Nuclear Neo-Racism - Ending Technological Apartheid

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

After 500 years of domination over the earth, the Caucasian races

are finding it difficult to adjust to a universe in which the lesser

breeds challenge their supremacy. The first blow was struck in

1947 by India, which forced out the British through non-

cooperation and a no-tax campaign. Finally, the colonisers had

to accept the inevitability of withdrawal in an environment in

which fewer and fewer local quislings obeyed their orders.

Indian independence from British rule ignited a firestorm against

European colonisers, which led to their withdrawal from most

colonies by the 1960s. Today, only a handful of entities such as

Diego Garcia and the Falklands remain under western suzerainty.

Turning Point

However, of the four white supremacist immigrant countries, 

only one has thus far come under a genuinely multi-racial

administration. This is South Africa, where Nelson Mandela’s

emergence has ensured a fairer share in both power and wealth

for hitherto-colonised races. The other three countries still retain

administrations dominated by Caucasians; moreover, they have

put in place immigration regimes that prevent a sufficient inflow

of citizens from Asia, Africa and Latin America. These countries

are Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Just as South Africa

once was, they need to be the target of an intemational campaign

to ensure that their racial mix more correctly reflects international

reality.

It is not a coincidence that it is the Australians, New

Zealanders and the Canadians who served as the shock troops·

for the Caucasian races recently when 'low-caste' India matched

’high-caste' technology, and had the gall publicly to demonstrate

it on May 11 and again on May 13. The rhetoric used by these

three countries brought back memories of a century ago, when

the intellectual progenitors of the Axworthys and the Downers

were inventing justifications for the continued exploitation of the

'lesser' breeds.

Sadly for such individuals as Jamie Rubin, who made

disparaging remarks about Indian leaders, the world has changed

somewhat since the first half of this century. If India'; accession

to freedom on August 15, 1947, marked a turning point in

international relations, then so did the two rounds of tests in

May this year. Pokhran-II showed that a country that had been

starved of access to sophisticated technology by the US and other

western powers, could by its own efforts catch up to them.

Unlike the "Pakistani" bomb - which is a China-created device

and whose detonation was intended to help persuade India to

retrace its path of technological advancement - the Indian nuclear

and missile programme is indigenous. Not accidentally,

"international opinion" (which is how the BBC describes the US-

UK perspective) tacitly condoned the decades of Sino-Pakistan

collaboration, while continuously striving to force India to "cap,

roll back and destroy" its nuclear and missile programme. 

Should a genuine non-proliferation treaty get negotiated -

one that blocks transfer of strategic technology between borders - 

India can be expected to sign up. However, it cannot accept any

slowdown in its drive to become a technological superpower.

The more the United States, the United Kingdom and other

countries try and impose an international caste system that puts

India in the role of Ekalavya, the greater will be New Delhi’s

motivation to challenge the policy of technological apartheid. In

this, Beijing can soon be expected to become an ally, as also the

fiercely nationalistic post-Yeltsin Russia that is waiting to be

born. The Gulf and even Pakistan can in course of time be

expected to sign up, as can the peoples of countries that were

former colonies. Within South America—notably in Mexico and 

Brazil—there is a new pride in indigenous culture.

Racial Tolerance

This is the strategic alternative in the event of the Caucasian

powers attempting to destroy the Indian economy—and with

that the country’s unity—through sanctions. However, there is

no doubt that this is a less attractive alternative than a strategic

alliance with the democracies of the western world. Western

society today is very different from what it was during the

colonial era. Extensive travel and generous immigration policies

in much of Europe and the United States have resulted in a

change in societal attitudes. Despite the skinheads, the dominant

mood in major western countries such as Britain, France and

Germany is racial tolerance.

Even during the struggle against colonial oppression, many

of the most active participants were themselves Caucasians.

Annie Besant, Madeleine Slade and others come to mind. Today,

that liberal trend is slowly elbowing out the racists, though in

some sections of the media, attitudes of caste superiority remain

strong. Media commentators, however, are not half as offensive

as Robin Cook or Madeleine Albright, both of whom evidently

believe themselves to be schoolteachers ordering around a

cowed set of truant children. Thanks to such "diplomats", the

western world may forfeit as an ally a country that is the Mother

Civilisation of the West’s cultural inheritance.

Far-reaching Results

However, there is an Indian saying that there can be true

friendship only between equals. If President Clinton truly feels

that nuclear weapons are an abomination in the emerging

century, he should initiate steps to follow his own advice to

India, and unilaterally destroy the US strategic arsenal. It is

ludicrous to hear the president of the world's most weaponised

country preach abstinence, just as it is to hear the BBC fulminate

against "immoral" India, when they have yet to mention that

Britain (who perhaps faces a strategic threat from France) is a

nuclear-weapon state, and therefore as culpable. Should the

western powers continue their current tirade against this country,

then New Delhi cannot be blamed for turning away from

cooperation with them to a policy that returns to its anti-colonial

roots.

The events of the coming years will have incalculable

consequences on the future international balance of power, for

they will determine the strategic direction taken by an India that

will inevitably take its pride of place in the international order.

Widening the NEt - Bringing a Corrupt Elite to Book

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

India’s miserable performance in athletics reflects the national

tendency to lose steam after a good start. After the initial burst

of enthusiasm and energy, we tend to peter out and the final

result is usually dismal. This situation obtains in corruption

investigations as well. As numerous infructuous enquiry

commissions have shown, an unwillingness to concentrate on

crucial issues and delays in investigation often lead to the

punishment for graft being merely some bad publicity.

Lok Pal Bill

That the political class in India is unwilling to stem the flow of

cash in its own direction has once again become clear from the

draft Lok Pal Bill. Instead of protecting the citizen from venal

politicians, the present draft Bill will serve to gag the media and

enable wrongdoers in government to avoid accountability by

directing enquiries into other more convenient channels. As the

hawula and other scams have shown, unless there is constant

media and judicial scrutiny of cases, these will become

progressively more diffused and finally die out. Public opinion

needs to be mobilised to ensure the framing of laws—and the

creation of institutions—that can lessen, if not destroy, official

corruption.

In this campaign, winning a few battles—such as sending a

Sukh Ram into custody for a few weeks—is not enough to win

the war. Only a system of checks on the political and bureaucratic

elite can do this. The main thrust should be targeting the top

echelon because corruption flows from that level to others. If the

highest level of the administration is seen to be honest, the rest

will follow suit contributing to a better regime. This was evident

in Kerala during the time (1969-77), for example, when C.

Achutha Menon was chief minister. Or, look at a wider all-India

example. Government functioning was far more honest and

transparent during the short period (1964-65) of Lal Bahadu

Shastri than it was subsequently. However, a Menon or a Shastri

are rare. And, after full-fledged "family rule" began in the 1970s,

such people foimd it almost impossible to get anywhere in durbar

politics, where what matters is to catch the eye of the ruler

through sycophancy. Small wonder then that politicians are

resisting the efforts of the Election Commission to democratise

their party structures.

Defining the political and the bureaucratic elite for purposes

of legislation is easy. The "political elite" comprises the presidents

and legislature party leaders of all recognised political formations,

both at the central as well as state level. It also includes all past

and present cabinet ministers, again at both the Centre and the

states as well as all current MPs, and MLA/MLCs. The

"bureaucratic elite" comprises all those whose salaries come

from the state exchequer and which exceeds a total of Rs. 10,000

per month, (all inclusive). This includes public sector officers as

well as those from the administration and the police. Needless

to say, this definition also includes the spouses and the children

of those listed. The judiciary and the armed forces will also need

to develop systems to identify and punish the black sheep within

them. The new legislation would cover all their actions from the

period they enter into its scope.

Apart from a Lok Pal rid of the opacity and toothlessness

patent in the current draft legislation, the CBI needs to be vested

with the same level of autonomy which the Comptroller and

Auditor-General and the Election Commission enjoy at present.

This new CBI should have as its mandate investigations into

charges involving the political and bureaucratic elite. Cases

involving smaller fry should be devolved to other organisations

set up for the purpose. At present, rather than concentrating on

major cases, the CBI has got far too much on its plate. It is no

surprise, therefore, that it has been unable to frame chargesheets

on time in several cases, thus leading to the accused being let free

on bail. Were the CBI to concentrate only on involving those at

the top, or those where the loss to the exchequer is computed at

over Rs. 100 crores, such delays would hopefully not occur.

Special Tribunal

However, investigating agencies by themselves are as useless as

water without irrigation canals to take it to the fields. The

existing criminal justice system—clearly designed for a population

the size of the British Isles—would not be able to take the burden

generated by a campaign against high-level graft. It needs to be

supplemented by a system of special tribunals which will try

such cases. These tribunals could be modelled on, for example,

the land boards set up by the Devaraj Urs government in

Karnataka during the 1970s. These boards had wide powers and

strict limits on appeal procedures. As a result, decisions were

taken and implemented speedily.

The experience gained since the investigations into the Jain

hawala case shows that there is a lack of coordination between the

key investigating agencies, in particular the CBI, the Directorate

of Revenue Intelligence and the Enforcement Directorate. In

order to investigate cases involving the elite, or those where the

loss to the exchequer exceeds Rs. 100 crores, a coordinating

mechanism needs to be set up so that information can be pooled

and duplication of work avoided. Contrary to the intentions of

the framers of the present draft of the Lok Pal Bill (which is to

prevent media scrutiny), there is need for constant monitoring

by the media of the activities of these watchdogs, so that they

themselves do not fall prey to corruption. Given that India is by 

and large a functioning democracy, the best guardian of public

standards is a citizenry kept informed by an alert press.

Two Gifts

While the British enriched themselves during their uninvited

sojourn in India, their crimes were mitigated by two gifts that

they—perhaps unintentionally—left behind. These are the English

language and the system of parliamentary democracy. Both have

resisted the efforts of Indian goons and cultural fascists to banish

them. Thanks to the two legacies, over time a vigilant press and

judiciary have also emerged that have combined to carry forward

the present drive against corruption. In particular, the present

Supreme Court has ensured its place in history by taking the lead

in bringing the mighty who have transcended the law to book.

However, an institutional framework needs to be created to

ensure that this achievement is permanent.

Only sustained public pressure can shame the political class

into setting into place systems and procedures that would deter

a member of the political or the bureaucratic elite from becoming

corrupt. A start has been made by the forced arrest of Sukh Ram

for possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of

income. However, the politician from Mandi is not the exception

in his class, but the rule. Those in authority, however, should not

be allowed to escape by making scapegoats of a few like Sukh

Ram. The net needs to widen so that it covers the activities of all

those who have held prominent positions during at least the past

ten years. Narasimha Rao and Sukh Ram are not the only

politicians to have bent the rules. Many of those now leading the

wolf pack against them are no less guilty. At present, the "drive"

against corruption has all the orderliness of a Roman arena

where the crowd screams for the fallen gladiators to be

despatched. Such frenzy needs to be replaced with the putting

into place of new systems designed to identify and punish graft

and misuse of office.

Talks with Pakistan - India should Mix Firmness with Conciliation

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The landslide victory of Nawaz Sharif and the statesmanlike

support given to him by Benazir Bhutto to enact legislation that

would return power to elected representatives rather than to

Army appointees generated optimism that Pakistan would join

the ranks of the full democracies. However, it appears that the

Pakistan Prime Minister is unable to assert his primacy over non-

elected power centres. Very quickly, he has moved away from

a focus on trade and people-to-people contact and back towards

the Pakistan Army hard line that India should agree to a

plebiscite in Kashmir before Islamabad can agree to enhance ties.

This is akin to an individual saying that he can be friends with

another, provided the latter hands over his sister to him.

Asking for the handover of a sister is not indicative of a

friendly mindset. In like fashion, the efforts to push India into a

path that has the potential — if conceded — of opening the

Pandora’s Box of states' integration show that, despite his

victory, Sharif is very much the junior partner in government. If

indeed he is a partner at all. Clearly, Pakistan will continue to

foment insurgencies in India. Equally clearly, it cannot be given

any strategic concession until it halts this.

While hoping for a change in the power equations in

Islamabad, so that the elected representatives of the people set

rather than merely carry out policy, New Delhi needs to avoid

the Pollyanna syndrome of cheerful optimism about the good

intentions of others. Instead, it needs to craft policies that take

account of the factual situation in Pakistan.

The first step would be to substantially increase contacts

with the different segments of Pakistani society: businesspeople,

religious groups, NGOs and others. Such individuals should be

encouraged to visit India and interact with groups here, to make

them realise the advantages of a secular structure in which all

religions and regions are treated equally. In this connection,

Gujral’s visa liberalisation is welcome.

Second, New Delhi needs to openly articulate its concern for

human rights. There have been massacres in Karachi of MQM

supporters. There has been under-representation of Sindh in the

Pakistan Army. Within the civil service, Baluchis and Shias have

been given short shrift. These and other issues need to be taken

up by New Delhi, in view of the need to build constituencies

among such groups in the event of a fissioning of Pakistan into

Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Pashtunistan. Sadly, as the lack

of attention shown to building up an Indian diplomatic presence

in north Afghanistan has shown, New Delhi responds to a

situation only after it has evolved into a chronic sore. In line with

a policy of promoting democratic values, India needs to monitor

and express its concern over the plight of Shias, Ahmadiyas, non-

Punjabi Sunnis, Christians, Hindus and other disadvantaged

groups in Pakistan. At the same time, it needs to be understood

that when President Leghari and others point to alleged atrocities

in India. Pakistan has a right to express concern about

developments in India, just as India has a similar right towards

Pakistan.

Third, this country needs to reverse the neglect that has gone

on since 1984 of Indian defence capability. The core of this

country’s defence has to be its missile systems, whether located

on land, air or sea platforms. Rather than throw money away in

purchasing outdated equipment — as was done with the Bofors

gun and now may take place with a new aircraft carrier — this

country needs to improve its missile capability and the familiarity

of its armed forces to the computer as a force-multiplier.

Fortunately, the Deve Gowda government appears to have

moved away from the past policy of throttling strategic

development in India. However, much work needs to be done to

undo the neglect of the past twelve years.

Equally important, this country needs to clearly articulate its

core interests, and specify that these are non-negotiable. No

Indian government would survive mass hanging for treason

were it to concede Pakistan's agenda on Kashmir. Yet, except for

Prime Minister Deve Gowda, there appears to be a coyness

among other VIPs to make explicit the reality, that India will not

agree to a re-opening of the accession of Kashmir, no matter

what the pillow talk may have been during the time of the

Mountbattens’ sojourn in the Viceregal Palace. Unfortunately,

the halting of operations in 1948 before Kashmir was freed of the

invaders, the giveaways at Tashkent and Shimla, and the one-

sided agreement on river waters, have not yet convinced India's

Pollyannas of the futility of strategic concessions (such as on

Siachen) to an Islamabad still in the grip of the military. Such

concessions can be made only after South Asia forms a common

market, visas get abolished and each currency becomes freely

usable in all the other SAARC countries.

New Delhi needs to operate a two track policy: firmness on

strategic issues, conciliation on trade and people-to-people links.

If this country can benefit from Pakistani imports, such items

should be allowed. If representatives of segments of the Pakistani

people wish to visit India, they should be encouraged. What

needs to be discouraged — through the avoidance of strategic

concessions — is the shadowy coterie of feudals, druglords and

armymen that is slowly pushing Pakistan to its next division. So

long as Nawaz Sharif lacks the will to confront this, he will be

unable to prevent this slide. Only democracy can preserve

Pakistan.

While for Pakistan its obsession with India is central to its

policies, for New Delhi the gyrations of its western neighbour are

becoming less important with time. Intra-regional cooperation

within SAARC; diplomacy with China, Russia, France, Germany

and Japan; keeping open the option of future strategic cooperation

with the US; links with ASEAN states such as Singapore,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea; and cultivation of the Gulf, CIS

states and Iran all rank much higher than adjustments with a

country that is diminishing in clout daily. Recently it was said

that "60 per cent of the MEA's attention" was devoted to

Pakistan. Six per cent would be a more desirable figure.

Reservation Losing Appeal as Economy Expands

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The concept of the melting pot has held social analysts in thrall.

Multi-ethnic countries such as the U.S. have been characterised

as places where this concept applies. However, an examination

of the reality, even in the U.S., will bring out that rather than a

'melting down' of different ethnic groups into a homogeneous

mix, there is a coexistence—sometimes placid, sometimes tense-

of different groups. There is, in other words, very little melting

taking place in the pot.

This parallel development of different ethnic strands exists

not just in the racial sphere, but in the cultural as well. In the U.S.,

for instance, the statistical readings for variables such as unwed

mothers, drug addiction and illiteracy are significantly different

for groups such as, WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants),

African Americans, Asian Americans and Hispanics. These create

invisible barriers in the all-important business sphere, where

WASPs do much better than either African Americans or

Hispanics.

India, too, is a congeries of ethnic groups, and here—despite

the frequent use of the 'melting pot' analogy—the mingling of

communities (through, for example, marriage) has been the

exception. However, unlike the U.S., this country has a well-

developed affirmative action policy implemented through the

mechanism of reservations. As a consequence, previously

disadvantaged groups have increased their representation in

administration, while sub-groups within them have reached the

stage of social take-off. This fact has been taken note of by the

judicial directive that the 'creamy layer' within the backward

communities be excluded from the benefits of reservation.

While affirmative action for the backward classes took deep 

root in the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka, 

the forward castes retained their dominance in the Hindi- 

speaking states. A Karpoori Thakur or a Ram Sundar Das could 

do very little to dent the hold of the forward communities in the 

administrative machinery. However, the situation has changed 

with the coming to power of the SP-BSP in Uttar Pradesh and the

Janata Dal in Bihar. While within both regimes there is a

jockeying for positioning between different backward

communities, on one issue all such communities are united, and

this is on keeping the forwards out.

Why is it that four years ago, when V. P. Singh pulled the

Mandal rabbit out of his Kashmiri cap, there was such an outcry,

while today-when the backward class movement has become

such more strident—there is relative calm? The difference may

be a result of the liberalisation process set in motion in 1991. The

central motif of the entire process has been the steady

downgrading of the governmental apparatus as a system of

employment generation and decision making. Till 1991, it was

taken as axiomatic that growth in government was socially

beneficial. Very seldom were the hidden costs of such growth

examined. Indeed, few realised that the chronic inflation of the

currency and the anaemic performance of employment generating

units was linked to the expenses of maintaining a state structure

that, in many of its parts, was functionless.

Granted, the Narasimha Rao government has lost some of its

earlier reformist zeal. In particular, progress in the privatisation

of PSUs and reduction of subsidies has been slower in 1993-94

than the steps taken in 1991-92 would have led one to predict.

But, by placing on governmental units the onus of proving their

usefulness—rather than taking it as given—and by reducing the

flow of subsidies to loss-making units, the government has

helped generate a paradigm shift in social attitudes. Today, as

compared to 1990s, the sons and daughters of the middle classes

are far less likely to see their future as employees in a government

unit. On the contrary, these days the 'best and the brightest'

gravitate to the private sector, where rewards follow performance

more closely.

This displacing of the public sector by private industry as the

main engine of growth and employment has reduced the

significance of the Mandal formulations in middle class lives.

With the share of the state shrinking in the total employment pie,

the disadvantage caused by reservations will also be reduced.

Indeed, an argument can be advanced that those communities

which do not enjoy the benefit of reservation may actually find

their comparative positions improving, in that they will tend to

avoid the (declining) state sector and flock to the (growing)

private segment. An example of this is Tamil Nadu, where, from

1967 onwards the Dravida movement began to squeeze out the

Brahmin community from administration. As a consequence,

many went into business and thrived.

Why is it that the question of reservations has generated

much less friction in the three southern states compared to the

Hindi belt states? The reason could lie in the fact that the latter,

because of their statistical dominance in Parliament, had till 1991

enjoyed a flood of government investment. Even today, the role

of the organised private sector is less significant than the

governmental one in most of the Hindi belt. Whether as a

policeman or as a village officer, employment in the state

machinery is still a respectable option in the region. As a

consequence, any reduction in this due to reservations will be

contested. The reply to this is not (the politically impossible task

of) ending reservations, but creating conditions in the Hindi belt

for a faster growth of the private sector, a sector which is not the

parasite of the state sector, which itself is a parasite of the

exchequer.

For this to happen, standards of governance—especially law

and order—will need to be significantly improved. Unhappily,

such a process does not as yet seem to be occurring. Neither

Mulayam Singh Yadav nor Laloo Prasad Yadav are noted for the

high quality of their governance. By concentrating on getting

benefits from the shrinking govemment cake, rather than on

building up systems for private sector expansion, both of them

are—albeit unwittingly—blotting their political futures, for only

economic expansion will generate the conditions needed for

them to retain their popularity.

The danger in the populism seen in these two states is that,

on seeing that the governmental goose is no longer generating

sufficient political rewards, a cry may go up to extend reservations

to the private sector as well, thus killing the golden goose. So

long as reservation is confined to the state sector, the disincentives

inherent in it will not in themselves be sufficient to weaken the

pace of economic expansion. However, should it be forced on the

private sector, the negative effects could abort this country’s

nascent attempt to enter the economic major leagues.

What then is our defence against such a contingency? The

same as has acted as a bulwark for the liberalisation process. This

is the emergence of the first pan-Indian class, which is the Indian

middle class.

The process of economic expansion has created a class of

individuals who are ’at home' in most of the larger cities of India,

whether it be Calcutta or Madras or Bombay.

Should this development proceed, the middle class is likely

to be the country's largest voting bloc, rivalling farmers or even

the backward classes in number. The significance of this is that

this class, being very economics-centred, is likely to support that

political grouping which promises economic growth with

reasonable price stability. The future may, after all, be with

Manmohan Singh rather than with Mulayam Singh. 

India was 'Forced' to Conduct Nuclear Tests

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The reasons behind the resuming of nuclear testing are the

continuing negative reaction of the United States of lndia's

nuclear restraint since the 1974 test; the increasing threat from a

nuclear-armed China intent on providing Pakistan with offensive

capability against India; as well as the need to ensure that the

Indian deterrent is safe and reliable. After waiting for nearly 25

years for a positive response to India's soft policy, the country

has been forced into a series of tests to ensure its defence against

future nuclear blackmail.

Despite avoiding further testing since the 1974 "peaceful

nuclear exploration", India was met with sanctions on a range of

nuclear technologies "that were 85% civilian", in the words of

top policy-maker. He added that "even essential safety equipment,

as well as technology and material needed for peaceful

applications such as weather forecasting, were denied to us by

Washington". However, these sanctions had the effect of spurring

Indian scientists into developing supercomputers and other

equipment "that even China cannot match", he added.

Another reason for the resuming of testing by the world’s

sixth declared nuclear power was the stepping-up of China’s

assistance to Pakistan through its North Korean ally. The near-

total absence of United States reaction to such technology transfers

convinced Indian policy-makers that "we cannot expect any

credible US action to prevent cross-border proliferation by two

countries described by Washington as “strategic allies". In

contrast, the United States has taken an offensive position on

India, especially through favoured media outlets such as The

New York Times, "despite New Delhi’s total prevention of the

proliferation of strategic technology to other countries", said a

cabinet source, who added that "it is clear that by the time the

Clinton administration wakes up to the danger posed by the

China-Pakistan-North Korean axis, it will be too late for India,

unless we perfect our own deterrent".

Analysts believe that the policy of nuclear restraint followed

by India has encouraged both China and Pakistan to step up

their covert war against India. Islamabad has backed organisations

active in the terror campaign in Kashmir. China has given help

to insurgents in the North-east, and has provided logistical

support to terrorist groups operating within Bangladesh,

Myanmar and Thailand. "Enough is enough. It takes two hands

to clap, but only one to molest. Thus far, India’s restraint has

been met 'only by increased anti-India activities", said a high-

level policy-maker.

"Given that universal nuclear disarmament is utopian, and

that China is merrily proliferating, there was no option but to

take steps to perfect our deterrent", said a military source. He

added that "India being a full democracy, is much more

responsible than China or even Russia, where government

authority has ceased to exist in most sectors. Pakistan, using

money from its friends, is shopping for scientists and materials

to become a nuclear power. Under the circumstances, India was

left with no option but to resume testing", said a top policy-

maker, who added that "our scientists informed us that a

minimum number of tests was needed to ensure safety, especially

as the United States has banned all safety technologies to us since

1974".

Substance, not Form - Mistaking Posturing for Progress

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The cooktail cliques reserve their choicest endearments for those

who have wounded Indian interests most. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

was a particular favourite, despite his constant attempts to

actualise the ISI objective of a balkanised India. These days,

whenever Henry Kissinger comes to Delhi or Mumbai, there is

a scramble among the well—heeled to host him—possibly as an

expression of gratitude for the consistent hostility he displayed

towards New Delhi during his years in power.

Anatoly Dobrynin has, in his memories of Washington life,

revealed that the US and Pakistan signed a secret protocol in

1962 that assured that country of American support in the event

of any "aggression" by India. Not being aware of the nuances of

decision-making in a democracy, poor Ayub Khan believed that

this agreement guaranteed US military intervention on Pakistan’s

side in case the Indian Army beat back his offensive and entered

Pakistan territory. As a result, he grew bellicose and went to war

twice in 1965. The Soviets being as unused to democracy as the

Pakistanis panicked when told by Kissinger of this secret protocol

and put pressure on New Delhi to refrain from recapturing

"Azad" Kashmir.

Frontline State

Even an administration as paranoid as Nixon's would not have

dared to inflame public opinion in the US by militarily attacking

the world's largest democracy. Thus this "protocol" was another

of the placebos used to pacify dictators. Even today such

nostrums are being handed out—witness the many interjections

on Kashmir in western chancelleries. Except for the ISI, and its

dupes in the Valley, all others know that no country has the

capability to change Indian policy on Kashmir in a manner that

will dilute New De1hi’s sovereignty over it. Now the US claims

it wants to involve China in "resolving" India-Pakistan tensions-

a clever move to increase tensions between New Delhi and

Beijing.

During his first term in office, President Clinton gave

indications that his administration would be almost as hostile to

India as Nixon’s was, However, there seem to be glimmerings of

recognition of India’s status as a frontline state against terrorism

and hegemonism. Sadly, many of the officials in New Delhi

appear to be caught in the 1970s time warp, perceiving the US

as a hostile country. A recent example of this was the Indian

defence secretary's refusal to go to Washington to attend a

meeting cochaired by a "less senior" US official.

Strategic Objective

While India has had clear internal markers on the parameters

outside which it will block or otherwise stymie unfriendly

initiatives, thanks to politeness few of these have been made

public. Apart from the continued development of strategic

programmes to build up deterrent capability against the two

countries that have attacked India in the past, other markers

include the willingness to march into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir

and liberate the territory should Islamabad’s covert war against

India spill over into major population centres, as seems to be

happening now, Again, should Pakistan provoke another "hot"

war by further intensifying its terrorist campaign within India,

this time the strategic objective needs to be the liberation of the

Sindhi, Baluchi and Pashtun people from Lahore's domination.

Indeed, a mosaic of smaller states would not only damp

sectarian tensions in what is now Pakistan, but would also

develop much faster. The borders of these states can be guaranteed

by a common SAARC defence set-up. Finally, the goal should be

visa-less travel and a common intra-SAARC currency acceptable

within the region, even while the national identities of all the

states are protected. Rather than develop into fundamentalist

breeding grounds, as has taken place in Taliban-controlled

Afghanistan, these SAARC nations need to evolve into secular

democracies where minorities are given equal rights.

However, for such an outcome, it is important that our

policy-makers not accord primacy to form over substance. Silly

disputes over protocol are less important than the need for large

democracies to work together for international stability.

Ties with Pakistan - Why not Play the Business Card

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

In medicine, it is not merely the symptoms that need to be

treated, but the causes. Otherwise, whatever the expense and
attention paid to the symptoms, they will recur, often with
greater virulence. This is what has been happening to relations
between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Indian policy towards Pakistan has concentrated on
addressing itself to the specifics of the hostile actions of that
country. Over the last decade and a half, emphasis has been laid
on security systems designed to tackle the problem of Pakistan-
financed terrorism. If Indian policy means merely preventing
aggressive action it is clear that it has failed. Indeed, the threat
from Pakistan is today more virulent than at any time during the
past two decades. The reason for this is a paradigm shift in
Pakistan’s strategy towards India since 1971, from concentrating
on a 'hot war involving regular troops to a covert war involving
guerrillas.'

The Indian response to this new strategy has been reactive
rather than proactive. It has focused on the effects of Pakistan’s
actions rather than on their roots. This is akin to dousing fires
while the blowtorch that set them off in the first place is left
untouched. Thus the ’victories’ that are being won over the
terrorists—at enormous cost——are merely paving the way for
future disasters.

Only Superpower
India has a lot to learn from the United States, and not merely
in the sphere of technology. The world's only superpower has
been clear-cut in the defence of its vital national interests, going
so far as to bomb the residence of a head of state (in Libya) and
jailing another (in Panama). The United States has therefore
expanded the concept of 'hot pursuit' to include countries
several thousands of kilometres away from its shores. As a
consequence, despite its openness, it is relatively free of terrorist
acts. Had the U.S. followed the Indian pattern of reacting only
within its boundaries, a rash of violence would have been the
result.

This is not to argue that India should emulate the U.S.A
superpower has degrees of freedom not available to weaker
countries, and international opinion would be quick to condemn
the bombing of Benazir Bhutto s Clifton residence in Karachi, for
example, or the capture and imprisonment of General Hamid
Gul of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). What can be done,
however, is to increase to unacceptable levels the cost to Pakistan
of financing insurgency and terrorism within India. This can be
achieved by permitting private organisations to provide financial
and material aid to elements within Pakistan that are facing
discrimination. The Sindhis, the Ahmediyas and indeed the
Shias would in substantial numbers fall into this category.

What is sauce for the goose should be so for the gautier. A
Pakistan that openly defends a policy of financing insurrection
in a neighbouring state should have no grounds for objecting to
that state repaying the compliment. Once Pakistan gets the
message that the financing of insurgency is a game that two can
play, the pressure within that country for a mutual cessation of
covert hostilities will grow and (hopefully) prevail.

Second Aspect
This brings us to the second aspect of the suggested paradigm
shift. Apart from instituting a system of responding not just
within India but within Pakistan as well, there is a need to
prepare and articulate a set of responses that can initiate a
dialogue not just with the armed forces establishment in Pakistan
and its subservient civilian cover, but those elements within
Pakistani society that have a long-term practical interest in
peaceful relations with India. The day the Punjabi entrepreneur
displaces the Punjabi General as the centre of gravity within
Pakistani society, peace between the two countries will be better
assured.

Within Pakistan, the most significant of the potentially pro-
peace groups is the entrepreneurial class. It is no accident that
sentiment in favour of accommodation with India is stronger in
business-oriented Karachi than in the more cantonment·oriented
Lahore. Rather than confine its dialogue with Pakistan to the
agenda set by that country India should expand the boundaries
of the discourse by emphasising economic and cultural interaction.
That the trade between the two neighbours is so meagre, and
largely confined to such items as cement and sugar, is to the
benefit of the trading class of neither country. Should India make
some unilateral trade-related gestures to Pakistan, it would
increase the pressure of the lobbies within that country which
recognise that Pakistan cannot make significant economic progress
except by befriending India.

Even according to published records, military spending in
Pakistan as a proportion of total government spending is, at 39
per cent, three times greater than India's. Defence spending in
that country (even excluding the hidden items) rose by more
than seven times between 1980 and 1994. This has eliminated the
advantages enjoyed by a Pakistan freed in 1971 of its poorest
province (Bangladesh) by its ostensible foe. Within Pakistan, the
business class is increasing its first-hand contact with India, a
process that needs to be encouraged, and is thereby becoming
aware of the benefits of a policy of peace. By offering greater
trade, India would expose the essentially anti-Pakistan policy of
the armed forces of that country.

Today the military and its feudal allies in Pakistan are
confronting a bourgeoisie chafing under autocratic rule. Although
Pakistan passes off as a democracy, the fact remains that neither
its press nor its politicians dare to take on the armed forces. The
brief empowerment of the entrepreneurial classes ended on
April 18, 1993, when Nawaz Sharif was dismissed from office
and - to the relief of the armed forces - lost to that convert to
traditionalism, Benazir Bhutto, in the elections that followed.
However, the public support that was generated for the caretaker
government of Moeen Qureshi indicated the support within
Pakistan for a policy that focused on economic progress rather
than on seeking to harass its bigger neighbour.

Failed Reforms
The ruling elite within Pakistan has cleverly used Islam as a
shield protecting it from exposure by prying eyes. After the
infructuous agrarian reforms of 1949 and the Ayub reforms of
1959, Pakistan has not experienced the changes in land ownership
and tenure that have become commonplace in most parts of
India. Even the earlier attempts at reform were modest, the
ceiling being 150 acres of irrigated land in 1949 and 500 acres of
irrigated land in 1959. That even such reforms failed is testimony
to the grip of the Bhuttos and the Pagaros, the Jatois and the
Mazharis, over agriculture in Pakistan.

As in the industrial sphere, a well-crafted offer by India of
trade in agricultural commodities with Pakistan would
immediately divide the farming community there into the
pragmatists and those die·hards who are willing to forgo
economic benefits in the hope of dividing India. Indeed, the
much-maligned GATT agreement can be used as a lever to
generate free trade between the two neighbours.

By simultaneously increasing the costs to Pakistan of its
policy of interference in India, and by waving the carrots that
would accrue from closer economic co-operation, relations with
that country can be put on a less troubled track far more
effectively than the present policy of treating the symptoms
while leaving unattended the source of the disease.