were left to local control rather than taken over by the occupying
army, which now confined itself to military operations and tasks apart from
goodwill moves such as relief of medical camps
By mid-1988, the Tigers had been
cornered, their headquarters at Nithikaikulam destroyed.
Later than year local council elections
were held, resulting in a majority for those hostile to the LTEE's violent
tactics.
The Tigers were by now confined to a
small patch of land in the Mullaitivu forests, awaiting an Indian offensive to
wipe them out. In April 1989, however, power transferred from Sri Lankan leader
J. R. Jawawardene to the new president, R. Premadasa, someone who was
historically hostile to India.
The new president secretly armed the
guerrillas and asked publicly for the Indians to leave by July. They ceased
operations after that demand was made -- thus allowing the guerillas to recoup
their strength -- even though the last IPKF soldier left Sri Lanka only on
March 24, 1990. After that, the LTTE swiftly regained control over most of
northern Sri Lanka.
President Premadasa's reward was to be
assassinated in 1993.
What the LTTE guerillas were about to
lose militarily was won back for them politically. Had Premadasa not changed
course, the guerillas might have been finished off by the time the last of the
IPKF left the country.
The lessons for any other army of
occupation should be clear.
First, standard military tactics have no
value in an unconventional guerilla war. Emphasis must be placed on ensuring
that the local population does not provide a reliable base in which to hide;
Second, attention must be given to the
message disseminated throughout the countryside, linking the guerillas rather
than the occupiers to any hardships the population may experience;
Third, political authority must be left
in the hands of local leaders. This allows the occupying army to concentrate on
winning the war rather than administering a territory;
Fourth, any political compromise giving
the guerrillas extra time or space, which can be used to rearm and restore
morale, must be avoided.
The United States and the organizations
it has created to governing Iraq in the post-war period are ignoring these
basic lessons. The lessons learned in Sri Lanka between 1987-89 can be applied
to contemporary Iraq.
-(Professor M.D. Nalapat is vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
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