Regionalism Rainbow Bridge or Great Divide

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

In the 11th Lok Sabha, the second largest group after the B]P is

not the Congress but the regional parties. If the CPI and CPM are

counted as regional parties—of Kerala, Tripura and Bengal-

and 12 Independents are added to the tally, 195 out of the 534

seats declared have gone to regional groups, leaving 29 for the

three national parties—the BJP, Congress and Janata Dal. Even

in 1967- the first flood-water mark of regionalism—the then

three national parties, Congress, Swatantra and Jan Sangh, won

362 seats to the others' tally of 158. 

In 1967 regional parties came to office both in the Hindi belt

as well as in Tamil Nadu. Indeed, the year before Conjeevaram

Natarajan Annadurai had warned in Parliament that Tamil

Nadu may secede if Hindi was imposed. Maoist guerrillas

laxmched armed struggles in Kerala, Bengal and Andhra Pradesh.

Thanks to a drought and to Indira Gandhi's decision to devalue

the rupee by 57 per cent, inflation soared. Agitations erupted,

and those who predicted that within five years there would be

a completely centralised policy were laughed at. That is precisely

what happened.

Perhaps as a reaction to the chaos of 1967, Indira Gandhi

initiated the process whereby almost all power remained in

Delhi. Between then and her defeat at the polls in 1977, Indira

Gandhi used the imposition of l’resident’s Rule 23 times against

opposition governments, and five times against her own Congress

governments. Central control of finance and foodgrains were

used to literally starve states which had assertive chief ministers.

The centrally-engineered "food crisis" in Gujarat, that saw the

fall of Chimanbhai Patel on February 9, 1974 is a case in point.

The Morarji Desai government quickly forgot its commitment

to federalism when confronted with the thirst of Janata party

workers to come to power in the states. Nine Congress ministries

were dismissed, a "favour" returned by Indira Gandhi on her

return to power in 1980, when she dismissed nine non-Congress

state governments. The only exception was Bhajan Lal, who

presumably made an offer that she could not refuse. In the event,

he remained in office not just during her time, but in the reign

of Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao as well, falling to the

ballot last month. As for Rajiv Gandhi, while he mostly let non-

Congress governments be, during 1985-89 he changed Congress

chief ministers 22 times.

The V.P. Singh government was too involved in intra-party

clashes to be a threat to the states. However, his successor,

Chandra Shekhar, dismissed the DMK government in Tamil

Nadu and the Asom Gana Parishad government in Assam, the

reason given being "collusion with terrorists”. What Chandra

Shekhar was too diplomatic to mention was that in both cases the

terrorists-the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and the Bodos in Assam—

had been encouraged by the Congress government at the centre

to embarrass the Sri Lankan and the AGP governments

respectively.

In line with its policy of inaction, the Narasirnha Rao

government adopted a similar attitude towards the states, except

when two Rajiv Gandhi appointees, - S. Bangarappa of Karnataka

and N. Janardhan Reddy of Andhra Pradesh - were replaced

with Veerappa Moily and Vijaybhaskar Reddy. Unfortunately,

neither was as much a hit with voters as they were with Rao. In

both states the Congress lost power in 1995.

However, while Rao was less adventurous than the two

Gandhis in dismissing state governments, he excelled them

when it came to centralising power. Indira Gandhi allowed her

trusted ministers to function autonomously. Rajiv Gandhi allowed

those officers whom he liked to do what they pleased (and their

ministers be dammed!). Not so Rao. By the beginning of 1994,

almost all major decisions were in effect taken by the PMO, with

the principal secretary Amar Nath Verma functioning as the

deputy Prime Minister.

Cabinet meetings in the Rao period were a delight. If any

minister offered an opinion on a pending matter, he was quickly

silenced with: “Let the officers decide on that. In the meantime,

drink your coffee". Verma dispensed with the formality of going

through the ministers, routing his orders directly to the secretaries.

The frequent misuse of Article 356 to dismiss state

governments, combined with the growth of the PMO has meant

that in effect India has a presidential system of government. It

is small wonder that the regional parties are anxious to use their

new-found clout to ram through amendments that may make the

Indian structure of governance more federal. It is the total

centralisation of power at Delhi and the fact that all parties want

their state units to act as vassals of the central leaders, which has

weakened the state-level units and allowed regional groups to

flourish.

The chances are that in the coming week the Vajpayee

government will be replaced by one led by H.D. Deve Gowda.

Should this government attempt to correct the distortions in the

federal structure—a fallout of the Gandhi family's mistaken

perception of India being a family-owned company—there will

be applause. Greater financial and administrative powers to the

states will strengthen rather than weaken the Union. However,

should the government succumb to the blackmail of regional

leaders and dole out largesse in fear of loss of parliamentary

support, it will quickly become unpopular and face the possibility

of both the Left Front and the Congress withdrawing support.

Most are aware that the 11th Lok Sabha is unlikely to have a long

life. Unless, that is, a miracle provides us with good governance.

Regressive Restrictions - make Honesty the Best Policy

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

By 1988, Rajiv Gandhi decided that he had had enough. He had

removed corruption from the system and given India growth

rates that rivalled China’s, yet the newspapers refused to

acknowledge this. They preferred instead to concentrate on

Bofors or the volte-face on the Muslim Women’s Bill. The press,

it would appear, prevented the Indian voters from realising how

lucky they were to have Rajiv Gandhi as their leader.

Fortunately for the then Prime Minister, he had a Harvard-

educated adviser in the home ministry who helped draft a

"defamation Bill" which would have, if passed, put most

journalists behind bars. Sadly, the media did not realise how

beneficial the legislation was to the public interest. In its myopic

way, it opposed the Bill and finally got it shelved. 

The proposer of the defamation Bill in 1988.

P. Chidambaram, is today the Union finance minister. That he

has lost nothing of his belief in tough laws is clear from the 

manner in which he is introducing one punitive legislation after 

another. The first was to give income-tax officers the right to levy

a penalty of up to 300 per cent on unaccounted income. The next

is to make the mere possession of "unexplained" money an

offence. According to this legislation, it will not be necessary to

prove that an illegality or crime was committed to get an

individual in trouble. What next, one wonders? A law that

makes the mere possession of property a criminal offence?

Nehru Family

But one should not judge Chidambaram too severely. After all,

he does owe much of his political career to the Nehru family

which had very clear views on the subject of whether Indians

could be trusted to behave as responsible adults. Under Nehru,

large-scale private business became an undesirable activity. The

effects of such an attitude are evident today, when this country

has dwindled economically. Indira Gandhi, through another

finance minister, Pranab Mukherjee, raised the marginal rate of

income-tax to 97.75 per cent. By the time Rajiv Gandhi came to

power, it was much more difficult to live up to this patrician

legacy, though to his credit he tried. It is nobody’s case that those

possessing black money should not be punished. They should

be, and severely at that. However, before this, the tax rates

should be brought down to sensible levels. There is a strong case

for just three rates of income-tax on individuals: 10 per cent, 20

per cent and 30 per cent. As for companies, 40 per cent should

be the highest rate for them. Should such a downsizing of rates

take place, the number of taxpayers will multiply by tens of

millions, and collections will go up.

The option is the present one of keeping in place a system

that makes it almost impossible to thrive while remaining

honest, and building up a police state to punish the numerous

defaulters. Morarji Desai, a staunch follower of Gandhi, was the

unwitting prime mover behind the growth of the Mumbai mafia.

As in the United States, these groups flourished because of

prohibition. Thanks to another of his edicts, that on gold control,

an entire community lost its livelihood. Today Bansi Lal is going

the Morarji way, breeding corruption within his police by

attempting to stop the sale and consumption of alcohol in

Haryana. This he did even after it was clear that Andhra Pradesh

has gone bankrupt due to the same policy.

Liberaliser's Image

If Chidambaram is to justify his image as a liberaliser, he should

look for ways of creating within India the conditions for enterprise

that operate in countries like South Korea or the United States.

He should nudge the government to bring forward legislation

and policies that encourage people to use their money

productively rather than hoard it. Then, just as the people

responded positively to the good king in times of crisis, they will

respond now by voluntarily coming forward to pay taxes and

fulfil their obligations to a regime that, at last, has begun to treat

them fairly. This country is too big for the stick. It needs

individuals who not only have big minds but also big hearts.

India's Defence-Capability, Must Match Rhetoric

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Jawaharlal Nehru had his weaknesses - as readers of

Edwina Mountbatten's biographies know - but what

compensated for them was his vision of India. It was to be

secular, it was to be technologically advanced. Where he erred

was in using rhetoric that had no relation to the reality of a

dwindling defence strength. The off-the-cuff remark that he had

"ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out" of Aksai Chin was

ineffective in staving off that country's 1962 war on India.

Strategic Reason

The Chinese had strategic reasons for keeping Aksai Chin, such

as the need to provide a corridor between Tibet and Sinkiang.

Also, till 1960-61, when Indian rhetoric about Chinese

"expansionism" escalated, that country had not interfered in

internal Indian tensions. Afterwards, both in the north-east and

briefly in the Naxalbari movement, Beijing retaliated for what it

saw as Indian "encouragement" to the Free Tibet movement. By

1971, however, Beijing's obsession with domestic matters led it

to refuse to intervene when the Bhutto-Yahya Khan armies were

being defeated by the Indians.

For six or seven years prior to 1962, the Nehru government

had deluded itself into believing that diplomatic gestures and

tough talk were sufficient to avoid war. As a result, defence

capabilities got eroded, especially in the air and on the eastern

frontier with China. Believing perhaps that the Chinese were as

prone to words unmatched by action as the Indians are, Nehru

escalated the toughness of his language even as our defence

preparedness declined. Simultaneously, kinship—both genetic

and social—was allowed to become the dominating factor in top-

level defence appointments, General B.M. Kaul being the most

obvious example.

Looking at the belligerent rhetoric of Rajesh Pilot, the bold

statements of Pranab Mukherjee, the continuation in office of the

obviously dysfunctional General Krishna Rao and the consistent

inattention paid to Indian defence capabilities, there is a sense of

history repeating itself. Once again, an escalation in language

matches—though in reverse—accompanies a fall in defence

preparedness. Should such a policy continue for the rest of the

current decade, it will take a generation before Indian defence

technology once again approaches world standards. One looks

in vain for any national interest that will be served by such

sabotage, carried out under the guise of "shortage of funds".

There has been substantial comment about "pressure" from

the U.S. on India to throttle its nuclear and space programmes.

The Clinton administration, arguably the most pro-Pakistan

team in Washington since the Nixon-Kissinger one, cannot be

blamed for attempting to ensure that this country does not

develop a substantial defence capability on its own. The model

favoured by the U.S. is clear from the example of Saudi Arabia,

which—despite its huge capital inflows—is technologically

deficient. Such underdevelopment ensures dependence on

Washington as a source of armaments, a situation favourable to

the U.S. not just strategically but financially.

However, it is not Saudi armaments that are a reason for

worry within India, though the same unconcern should not be

shown to the Saudi money being funnelled to fundamentalist

organisations in India. Pakistan, as has been the case since 1947,

is the major security concern for India, a concern now multiplied

by the desire of the Clinton administration to rearm that country.

Despite the evidence that international terrorist organisations

are using Pakistan as a logistical base, the U.S. State Department

considers Pakistan a "moderate" state. As for Pakistan stealing

and buying nuclear technologies from outside, Washington is

seeking to reward this unique path to nuclear disarmament by

revoking the Pressler amendment.

Specious Argument

As long as India was "within the Soviet sphere" and declined to

join U.S.-inspired defence pacts; as long as fundamentalist

terrorism was considered a useful weapon against communism,

some defence was possible for the flow of U.S. arms into

Pakistan. However, this alibi no longer holds. The clear fact that

any transfer of arms to Pakistan can only be the result of a policy

hostile to India needs to be stated. The argument that "moderate

Islamists" will be better able to beat back "radical Islmists" 

through the revival of the U.S.-Pakistan arms link is specious.

Today the Pakistan army is among the leading backers of

"radical Islam". lt's very war cry is jehad. Thus the transfusion

on arms to such an organisation can only be taken as one of the

steps in a policy aimed at containing the development of India

as a major strategic force.

Apart from the US, the other enthusiastic player in such a

game-plan is the Indian government, in particular that part of it

which deals with defence. The absence of not merely strategic

but even tactical thinking in recent defence policies has resulted

in the ignoring of the positive impact of adequate defence

systems on security, and consequently stability. Just as a police

force promotes economic development by deterring crime, an

adequate defence system discourages hostile intervention. It is a

reasonable hypothesis that an India that had pushed ahead with

its nuclear and missile programmes would not have been so

attractive a target as it is today for Pakistani intervention. That

Islamabad is contemptuous of this country’s ability to defend its

interests is clear from the war the ISI is (publicly) engaged in.

An Example

South Korea is an example of how greater defence spending can

coexist with rapid progress. If the security of that country had

not been ensured by effective defences, its development may

never have taken place. The blows struck by Pakistan—whether

in Kashmir or elsewhere—are costlier, even in purely economic

terms, than the expense of developing strategic systems. Pakistan,

it is argued by its backers, has a difference of perception with

India only about Kashmir. On the contrary, should the ISI

succeed in that state, the consequent weakening of this nation's

integrity will lead Islamabad to intensify terrorist activities in

other Indian states. The mindset that breeds terrorism (or, in

Washingtonspeak, "moderate democracy") feeds on success and

does not stop until the enemy is totally destroyed.

While unapologetically taking care of its own security, this

country needs to engage the world’s biggest economy in a

friendly dialogue. There is much more to Washington than the

State Department or even the White House, and there is much,

much more to the United States than Washington. After the love

affair between the ISI generals and the Pentagon cools off,

Washington may finally notice that the only major armed force

in Asia that has remained non-fundamentalist and non-political

since freedom is India’s. In the meantime, this country needs to

build bridges with major U.S. interests, such as business, rather

than indulge in the luxury of alienating what could be a decisive

ally in the attempt to change American policy into an India-

friendly one.

A Friend Returns to Beijing

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

When Kocheril Raman Narayanan returned to New Delhi from 

Beijing in end—1978, after serving for two-and-a-half years as 

India's first Ambassador to China since the 1962 war, he could 

not have foretold that nearly 16 years later, he would be 

returning to Beijing as the Vice-President of India. Narayanan  

finds a delegation that is visiting China between October 21 and  

28. 

The Chinese have long memories, as witnessed at the royal 

treatment they gave Richard Nixon even after his fall. They will 

not, therefore, forget that since 1969, from within his perch in the   

Foreign Ministry as a career official, Narayanan has pushed for 

normalisation of relations between the two Asian giants. Between 

1963 and 1967, he was Director (China) in MEA, thereafter going 

as India's Ambassador to Bangkok. On his return in 1969, he took 

over as Joint Secretary (policy planning), and promptly began  

initiating studies on how ties could be retrieved from the deep 

freeze. 

Just as in the US it was Richard Nixon’s personal intervention  

that led to ties between Washington and Beijing, in India, it was 

the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who encouraged a small  

clutch of MEA officials to pursue their goal of a reconciliation it

between India and China. Within the MEA, two lobbies opposed  

this: the West-centric lobby, that did not want yet another

diversion from its efforts at making India a strategic partner of 

the US and West Europe; and the rival Soviet lobby, that 

responded to Russian uneasiness at the prospect of better Sino- 

Indian ties. If officers in the MEA are to be believed, neither 

Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta nor his successor Kewal Singh 

were enthusiastic about..the efforts at normalisation.

However, support from Indira Gandhi continued, and in

1976 it was decided to take a political risk and announce the

appointment of an Ambassador to Beijing. This was done without

first ascertaining from the Chinese whether they would reciprocate

by appointing an Ambassador to New Delhi. Within the MEA,

opinion was strong that unless such a commitment was first

secured, India should not risk a snub by moving first. However,

the Prime Minister took the plunge and appointed Narayanan to

the post. As it happened, even while India’s Ambassador-

designate to China was in Hong Kong en route to Beijing, the

Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the appointment of an

Ambassador to India. And thus, for the first time in 15 years, top-

level diplomatic ties were resumed.

1977 saw the first defeat of the Congress party in national

elections, but fortunately for the nascent shoots of Sino-Indian

normalisation, the new Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, was as

much committed to the policy as Gandhi. Thus he also overruled

the timidity of a section of the foreign policy establishment and

encouraged the exchange of high-level delegations between

India and China. First a FICCI delegation went, followed by

journalists and then a cultural troupe. The Chinese reciprocated

with delegations of their own.

However, not everybody in the Morarji government shared

the Prime Minister’s eagerness for closer ties with China. Whether

because of his own predilections or because of pressure from

hard-line elements in the former Jana Sangh, the then external

Affairs Minister, A. B. Vajpayee, called off his scheduled 1978

visit to China a week before take-off. The reason? A stomach

upset. Fortunately, the tender state of Vajpayee’s digestion did

not derail the normalisation process, in view of Gandhi’s return

to power in 1980. She had always sided with those who felt that

better ties should not be hostage to a resolution of the border

question, calculating that better ties would, indeed, help in an

amicable settlement (of the border issue).

Another quantum jump in relations took place in 1988, with

the visit of an Indian Prime Minister - Rajiv Gandhi - to Beijing. By

this time, the rot within the USSR was becoming clearer, and

hence the need for a policy of developing ties with other powers.

More than China, the emphasis was on better relations with

Washington, a goal that was brought closer by the visit of Rajiv

Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi to Washington, and their very cordial

reception by the Reagans.

Since that time, an unstated keystone of India’s foreign `

policy has been better relations with the US, a policy that has  

lasted despite the odd hiccup, such as the V. P. Singh government’s 

tilt to Iraq during the Gulf crisis. China also, despite occasional 

public shows of displeasure, has been careful not to provoke

Washington. However, both countries are aware of the utility of 

improving ties with each other and with alternative power

centres such as Europe and South-east Asia. Even Russia, despite

its current propensity to chaos, is a once and future superpower. 

That, however, seems very much in the future. In the case of 

India, hemmed in by a dominant superpower unsympathetic to

its independent strategic ambitions and, if certain US officials are 

to be taken seriously, to its very integrity as a unified country,  

national interest dictates better relations with the merging 

superpower on our northern borders. This need is further

enhanced by the Benazir Bhutto policy of aiding subversive 

movements within India. 

It is anybody’s guess as to the demons the Pakistan Prime

Minister is hoping to exorcise by her covert war on the Indian

state. It could be an expatiation of the suggested Bhutto guilt in  

the vivisection of Pakistan. For it is on record that General Yahya 

Khan ignored the results of the free election held in Pakistan 

years ago because, had he accepted the results, Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman and not Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would have been the Prime 

Minister of (united) Pakistan. Mr Bhutto's tacit encouragement 

to the brutal army crackdown in East Pakistan fuelled the

separatist movement in what is now Bangla Desh. Thus it could 

be that Benazir Bhutto seeks to make up for this smudgy

historical record by attempting yet another vivisection, this time

of India. 

Keeping China friendly is an essential component in India’s 

defence against Pakistan’s war. Apart from this, the other 

advantages of closer ties are cooperation in science and 

technology; more joint ventures between the two countries and 

a better understanding of how China has opened up its economy 

to foreign investment without surrendering sovereignty over

crucial decisions. Closer ties with China would also help in the 

integration of India with the rest of Asia. In its partly West

centric and partly Soviet-centric orientation, the country’s foreign  

policy mandarins neglected the country’s own backyard, with 

the result that India is not a major player in any Asian grouping .

except SAARC. 

Despite murmurs that it is choking off India’s strategic  

independence by ’underfunding' the nuclear and missile

programmes, the Narasimha Rao government has in fact taken 

significant steps to improve its ties with the rest of Asia. Apart

from the present Prime Minister’s visit to China itself in 1993, 

there have recently been trips to Viet Nam and Singapore, with

more Asian visit in the pipeline. According to policy planners,

the present Indian prime minister is as committed to better Sino-

Indian ties as Gandhi, Morarji Desai and Rajiv Gandhi were.

The Vice-President, therefore, goes to a country with whom

ties are steadily growing, the major remaining irritant being (on

India's side) the sporadic public activities of the Tibetan refugees

on Indian soil, and (on China’s side) the arming of Pakistan.

During his week-long stay, the Vice-President is expected to meet 

with `China's President, Prime Minister and other leaders confident

that the policy of rapprochement has wide support at home. A 

far cry indeed from the lonely days of the late 1960s, when 

suggestions for India-China friendship faced an atmosphere

made hostile by memories of the 1962 war. 

Run, Don't Crawl - Need for Action, Not Rhetoric

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

First impressions may not always be the best ones, but they last. 

While in many other democracies, incoming administrations

seek to push through major changes in emphasis during the first 

100 days, in India this has not been done except by P. V.

Narasimha Rao, who 44 years after independence began turning 

India away from the 1,000-year clasp of the Mughal-British-

Nehru patriarchal state.

Inder Kumar Gujral's entry to his present post was due to the

coincidence of his excellent relations with both V. P. Singh and

Sitaram Kesri. However, once in, his touch faltered. The first

hiccup was his acceptance of almost the entire Deve Gowda

team, thus confirming the impression that the change-over had

been because of a personality clash between Deve Gowda and

Sitaram Kesri. As a result, the incoming Prime Minister's authority 

over his team got diluted.

Headhunters will testify that the time for tough negotiations

is before an employment contract is signed. Once duty is joined,

efforts to substantially improve conditions are usually futile.

Neither Mulayam Singh Yadav nor C. K. Moopanar boasted the

acceptability to the Singh-Kesri duo that Gujral had. The other

alternative, Chandrababu Naidu, declined to follow Deve

Gowda’s example of exchanging a safe regional perch for an

unstable national one. Thus Gujral could have driven a much

harder bargain before accepting the offer to head the government.

Family Nostalgia 

Nostalgia about the days of the Nehru family—when India

crawled along at a growth rate of three per cent and the

corruption-breeding controls system dug in—was not going to 

lift Gujral’s rating. Rather than lapse into sentimental

remembrances, what is needed is the hard-headed formulation

and implementation of policies designed to push up growth

from the seven per cent bequeathed by Rao to the 10 per cent that

China has shown to be possible. Step one is the rapid dismantling

of the web of procedures and permissions that chain Indian

companies. Step two is to remove the restrictions on the setting

up of service industries.

Sadly, instead of diminishing in critical areas regulations

have grown. While Murasoli Maran acted as a reformer during

the Gowda period, in the Gujral era he appears to be using

restrictive regulations for reasons not transparent. Beni Prasad

Verma is doing likewise with communications, while both R. V.

Paswan and C. M. Ibrahim are working hard to ensure that local

transport infrastructure remains inadequate.

While a certain amount of personal diplomacy may be

necessary for the continuance of the UF ministry in office, it

needs to be remembered that survival is by itself not the

objective. The goal has to be increased growth. If it is expected 

that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will appreciate

that the world has changed somewhat since Papa Korbel's time

and not harp on the same Kashmir mantras as were used then

by the US and the UK to kill any incipient move by India to forge

strategic links with the rest of the democratic, English-speaking

world, one expects the Gujral team to go beyond old policies in

formulating solutions to domestic economic problems.

Appeasing Game

Today's Nehru family loyalists are not just those who flock to 10

lanpath, they are also those political parties that seek to push the

economy back into the regulatory cage of the pre-1991 period.

Unless the Gujral government passes legislation freeing industry

and services from such cords, it will not be fulfilling its promise.

At present, it appears to be more a Surjeet than a Gujral

government, at least in regard to economic policy.

For the sake of a few thousand state employees, the UF

partners appear prepared to sacrifice the long-term interests of

the rest of the country, just as the right-wing swadeshi lobby

wants to coddle controls-friendly sections of domestic industry

at the cost of the consumer. Elements of both saffron and scarlet

are united in promoting Mughal-British-Nehru style restraints

on honest and efficient enterprises, thus encouraging units that

profit through sleaze and connections. Unfortunately, the UF

government has thus far gone along with such views rather than

implement reforms that will lower bank interest rates and attract

greater investment in infrastructure and other key sectors.

The Communists (and Mahathir Mohammed) have a point:

that pure speculation needs to be curbed. However, this is

possible through the market, as Singapore has demonstrated in

the housing sector. There, punitive capital gains taxation is

levied on houses sold within three years of purchase. India can

also have a system whereby steep capital gains taxes get levied

on shares or houses sold within 180 days of purchase. On a

sliding scale, those sold after 18 months should escape this tax.

This would attract the genuine investor while keeping most

speculators out. However, such measures are different from

those that choke off investment altogether, which is what the

China and Pakistan lobbies in India want the government to do.

Lack of Leadership

On August 15, robust speeches were made about "cleansing the

country of corruption". To show that little has changed, all that

needs to be done is to examine the Foreign Investment Promotion

Board (FIPB). In the Narasimha Rao period, the PMO would

block or clear projects on opaque and arbitrary grounds. Today

the same process continues. Files move swiftly, then crawl, then

stop, then mysteriously speed up again. Unless the FIPB is made

transparent and guided by objective procedures, investment

flows will continue to be a trickle relative to the potential.

However, just as in the case of the (frozen) PSU reform or the

(lack of) moves to simplify laws and procedures, here too

rhetoric seems all that is on offer. Another ministry more

concerned with blocking than with promoting growth is the

ministry of environment. It has been killing or freezing projects

with a vengeance. The eco-fundamentalists who seek to push

India back to the agrarian age appear to be ruling the environment

ministry, with negative consequences for growth.

One reason why there appears to be a glut of politics on the

front pages may be the lack of initiatives to prod the country

onto the 10 per cent growth track. Should Gujral put his job on

the line and shame his team into bringing forward the policies

and legislation needed tu achieve this, he may find the doubts

about his survival dissipating. Such a course is the only one

consistent with the pledge he took on August 15, 1997 - to

fashion a system free of graft that will give a better life to the

prior. Both aims are linked, and need a focus by the UF

government on development rather than politicking.

Jinnah Revisited-Fostering Insecurity in Minorities

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999) 

Sometimes, the nature of the fight so destroys the prize that it is
not worth winning. Several prosperous businesses have been
ruined by litigation, leaving the "victor" only a shell. While
elections are, by their nature, contests, there are limits beyond
which a healthy campaign should not go. The style and substance
of the current campaign has been such that it could be at the cost
of stability in India.

During the 1940s, M. A. Jinnah argued that Congress rule
would imply the subjugation of the minorities. This created a
fear psychosis among the Muslim intelligentsia. After 1947,
Muslims have neither been subjugated in India, nor have they
been protected in Pakistan. Jinnah’s sectarian logic has penetrated
deeper into the Pakistan polity, separating Baluch from Pashtun
and Sindhi from Punjabi. Today, in India, there is once again an
organised effort to create a polarisation between different
religions. A message is being disseminated that the BJP's coming
to office will cripple minority rights. The "secularists" are thus
using Jinnah's language to score points in the battle against the
BJP.

Crippling Burden
This election has been caused by the Congress' attempt to
dominate the next government. Should its tally fall below 160,
the gamble will have failed. Apart from the Rs. 950 crore direct
cost of the election campaign and the (estimated)
Rs. 750 crore spent by political parties, there is the cost of the
policy vacuum till a new government is sworn in. A modest
estimate for such losses would be approximately Rs. 5,000 crore.
Thus, the direct cost of the 1998 elections to taxpayers is in the
region of Rs. 6,700 crore.

More has been lost as a consequence of the legislative
gridlock created by MPs during the last Lok Sabha session. The
hopes for a more Indian-friendly regulatory structure vanished.
Will such behaviour continue into the l2th Lok Sabha? The
campaign signals are not encouraging for those who are looking
forward to a time when politicians will deliver results rather
than abuse.

Today, the Congress has restricted its all-India campaign to
three individuals: Sonia Gandhi, Rahul and Priyanka. Thus the
credit for the Congress' performance will flow to Gandhi and her
children alone. This is unexceptionable. What is not is the
message of the party's star campaigner: that the very future of
India is at risk if her party's principal opponent comes to power.
Vote BJP and risk civil war, is the message. This has been
amplified by reminding voters that Mahatma Gandhi was shot
by an RSS sympathiser. This is similar to blaming an entire
community for the murder of Indira Gandhi.

Historical Wrongs
Today, many "secular" campaigners are trying to create the
same insecurity in the Muslim mind as was created by the
League during the 1940s, after the British began helping Jinnah
as a consequence of Congress non-cooperation in the war effort.
The harm done by such divisive messages will linger long after
the votes have been counted.

True, the BJP has a lunatic fringe that believes in correcting
historical wrongs by the kind of vandalism evident on December
6, 1992. However, within the saffron fold, opinion appears to be
growing that only a country where minority rights are protected
is safe for the majority. Instead of seeking to integrate the BJP
firmly within the secular mainstream, its rivals are trying to
perpetuate the distrust between that party and the minorities.
While this may bring in some extra votes, it is likely to undermine
social harmony. The experience in BJP-ruled states indicates that
power has tempered the saffron brigade’s sectarian impulses.
National office may further moderate the BJP and its allies into
(for example) effectively abandoning moves to introduce a
(largely western) uniform civil code, or to abrogate Article 370.

By seeking to restrict the BJP to the sectarian space that it is
seeking to escape from, the "secular" groups are, in fact, harming
their cause. Fanning insecurity among the minorities will retard
progress towards a fully integrated society. Just as economic 
populism goes against public interest, so does political populism
of the kind now being used against the BJP. Tomorrow, the very
parties trashing the BJP may need the help of the saffron brigade
in getting crucial legislation passed. Polarising the Indian political
spectrum and through this the voters into mutually exclusive
and hostile segments can only promote a separatist agenda.

A country cannot flourish unless its basic interests are kept
above party politics. If these are sacrificed so as to get a few extra
seats, then "victory" will lose its charm. Communal hatreds and
caste prejudices are the enemies of a just society, and all political
parties need to work against rather than exploit such tendencies.
Similarly, terrorism affects every citizen. The bomb that takes
only the life of a Hindu while sparing a Muslim has not been
invented yet. Thus, it was distasteful to watch even terrorist acts
being viewed through political eyeglasses. Should evidence be
secured further linking the Coimbatore blasts to the ISI, that
organisation can claim- on the authority of the Congress
President—that it is innocent.

Gujral Style
If the extremists in the Sangh Parivar need to be condemned for
their efforts at dividing citizens on sectarian grounds, so should
those "secularists" who follow Jinnah's policy of creating
insecurity in the minorities. Democracy implies coexistence and
consensus. In the past, any tactic was acceptable to beat a
political rival, be it helping Bhindranwale in Punjab or Ghising
in Darjeeling. Today Mufti Mohammed Sayeed has become
almost a front for the Pakistan—centric Hurriyat in condemning
Farooq Abdullah, while Nagaland's S. C. Jamir has ensured his
continuance by means as questionable as those used in Kashmir
in the past. Campaign l998’s high—decibel "secular" campaign,
which effectively places the B]P as worse than the ISI in the list
of India’s enemies, reflects this trend.

After the campaign, the BJP and the Congress party will need
to cooperate on issues of national concern, be they economic or
security related. Hopefully, in such a situation, the current
exclusivist rhetoric will be replaced by attitudes better suited to
a democracy. For this, we need I. K. Gujral's style rather than that
of Sitaram Kesri.