Congress has Two Conflicting Strategies to Regain Power

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The discussion on the extent to which the Congress should exert

pressure on the United Front (UF) to get its support for a

Mayawati-led ministry in Uttar Pradesh gives an indication of

the emergence of two contrary strategies that the Congress could

follow.

While both have adherents and critics among the office-

bearers of the former ruling party, the terms "Pawar" and

"Antony" lines will be used to denote the two approaches, as the

two have emerged as protagonists of the same.

While both sides have thus far refrained from publicly

articulating their strategies and have indeed denied that there

are any differences, discussions with confidants indicate that the

Pawar line is to forge a formal alliance with the UF in order to

isolate the BJP. This would involve joining the UF ministry at the

Centre and joint action in states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat

and elsewhere. Gradually, thanks to the force of numbers and

greater cohesion, the Congress would dominate the UF and in

time would have its own candidate as Prime Minister. Thereafter,

a Congress-led UF would face and defeat the BJP in the subsequent

Lok Sabha polls.

The Antony line would support the UF at the Centre for a

period of two to three years, during which time the Congress

would be revamped into an organisation based on inner-party

democracy and an elected set of office-bearers. The strategy

would be "unity" with the UF in Delhi and "struggle" in the

states, where the Congress would shed its current inhibitions

and become a vociferous opposition to both the UF as well as the

BJP. In certain states local alliances would be forged, such as with

the BSP in UP and Ramakrishna Hegde in Karnataka. By these

means, the Antony strategists hope to have the Congress re-

emerge into health within 24 to 36 months, after which it would

force a Lok Sabha election.

While the Pawar line predicates cooperation with the UF, the

Antony line calls for the Congress to fashion its revival

independent of it. According to Antony, it is necessary for the

party to be away from power for a few years, "to rid itself of the

corruption associated with office". Should the Congress join the

UF, the temptation to revert to old ways would be great, and the

party would share in the scandals and disillusionment caused by

UF rule. Away from power, a fresh team of office-bearers can be

expected to emerge, with the state-level units—rather than the

AICC—being the focus of the leadership's attention.

The proponents of the Antony line have welcomed the

emergence of Sitaram Kesri as AICC president, as the Bihar

politician fits in with its strategy of focusing on dalits, the

minorities and the backward communities. According to the

Kerala politician, an alliance with the BSP will send positive

signals to the dalit vote-banks in the Hindi belt. Next would be

moves to woo the minorities and the backward communities.

Those in favour of the Pawar line give more attention to

government, and to using the advantages of office to generate

visibility and support among the electorate, Hence the eagerness

to join the Gowda government.

The advantage in this behind-the-scenes battle of wills lies

with the Maharashtra politician. Antony has ever exhibited a

reluctance not to go for the jugular, but to even get involved in

battle. Thus, very often his positions are lost almost by default.

Pawar on the other hand, has excellent powers of persuasion that

are put to good use in generating support for his stand. At

present, apart from his closeness to both Prime Minister Deve

Gowda and Congress icon Sonia Gandhi, Pawar has the support

of three CWC members, K. Karunakaran, Ghulam Nabi Azad

and Balram Jakhar. Rajesh Pilot, Ahmed Patel and Meira Kumar

have also given him qualified support, especially on the policy

of backing the UF.

Antony, on the other hand, has only himself as a firm backer

in the CWC.

However, if the attention shifts from the Delhi-based office-

bearers to the states, the Kerala politician has a significant

support base for his "unity and struggle" policy vis-a-vis the UF.

In particular, state units in the south and east are opposed to the

policy of going soft on the UF. In these states, the Congress has

begun to pay heavily for the ambiguity in its stand vis-a-vis local

UF rivals such as the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh the JD

in Karnataka and the CPM in Kerala. Over the next few months,

such state units may begin to exert pressure to prevent the

adoption of the Pawar line.

And what of the former Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha

Rao? Despite his distaste for Pawar, Rao has become compelled

by circumstances to adopt a dovish posture towards the UF,

which is dangling the threat of putting him or his son in prison

without actually expending the missile by actually doing so. As

long as the threat is present or remains unexecuted — Rao will

be forced to support a conciliatory line towards the very same

UF that is closing in on his followers through the CBI. While Rao

loyalists are being targeted, pro-UF Congressmen as well as UF

politicians are being spared CBI attention, despite their

involvement in numerous scams.

The UP imbroglio has shown up the fault lines behind the

facade of Congress-UF cooperation. The months ahead will show

whether the former ruling party will hitch its fate to the UF or

attempt to once again recapture the dominant heights of Indian

polity. At present, the odds favour the former outcome.

Spiking Rao to Boost Clinton

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

US diplomats are prone to asserting that the period of ’zero sum'

solutions between India and Pakistan are now over, and that it 

is no longer true that a concession given to one must be at the 

expense of the other. The difficulty is that there appears to be a 

zero sum situation between the US and India on the nuclear  

issue. 

President Clinton, dogged by the Whitewater scandal and by 

it allegations of inconsistency on Haiti and Bosnia, needs a 

spectacular foreign policy success to wash away the wimpish 

traces in his image. Forcing India and Pakistan to cap their 

nuclear programmes will provide just such a success. Hence the 

frenzied behind-the-scenes diplomacy on the non-proliferation 

issue.

This tacit equation of India with Pakistan ignores the reality 

of the vastly more advanced Indian programme as compared to 

the Pakistani one. While India actually detonated a nuclear  

device twenty years ago, and since then has progressed 

considerably in fabricating delivery systems, Pakistan’s  

programme is as yet a mix of borrowed technology and carefully 

planted stories about that country’s nuclear capability. However,

it suits the US to pretend that Pakistan too is a major player in  

the nuclear league, so that its ’capping’ can be taken as a reason

for India to abandon its own programme. 

The problem with the US formulation is that it ignores the

fact that India is not a country ruled by a military oligarchy but 

a democracy, and that no government that is seen as 

compromising on national security can survive politically. Even 

the Rajiv Gandhi government which came to power in 1984 on

a landslide, got defeated in 1989 amidst allegations that decisions  

involving national security were being taken for venal motives.  

The vice-like grip now taken by the PMO on foreign policy 

means that any bureaucratic dissent with the current PMO drive 

to ’improve' relations with the US will not get publicised. 

However, key officials within the ministry of external affairs 

confirm that in confidential briefings the MEA has warned 

against 'pushing into the background India’s security interests in 

favour of ’better commercial relations with the US'. It is pointed  

out that a country of India’s size needs its own strategic deterrent, 

especially in the context of a volatile geographic environment. 

The MEA’s argument is shared by policy planners in the 

ministry of defence, as well as by the three armed services, who 

are in favour of vigorous development and deployment of the  

missile systems developed by India’s scientists. They point out 

that such a deterrent, which in India’s case has been economically 

developed, will in fact lead to a lowering of defence costs, by 

protecting the security environment more effectively than 

significantly higher·cost traditional weapon systems. These circles 

point to the relatively low investment needed to develop Agni 

further, for example, as compared to the huge outlays needed to 

purchase fighter aircraft from abroad. 

Indeed analysts within the defence establishment claim that 

one reason behind the US obsession with capping India’s space 

and nuclear programmes is to ensure the future development of 

this country as an arms market for the US as large as that offered 

by certain west Asian powers. They claim that arms 

manufacturing companies in the US are concerned that Indian 

R & D will in the next decade lead to this country displacing

western manufacturers in many .third markets, as the Chinese

are already doing. Hence the hidden American pressure to  

throttle the research and development programmes in the defence   

field. 

The problem facing the PMO is that the dominant opinion 

within a key ministry—finance—is in favour of making strategic    

concessions to the US in the expectation of getting commercial 

advantages from that country. However, analysts within the   

Commerce ministry point out that the present US administration, 

faced as it is with joblessness at home,   in no position to give   

economic concessions 'to India, because concessions to one

country will be demanded by several, and the US administration   

cannot be seen as giving preference to outsiders at the expense  

of American industry'. Economic ties between India and the US 

'are dependent on company to company rather than on country

to country links, and these will grow simply because no one can

ignore the emerging Indian market'.

As for the implied strategic prescriptions of the finance

ministry, while its economic effects are debatable, its political

consequences are not. The BJP, groping for an issue after the

fizzling-out of the communal atmospherics of the Babri Masjid

agitation period, will get a free ride on the horse of national

security should India abandon the Agni programme and halt the

deployment of Prithvi.

The dilemma facing the Prime Minister is that national

security is one of the three planks holding together the Congress

party’s effective electoral platform, the second being the party’s

non-denominational approach to regions and communities, and

the third the ability to provide a stable government without 

falling apart midway. Thus there exists a clear contradiction

between the political interests of President Clinton and the

political survival of P. V. Narasimha Rao. No prizes for guessing 

which option the PM is likely to exercise in Washington. 

The Thumb of Ekalavya - India's Security Interests and the U.S.

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The multitudes who watched the teleserial, Mahabharuta and the

somewhat smaller number who would actually have read the

epic would be familiar with the fate of Ekalavya. Born of—in

today's jargon—'socially disadvantaged' parents, the boy was

barred from learning the skills reserved for the martial castes.

This did not prevent him from picking up these skills on his own,

all the while imagining to himself that the great teacher,

Dronacharya, was guiding him.

When the five Pandava brothers found out that the low-born

Ekalavya was not just their equal but in some respects their

superior in the crucial art of archery, they complained to

Dronacharya, who made Ekalavya cut off his thumb, thus

ending his career in archery.

If Ekalavya’s fate comes to mind during the month in which

India joined the nuclear club 20 years ago, it is because the

modern-day Pandavas—the five accepted nuclear powers—are,

through the United States, seeking to cut off lowly India’s

nuclear thumb through a voluntary capping of its activities and

capabilities in the nuclear and missile fields. Should the

Narasimha Rao government eventually agree to this strategic

mutilation, it would be as significant an act of self-abnegation as

Ekalavya’s.

Restrictive View

The mandarins of North Block, which houses the Union finance

ministry, are focusing on finance capital as the engine of economic

progress, especially the capital flowing in from abroad, This is a

rather restrictive view of development, and not just because such

financial inflows are ordinarily prone to sudden reversals in

direction. It is also restrictive because it ignores the fact that the

locomotive behind economic change has always been science 

and technology based on a durable foundation of educational with

excellence.

Had the finance ministry shown the same eagerness to

buttress indigenous research and development that it is showing interest

to attract finance capital into this country, India's long-term 

interests may have been better served. One is reminded of the 

consistent western criticism of Pandit Nehru's drive to improve 

the level of scientific research in India, and to create the social 

and institutional infrastructure needed for growth. Today, this 

far-sightedness has resulted in a science and technology 

establishment that is the equal of any other power. Had Pandit 

Nehru - or his successors - accepted the western viewpoint and

choked off funds to high-technology areas (as is being done by 

today's mandarins) India would today be at the mercy of outside

powers in the sphere of defence. 

The argument used by the small but dominant body of

officials seeking to cap India's technology in the nuclear and

missile field is that the U.S. would 'guarantee India's security in

the same way as it does that of Japan and Western Europe'. Such

a formulation ignores the very real difference between India on

the one hand and Western Europe and Japan on the other. In the

case of India, U.S. policy has often been ambiguous—and at

times hostile—on basic security concerns. One example is the

recent statement implicitly accepting the Pakistani demand for

a change in the present status of Kashmir. Another is the close

American attention to 'human rights issues' in sensitive Indian

states.

Should the finance ministry prescription be accepted, India

would be at the mercy of the U.S. on all issues affecting its

strategic interests. Should the U.S. perceive India as being 

insufficiently ready to open up its markets to American l

companies, it could up the ante on Kashmir and other sensitive 

indian states, and use the ensuing turmoil as a lever to press for 

further concessions. It is, for example, clear that Pakistan—which I

has been a client state of the U.S.—could have been compelled

by that country to desist from supporting terrorists in India. The

fact that Pakistan does not feel inhibited in carrying on such

activity and that other U.S.-friendly nations such as Saudi

Arabia also give financial help to fundamentalist organisations

within India, can be logically taken as indicative of a strategy to

keep tensions within this country on the boil.

Washington constantly speaks of its support for the territorial

integrity of India, while in the same breath derecognising

Kashmir's accession to this country. It speaks of its commitment

to regional peace, while simultaneously retaining its military

base in the Indian ocean. This brings us to one expressed

(through Paul Kreisberg, a senior American diplomat) U.S.

reason for stopping the development of Agni. According to

Kreisberg, this is essential ’in order to forestall any threat to U.S.

naval vessels in the Indian Ocean'.

War Games

The Pentagon is prone to playing war games, and not always on

computer screens, and one such 'game' could involve the despatch

of an American naval task force to the Indian waters in pursuit

of a strategic or tactical aim. Should Agni, Prithvi and such other

systems be done away with, the country would be defenceless

against such a move, one that was actually put into operation by

the U.S. navy during the 1971 Bangladesh war. To entrust the

defence of 880 million people to the goodwill of a power located

thousands of miles away, and which has had a history of putting

pressure on India to compromise its security concerns to

accommodate a hostile Pakistan, would be an act of

irresponsibility.

If the industrial revolution generated the momentum for the

development of European economies two centuries ago, the

chemical revolution during the turn of the century and the

computer revolution in the post-World War II period were

responsible for fuelling a substantial share of the progress made

in the 1900s. Today, the atomic revolution may well be the new

frontier. This is the reason why such immense effort is being

made in countries such as the US or Japan to harness fusion

energy. India lost out on the industrial revolution and forfeited

her freedom. India lagged behind on the chemical and computer

fronts this century, and missed out on prosperity. Today the

Clinton administration is asking this country to step aside once

more as a helpless bystander while others develop—and reap the

benefits of—frontline technologies.

US Intervention

Afghanistan is a nearby case that illustrates the consequences of

American intervention, an intervention not the less detestable

because it followed the equally repugnant Soviet one. Today that

country has been effectively partitioned into three states, each

controlled by a warlord who has thrived on U.S. resources and

weaponry. Cambodia is another example, a country where the

U.S. worked behind the scenes to oust the 'neutralist' Prince

Norodom Sihanouk only to welcome him back after many

millions of lives had been lost. Should the Dan Burtons and the

Robin Raphels have their way, Kashmir, Punjab—and indeed the

whole of India—may go the way of Afghanistan or Cambodia.

Only an independent strategic deterrent will curb this U.S.

propensity to intervene and experiment in third countries.

The U.S. needs to treat India not as so much avoirdupois in

the 'white man’s burden', but as an independent major power

with its own perceptions and strategic deterrents. This America

will do once India sheds the belief that only genuflection and

surrender will propitiate the gods in 1600 Pennsylvania avenue.

One hopes that the Narasimha Rao government will not go the

way of Ekalavya—or Gorbachev or Alia Izbetgovich, for that

matter—but follow the way mapped out not just by China but

also by Malaysia and even tiny Singapore. India’s strategic

independence and scientific prowess are too valuable to mortgage 

and destroy. 

Scientists See End to Nuclear Neglect

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Scientists and defence planners are closely monitoring the stirrings

of change in the Rao governments security policies after the

Brown amendment. The earlier dismay at the systematic neglect

of nuclear research since 1984 has given way to an expectation

that the programme may get back the political backing it enjoyed

during the tenures of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

A scientist who had been among the 1974 Pokhran explosion

masterminds said that "six to eight more tests are needed before

the safety and reliability of the Indian deterrent can be assured".

He pointed out that the US had carried out 1,149 tests, Russia

1,100, France 209, Britain 45 and China 43 to India's solitary

nuclear explosion at Pokhran.

A senior defence planner said that ”the Brown amendment

proved that those who were slowing down the Indian nuclear

programme on the grounds that the US would not arm Pakistan

were wrong". According to him, "while Pakistan does not as yet

have the capability of making nuclear weapons, this could

change in less than five years with the help of China. The only

defence against a threat of nuclear blackmail would be to perfect

our own systems". In the view of a scientist associated with the

Indian missile programme, "by giving weapons to Islamabad

despite knowing about its clandestine nuclear programme, the

Clinton administration has signalled that Pakistan has joined

Israel in the list of 'protected states' that can develop nuclear

weapons without fear of US sanctions".

Senior officials in the Department of Atomic Energy, (DAE)

on condition of anonymity, pinpointed two members of the

Atomic Energy Commission who, "routinely block funding for

essential research". According to another official, "it is curious

that these (two officials) parrot in meetings the exact arguments

of persons in Washington who are out to sabotage the Indian

programme. This has had a devastating effect on morale".

While agreeing that funding for the nuclear programme "has

been choked off almost to the point of killing it", a senior

scientist in the DAE said that "the other side is that there has to

be greater financial accountability. Also, safety standards must

be rigorously enforced by making the safety function independent

of the DAE". However, others reiterated that the problem was

not within the DAE as much as it was lack of political will in

backing the nuclear programme.

A scientist active during the Pokhran explosion claimed that

"the DAE has done world-class research despite poor funding.

However, it has not been allowed to license its technologies to

the private sector, nor to tap technical institutes such as the IITs

to help research".

A senior Defence ministry official agreed that "not enough

has been done to generate revenue by licensing technology not

only to Indian private industry, but to friendly countries such as

South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia". A DAE scientist pointed

out that "India is rich in thorium. Thus it makes sense to develop

technologies for power plants that will use thorium-based U-233

fuel. However, for the past 10 years, almost no funds have been

provided for such research". He added that "this is in contrast

to Japan, Germany and France, which have developed nuclear

power substantially". He added that "in case the CTBT is signed

by India, it must be on condition that the present restrictions on

technology and data transfer be removed".

A senior defence policy analyst working in the government

added that "the policy of adjustment to western sensitivities has

given no benefits. Not only has the flow of arms to Pakistan been

resumed, the ban on the sale of even safety-related items to India

has continued. At least now, one hopes the government will

wake up and drive a better bargain".

Defence and DAE officials are unanimous that the Jaswant

Singh committee's recommendations need to be adopted by

policymakers. The committee had observed that "if indigenously

developed (nuclear power) technology is not implemented,

(there will be) grave and irreparable damage (to Indian security).

As fossil fuels are finite, it is essential to harness nuclear power.

The Government must modify its policy and adopt a committed

programme with enhanced funding". 

India should Move to Protect its Interests in Afghanistan

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Should the Taliban consolidate its hold over Afghanistan, it will

be bad news for India. At present, the fundamentalists in

Kashmir are using Pakistan as a base for their operations. Now

under US pressure to cease such support, Islamabad may simply

transfer formal responsibility for the Kashmir insurgency to

Kabul. Given that there will not be an extension of the "Turn the

other cheek", policy adopted towards Pakistan, New Delhi will

then have to decide on the methods of retaliation.

In geopolitics as in public health, prevention is better than

cure. While the Najibullah regime, identified with the Soviet

occupiers, was not sustainable among the Afghan people, that of

President Burhanuddin Rabbani is. The only way to prevent

Taliban's consolidation is for New Delhi to declare that it

continues to recognise the Rabbani government, and to give it

assistance to beat back the fundamentalist offensive. Should

India dither and Rabbani’s forces get routed, the ISI will ensure

that the next target is the democratic government that will soon

get formed in Srinagar.

There are excellent legal and moral reasons for such a stand.

While a change of government brought about by democratic

means needs to be accepted, a shift in power brought about by

force is unacceptable. It is indeed remarkable that the very

countries that correctly waged war on Saddam Hussain for

annexing Kuwait are today condoning the Taliban’s recourse to

"Saddam" methods in Afghanistan.

This appears to be less the product of a well-conceived

strategy than one more aberration created by the Pakistan-

centric leadership at the South Asia division of the US state

department. Thanks to such officials, Washington has ignored

the twin holes in its anti-terrorist front caused by Saudi Arabia

and Pakistan. While Iran, Libya and Sudan are sought to be

contained, as yet little has been done about Saudi funding and

Pakistani training of extremists.

New Delhi will need to implement a programme of help to

the legal government in Afghanistan, besides taking up through

diplomatic sources the dangers to regional security caused by

the virulent teachings of the Taliban.

In Kashmir, India is attempting to fashion a democratic

alternative to rule by the extremists. They can be expected to

respond by sending in fresh levies of terrorists, once they are

freed of the need to deal with the Rabbani forces. Thus, security

in Kashmir is tied to the success of the legal government in

Afghanistan against the extremists.

The international drug bazaar has become an important

source of funding for extremists, almost as important as Saudi

millionaires. Through the UN, India needs to spearhead an

international campaign against drug cultivation in Afghanistan,

Pakistan and elsewhere, a campaign that includes the aerial

spraying of defoliants on areas where drugs are cultivated. In

addition, the domestic laws against drug trafficking need to be

made much more stringent, so that they are brought on a par

with Singapore. Extremism cannot be fought only by soldiers.

The roots need to be tackled, through helping Afghan moderates

fight extremists, and by fashioning an international campaign

against drugs in the subcontinent.

Sadly for this country, the Rao-Manmohan years witnessed

a "penny wise pound foolish" policy on security. As a result of

lack of support for Afghan moderates and parsimony in defence

expenditure, vast amounts of money had to be spent fighting the

insurgencies that such a policy encouraged. Today, should New

Delhi hesitate to help President Rabbani, it will be spending

many times that money in the next three years fighting the

Mujahideen that may flood it after Rabbani’s final defeat.

This is true despite the fact that the Taliban's success may

prove as self-defeating for Islamabad as the growth of Hamas

proved for Tel Aviv. In the early years of Hamas, Israel saw it

as a counter to the PLO. It was only much later that it realised

that it had a monster on its hands far more potent than chairman

Arafat’s men.

While the Pashtuns in the Taliban have thus far been willing

V to take Islamabad’s help, once they themselves form the Afghan

government, traditional ethnic nationalism will come into play,

and there is a high probability of a future linking up of Pakistani

and Afghan Pashtuns to attempt to carve out an ethnic state out

of both countries, Many within the Taliban—those that are not

fully under the control of the ISI—may realise that a policy of

jehad in Pashtun areas has lower costs and greater returns than

attempts at subverting Kashmir.

Rather than adopt in its entirety the Narasimha Rao policy

of turning the other cheek whenever slapped by Pakistan, New

Delhi needs to evolve separate responses to Pakistani businessmen

and people, and to the attempts by the Benazir government to

foment insurgency in India. While the first group needs to be

won over through concessions and contact, the second needs to

be tackled firmly.

In this, the US is a model. Despite international disapproval,

Washington went ahead with its show of force in Iraq, to

reinforce the point that defiance will not pay. Hopefully, the

apparent confusion at the Taliban takeover of Kabul will be

replaced by a policy that serves this country's strategic interests.

Below 150, Sonia finis. Below 200, Vajpayee falls again (Rediff)

Below 150, Sonia finis. Below 200, Vajpayee falls again 

India is the land of the Sorcars -- those masters of magic -- and it is therefore no surprise that there is usually a huge gap between the two. Take the case of two BJP ministers, Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha. While one is widely perceived to be a success, the other mediocre. Under Singh, who has apparently been content to follow the Prime Minister's Office's directions on foreign policy, India has substantially diluted its stand on Kashmir and the nuclear issue, in exchange for words of praise from the US and the EU.

Both Jaswant and the real master of the MEA, Brajesh Mishra, preen at every certificate issued by Washington, London and other capitals, in the manner of schoolboys getting a pat on the head from the schoolmaster. No cost-benefit has been done of the substantive impact of such "gains" on the 970 million citizens of India, the only gauge that counts.

Yes, there has been much patting on the head. However, the prohibition on World Bank and other multilateral loans to India remains in effect, even while Pakistan is busy negotiating fresh tranches of assistance on very soft terms. Both the US and its primary satellite, the UK, have complimented Nawaz Sharief essentially for bowing to the inevitable. The Great Jihadi had no option but to clutch at the face-saver provided by his army. Thanks to the Washington summit, both India and the US have lost.

The jihadi forces in Pakistan now believe that a victorious army was made to reverse course under pressure. Had it been conclusively demonstrated that Musharraf's men had been whipped, the affection for them in the populace may have declined, thus making it easier to cut the defence budget to levels that can save Pakistan from economic collapse. More people would have realised the futility of fighting a neighbour that -- despite its politicians -- is getting more powerful by the day. Instead, the illusion that the druggie-kookies can take on the professional and multicultural Indian forces is still alive, courtesy Clinton.

The US too has lost by its obsessive desire to insinuate itself into any conflict. More people in Pakistan now believe in the "stab in the back" theory that holds that Kashmir would have been Pakistan's by now but for the Jehadi prime minister knuckling under pressure and pulling back forces who were (according to this view, one heavily propagated in Pakistan's Urdu press) scattering the racially-inferior Indians. This lends further impetus to the already existing tendency in kook circles in Pakistan to target the US as an enemy as horrible as India, and to the purchase of tickets to New York and Chicago to bomb and kill in retaliation for the Clinton-Sharief agreement.

Indeed, a parallel can be drawn with 1917 Germany, where too the armistice (that the German army's comprehensive defeat made inevitable) was passed off by the kooks there as a fraud perpetrated on a winning army by mainly-Jewish politicians. This canard spawned the most evil individual to have been born in the 19th century, Adolf Hitler. Today, the Kargil lie created through Bubba's impulsive intervention will create individuals who in time will pose significant security challenges to the US.

Poor Bubba. It must have been on Madeleine Albright's advice that he accepted the Jehadi's plea to be received on July 4. Albright's appointment is clearly one of the decisions taken by Clinton in those historic moments when Monica Lewinsky was inside the White House. There can be no other explanation for the appointment of an individual so intellectually challenged to a post that is so critical to the future of US interests. The only prominent individual who makes Albright look normal in comparison is Sonia Gandhi, who needs notes even to know when to wave and how to walk.

The venerable president of the Congress should not be faulted for wanting to be prime minister, as ambition is not a crime. Should her party get 200-plus seats, it will be almost a formality that Sonia will get sworn in as the next European from the Nehru family to rule India after Jawahar, Indu and Rajiv. If these three could not destroy India, neither can the bahu who believes a wedding certificate can substitute for any proof of competence or capability.

In case the charms of Sonia-Rahul-Priyanka do not work, and the Congress tally falls significantly below 150, the worst-affected will be the BJP. A weakened Congress will be instantly more attractive to the converts from secularism now within the BJP fold. Within a year of a new Vajpayee government getting sworn in, these elements can be expected to make common cause with Congress leaders, egging them on to dump Sonia and thus fulfil the precondition for a Grand Alliance of the "secular" brigade.

The moves by George Fernandes and Ramakrishna Hegde -- dear friends of many present Congress leaders -- give an indication of this alignment. Unless the BJP crosses 200 seats, its life in government is likely to be as short as the tenure of the 1998 Vajpayee regime. Thus, it is crucial for the BJP not only that it do better than in the previous election, but that Sonia does not collapse as a vote-getter. The best insurance for the longevity of a new Vajpayee regime will be the continuance of Sonia Gandhi as the dictator of the Congress.

But we are digressing from our comparison of Jaswant and Yashwant. The ground reality is that the first has been a disaster, while the second has been an outstanding success.

Despite an unfortunate habit of trying to raise tax rates (as distinct from taxes), and continuously being a prophet of doom rather than of boom, the Union finance minister has done a remarkable job in managing the economy. It is no accident that in the Prime Minister's Office, foreign policy is monopolised by Brajesh Mishra, who leaves economic issues to be tackled by N K Singh.

Had the principal secretary been involved in economic policy, there is little doubt that India would have gone the way of Brazil under Delfim Netto, when each policy was hailed by Washington but led to disaster for the Brazilian people. Finally, the army dictators had to remove the finance minister to stop further riots and economic collapse.

Brajesh Mishra's appointment as his deputy has been the root of most of Vajpayee's political problems, including the break with Jayalalitha that led to his Lok Sabha defeat five months ago.

Unlike the case of the Samata or the Akali ministers, who got away with whatever they wanted, Mishra torpedoed most of the decisions of the AIADMK crew, even as he leaned on Vazhapaddi Ramamurthy or even Ananth Kumar in the case of any decision not previously cleared by Pramod Mahajan.

Mishra made a clear North-South distinction, interfering not at all with the north-based regional parties, but acting the overlord in the case of the southern ones, even the Lok Shakti, where Ramakrishna Hegde has had to struggle hard to have his way in a manner not a problem for the Samata-Akali lot.

If I K Gujral looked only to those born in Pakistan to fill vacancies, Vajpayee seems reluctant to cross the Vindhyas. This is going to create tensions should there be a second round. This time, ministers unfortunate enough to have southern bases are unlikely to accept the hectoring of the principal secretary, who is meek as a lamp before the Samata and the Akali crew.

This writer believes the US is a friend because it is a fellow democracy, and that in time relations between New Delhi and Washington will become very close. However, this does not mean that all the prescriptions of US bureaucrats on Indian foreign, security and economic issues are correct. The "loyalty test" that US bureaucrats inflict on their South Asian intermediaries is to uncritically accept all their nostrums, upon pain of being called a Cold War relic and anti-American to boot.

Like millions of Americans, this writer believes that Clinton is often wrong, especially on policy towards South Asia. This does not dilute the writer's belief that, after India, the US is the best country in the world. Or that India needs to adopt much more of the feisty, transparent style of US legislatures, as well as the ruthless manner in which security interests get defended by Washington.

Looking at the way even big parties get dominated by a single individual or clique, it is to India's advantage that the next Lok Sabha too be a melange of parties. That will prevent a Sonia or a Brajesh autocracy, and hopefully in the process further extend the range of freedoms enjoyed by a people colonised for most of the dying millennium.

http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/07monu.htm