M.D. Nalapat
Manipal, India — On Nov. 7 this columnist
wrote that Pakistani politician Benazir Bhutto's election plans were likely to
fail "if she survives." The skepticism over her longevity was because
of the threat she represented to both the Punjabi component in the Pakistan
army and to the continuation of the military's monopoly over state power.
While President Pervez Musharraf avoided
challenging the latter, since 9/11 he has quietly but systematically sought to
reduce the suffocating grip of the Punjabis over the army, giving better
representation to Mohajirs, Balochis, Pashtuns and even a few Sindhis in the
higher reaches of both the military as well as the civil administration. Had
there been a teaming up between the wily Musharraf and the mercurial Bhutto,
especially after he was made to quit as army chief, the two may have succeeded
in leveraging anti-army sentiment in Pakistan enough to send the soldiers back
to their barracks.
Since the 1950s, those in uniform have
controlled Pakistan's civilian institutions, ensuring that these were melded
with the military into a seamless system of preference and privilege to a
military that has made jihad a lucrative industry. Especially since anti-U.S.
passions rose after the Iraq war in 2003, but dating back to the earlier
attempt by Musharraf to put the Taliban out to dry in Afghanistan , the Baloch
and Pashtun components of the Pakistan army turned against their chief, to be
joined by the Punjabi component shortly thereafter.
