Scientists See End to Nuclear Neglect

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Scientists and defence planners are closely monitoring the stirrings

of change in the Rao governments security policies after the

Brown amendment. The earlier dismay at the systematic neglect

of nuclear research since 1984 has given way to an expectation

that the programme may get back the political backing it enjoyed

during the tenures of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

A scientist who had been among the 1974 Pokhran explosion

masterminds said that "six to eight more tests are needed before

the safety and reliability of the Indian deterrent can be assured".

He pointed out that the US had carried out 1,149 tests, Russia

1,100, France 209, Britain 45 and China 43 to India's solitary

nuclear explosion at Pokhran.

A senior defence planner said that ”the Brown amendment

proved that those who were slowing down the Indian nuclear

programme on the grounds that the US would not arm Pakistan

were wrong". According to him, "while Pakistan does not as yet

have the capability of making nuclear weapons, this could

change in less than five years with the help of China. The only

defence against a threat of nuclear blackmail would be to perfect

our own systems". In the view of a scientist associated with the

Indian missile programme, "by giving weapons to Islamabad

despite knowing about its clandestine nuclear programme, the

Clinton administration has signalled that Pakistan has joined

Israel in the list of 'protected states' that can develop nuclear

weapons without fear of US sanctions".

Senior officials in the Department of Atomic Energy, (DAE)

on condition of anonymity, pinpointed two members of the

Atomic Energy Commission who, "routinely block funding for

essential research". According to another official, "it is curious

that these (two officials) parrot in meetings the exact arguments

of persons in Washington who are out to sabotage the Indian

programme. This has had a devastating effect on morale".

While agreeing that funding for the nuclear programme "has

been choked off almost to the point of killing it", a senior

scientist in the DAE said that "the other side is that there has to

be greater financial accountability. Also, safety standards must

be rigorously enforced by making the safety function independent

of the DAE". However, others reiterated that the problem was

not within the DAE as much as it was lack of political will in

backing the nuclear programme.

A scientist active during the Pokhran explosion claimed that

"the DAE has done world-class research despite poor funding.

However, it has not been allowed to license its technologies to

the private sector, nor to tap technical institutes such as the IITs

to help research".

A senior Defence ministry official agreed that "not enough

has been done to generate revenue by licensing technology not

only to Indian private industry, but to friendly countries such as

South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia". A DAE scientist pointed

out that "India is rich in thorium. Thus it makes sense to develop

technologies for power plants that will use thorium-based U-233

fuel. However, for the past 10 years, almost no funds have been

provided for such research". He added that "this is in contrast

to Japan, Germany and France, which have developed nuclear

power substantially". He added that "in case the CTBT is signed

by India, it must be on condition that the present restrictions on

technology and data transfer be removed".

A senior defence policy analyst working in the government

added that "the policy of adjustment to western sensitivities has

given no benefits. Not only has the flow of arms to Pakistan been

resumed, the ban on the sale of even safety-related items to India

has continued. At least now, one hopes the government will

wake up and drive a better bargain".

Defence and DAE officials are unanimous that the Jaswant

Singh committee's recommendations need to be adopted by

policymakers. The committee had observed that "if indigenously

developed (nuclear power) technology is not implemented,

(there will be) grave and irreparable damage (to Indian security).

As fossil fuels are finite, it is essential to harness nuclear power.

The Government must modify its policy and adopt a committed

programme with enhanced funding".