The best “Muslim” policy for India (PO)

M D Nalapat

It used to be said that Joe Biden was the only US Senator who was not a millionaire. Now, he is the Vice-President. Unlike Dick Cheney, who was in the same office when huge contracts got awarded in Iraq to a company that he had been closely associated with, Biden stays clear of commerce. Had he been a politician in India, here too he would have been the exception. For there is no easier way to fabulous riches in India than through politics. In the present Manmohan Singh government, almost all the ministers are super-affluent. Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar (the President of the International Cricket Council) is even richer than former PM of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif or present President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, as are several of his Cabinet colleagues (even though most conceal their wealth through “benami” entities). Unlike most other politicians, Pawar is open about his wealth and his lifestyle, perhaps the reason why he is still popular in his home state of Maharashtra - the state that has given the world Sunil Gavaskar and Sachin Tendulkar.

In a polity which has multiple parties, even a 3% margin can make the difference between electoral defeat and a landslide. This is the reason why parties other than the few “Hindutva” parties ( who may be compared to the “Islam Pasanda” parties in Pakistan) are so eager to win over the Muslims. Now comprising 16% of the population of the Union of India, the Muslim community has understood the power of the ballot, and participates in the electoral process far more effectively than many other communities. The problem facing the Congress Party is that the Muslim vote is divided between itself and other non-Hindutva parties, such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the Samajwadi Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Janata Dal (United). Unless the Congress Party can convince the Muslim community that it can represent its interests better than any other, Rahul Gandhi’s dream of ensuring a majority in Parliament for his party will remain unattained.

FM Qureshi seen as Army favourite (PO)

M D Nalapat

Although as yet far behind in quantitative terms, the Indian elite see their country as China’s equal. While rates of growth have decelerated in China since the 1980s,they have accelerated in India. And like Pakistan, the second most-populous country in the world has a young population, while China’s is ageing. By 2027, the effect of this is expected to boost India’s prospects of catching up with what will at that time be the world’s largest economy (in Purchasing Power Parity terms), China. Hence it was with anger that South Block, the home of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of external Affairs, heard of Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s “blank cheque” to the Chinese Communist Party to mediate the Indo-Pakistan dispute.

Earlier, US President Barack Obama had made a cringing visit to China, during which he had generously made to the Chinese leadership the offer first made by Bill Clinton 13 years earlier, of partnering with Washington in “managing” India-Pakistan relations. That offer had led to the mistrust of Obama that today pervades the Indian establishment Why did Foreign Minister Qureshi make such a statement just two days before Foreign Secretary-level talks between the two sub continental neighbours? He would certainly have been aware of the strong Indian distaste of involving any country in the bilateral tango between India and Pakistan, especially China, which since 1963 has been aligned with Islamabad in its bid to limit Delhi’s freedom of action. There are three theories doing the rounds within Raisina Road, the Indian Beltway.

Punjabi Power and Zardari (UPI)

M.D. Nalapat


MANIPAL, India, March 18 (UPI) -- Regular readers of this column will not have been surprised at recent developments in Pakistan, in which army chief Ashfaq Kayani enforced the surrender of the Pakistan Peoples Party-led government to the demands of the Pakistan Muslim League-N chief, Nawaz Sharif.

The core purpose of Kayani's institution is to ensure the continued supremacy of Wahhabi Punjabis over all other groups in Pakistan, a mission that it has fulfilled thus far.

Uppity non-Punjabis, such as assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, were shown their place for daring to talk of a genuinely federal structure for the country. Now it is the turn of her husband, President Asif Ali Zardari, to be at the business end of Kayani's swagger stick.

The "honest" former -- and soon to be reinstated -- chief justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry, has been a member in good standing of the Punjabi supremacist brigade since his years as a lawyer. He detests Zardari and has only kind words about his champion and fellow Punjabi, Nawaz Sharif. This despite the fact that the Sharif family has acquired an asset base of close to $2 billion, entirely because of its proximity to the military and other levers of patronage in Pakistan.

Why Benazir Bhutto Posed a Threat (UPIASIA)

M.D. Nalapat

Manipal, India — On Nov. 7 this columnist wrote that Pakistani politician Benazir Bhutto's election plans were likely to fail "if she survives." The skepticism over her longevity was because of the threat she represented to both the Punjabi component in the Pakistan army and to the continuation of the military's monopoly over state power.

While President Pervez Musharraf avoided challenging the latter, since 9/11 he has quietly but systematically sought to reduce the suffocating grip of the Punjabis over the army, giving better representation to Mohajirs, Balochis, Pashtuns and even a few Sindhis in the higher reaches of both the military as well as the civil administration. Had there been a teaming up between the wily Musharraf and the mercurial Bhutto, especially after he was made to quit as army chief, the two may have succeeded in leveraging anti-army sentiment in Pakistan enough to send the soldiers back to their barracks.

Since the 1950s, those in uniform have controlled Pakistan's civilian institutions, ensuring that these were melded with the military into a seamless system of preference and privilege to a military that has made jihad a lucrative industry. Especially since anti-U.S. passions rose after the Iraq war in 2003, but dating back to the earlier attempt by Musharraf to put the Taliban out to dry in Afghanistan , the Baloch and Pashtun components of the Pakistan army turned against their chief, to be joined by the Punjabi component shortly thereafter.