Vaiko sabotaged Eelam compromise plan in 2008 (Sunday Guardian)

MADHAV NALAPAT  Colombo | 12th Aug

Former LTTE cadres with an army officer in Colombo on 11 May. As part of a rehabilitation programme, more than 500 ex-cadres were on a three-day visit to Colombo from Vavuniya. REUTERS hen Union Minister of Finance P. Chidambaram spent several days in March 2008 seeking to save the LTTE and V. Prabhakaran from impending annihilation at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army. This was revealed by Prabhakaran's effective second-in-command at the time, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, in Colombo on Thursday. Pathmanathan, who first came into contact with Prabhakaran in 1976, rose steadily through the ranks, leaving for India in 1982, from where he was tasked with the procurement of money and weapons from Bulgaria, Lebanon, Ukraine, North Korea and other countries. He left this country soon after the IPKF landed in Sri Lanka in 1987 as part of the Rajiv Gandhi-J.R. Jayawardene pact. Although he left active duty in 2002, soon after the new restrictions on money transfers and arms procurement post-9/11 made his job difficult, he was asked by Prabhakaran to rejoin as the supremo's effective deputy in January 2009, months away from the defeat of the LTTE at the hands of the Sri Lankan military. Aware that the LTTE leadership, including Prabhakaran, was cornered in a small area to the north of Sri Lanka, the Finance Minister undertook a mission to enforce yet another ceasefire, which would prevent the capture or annihilation of the top leadership of the LTTE. Chidambaram told the LTTE supremo via the latter's military second-in-command Natesan that he would "ensure that the Sri Lankan government agree to a peace deal that would involve the implementation of the 13th amendment", which would confer substantial autonomy to the Tamil-majority areas in the north and east of Sri Lanka. Further, the LTTE leader and his top confidants would be "escorted out of their trap in safety", presumably to fight another day. Vaiko All that Chidambaram asked for was a declaration that the LTTE would agree for "autonomy within Sri Lanka", rather than an independent Tamil homeland. According to Pathmanathan, "Prabhakaran was totally opposed to giving up Eelam, but he was considering making a declaration to the contrary" so as to save his organisation. "Prabhakaran would have issued a statement that he had dropped the Eelam demand (while determined to continue the battle once conditions improved) but Natesan confided the Chidambaram plan to Vaiko, who immediately sent a message to Prabhakaran not to give up Eelam" even verbally. Prabhakaran According to Pathmanathan, Vaiko assured Prabhakaran that he and other Eelam supporters in Tamil Nadu would "make the Government of India intervene to rescue the LTTE leaders", just as they had done on previous occasions. "Prabhakaran believed Vaiko and refused Chidambaram's request," the former LTTE deputy leader added. During the final days in May when the Sri Lankan Army was on the edge of eliminating the LTTE altogether, "several of those present with Prabhakaran in his final redoubt rued the day they had trust in Tamil Nadu leaders", Pathmanathan said. That the present Finance Minister of India went to such lengths in an attempt to save the lives of those that planned and carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi indicates that forgiveness is very much a part of Chidambaram's character. http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/vaiko-sabotaged-eelam-compromise-plan-in-2008

‘Some TN leaders wanted Eelam in India’ (Sunday Guardian)

MADHAV NALAPAT  Colombo | 12th Aug

Selvarasa Pathmanathan elvarasa Pathmanathan or "KP" (56) was LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran's oldest and most trusted associate, first coming in contact with him in 1976. In 1982, Prabhakaran sent him to Chennai in India to coordinate funding for the group as well as procurement of weapons, explosives and other materiel needed for LTTE operations in Sri Lanka. Two years after Rajiv Gandhi sent in the IPKF to LTTE-held areas of Sri Lanka in 1987, "KP" shifted to Bangkok, marrying a Thai girl and fathering a daughter. From there as well, he ensured a steady supply of cash, weaponry and provisions for the fighters back home. However, the restrictions on transfer of funds and purchase of weaponry and explosives put in place by the US after 9/11 severely handicapped his functioning, leading to a sharp fall in supplies. As a consequence, Prabhakaran removed him as chief of the International Department of the LTTE in 2002. However, less than four months away from his own demise, the LTTE supremo asked "KP" to once again take charge of international operations from Thailand itself, a request that was immediately accepted. On 18 May, a little after 6 p.m., all contact with Prabhakaran and his associate Soosai ceased. The supremo was dead, as was his organisation. "KP" surrendered to the Sri Lankan authorities and was placed under house arrest, from where on 9 August he talked to Madhav Nalapat: Q: Why did Prabhakaran order the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi? A: He was convinced that Rajiv wanted him to be killed. He was worried that the Congress may win the 1991 polls and that Rajiv would once again send in the IPKF, this time to finish him off. So he decided to get him first. Q: Who gave him that idea? A: (After a pause) A politician from Tamil Nadu, whom Prabhakaran trusted, told him that his information was that Rajiv was angry about his refusing to give up the Eelam (independent Tamil homeland) demand, and that (the politician had information that) Rajiv wanted to take revenge by killing Prabhakaran. Later, when other politicians in Tamil Nadu told him that the Congress was likely to come back to power, he gave orders to eliminate Rajiv Gandhi. (This was about) five months before the parliamentary elections of 1991. Q: Who is that politician? A: I am sorry, I can't give the name. He is still around and very senior. You must remember that even by that time, Prabhakaran was very isolated. Almost all his sources for information about India came from Tamil Nadu. And it turned out that the Congress (and its ally, the AIADMK) did very well in that state. The mistake Prabhakaran's informants made was to believe that all of India would follow the Tamil Nadu pattern and give a majority to Congress. Q: But Rajiv offered Prabhakaran a good deal in 1988. The Tigers would have got substantial autonomy for the areas they were interested in. Why did Prabhakaran go back on his agreement with Rajiv? A: You must remember that Prabhakaran was fixed on Eelam. At no stage was he prepared to accept anything less than a wholly independent Tamil state. He said that he was forced to pretend to agree so as to come back and resume the struggle. He had no choice. Besides, he mistrusted Rajiv's newfound closeness with (President) Jayewardene. This was why he believed the Tamil Nadu politician who told him Rajiv wanted him dead. Q: Why was Prabhakaran so adamant on Eelam? A: You must understand his psychology. From a young age, he had put aside everything to focus on Eelam. He saw himself as the successor to the Chola kings, and wanted to create a new Tamil kingdom that would rival theirs in greatness Q: Out of a tiny bit of land in the north of Sri Lanka? A: To Prabhakaran, winning control over the north and part of the west and east coasts of Sri Lanka would just be the beginning. The intention was to use the territory to "prepare" the Tamil Nadu people to revolt against Delhi the way he had against Colombo. What few know is that some Tamil Nadu politicians encouraged this dream by saying that they too favoured the extension of Eelam to India. Q: Who were they? A: I won't reveal their names. All I can say is that Prabhakaran was in regular touch with Karunanidhi, Nedumaran, Vaiko and Ramadoss. All four encouraged him in various ways. One point he made often to me was that Tamil Nadu politicians (who were in touch with him) were supporters of freedom for the Tamils only when they were out of power. Once in office, they became silent about the need for (a greater) Eelam. Q: What were the LTTE's last days like? You were in touch with Prabhakaran and his associates almost to the end. A: Many of those with him saw that they were lost when Killinochi fell in January 2008. Some used to confide this to me on satellite telephone. However, none dared tell Prabhakaran that he was defeated. They knew that if he heard something that he disliked, he could strip that person of all his powers or even finish him off. Hence even Pottu Amman gave him an optimistic picture, even though he knew from end-January 2008 that the game was up and that the Sri Lankan Army had won. Q: What was Prabhakaran hoping for? A miracle? A: He had a lot of faith in the Europeans, especially (Norwegian Foreign Minister) Eric Solheim. From 2006 onwards, Solheim had been putting pressure on Colombo to concede to LTTE demands. He had a lot of respect for Prabhakaran and saw him not as a terrorist the way some others did, but as a freedom fighter. Solheim thought that Prabhakaran was a great warrior who could always run circles around the Sri Lankan Army. Prabhakaran knew that Norway and other European powers had put pressure on the UN to come up with an agreement that would rescue him and salvage his cause. Q: What kind of agreement? A: The Europeans and the UN wanted the Sri Lankan government to agree to a "No Fire Zone", where LTTE cadres could move about in safety. This was agreed to at first, but then the LTTE continued to fire on Sri Lankan soldiers from within the zone, so the agreement broke down. Even during the last days, Norway ensured that the UN work towards bringing Prabhakaran as well as other LTTE leaders and their families to safety in Eritrea. However, in 2008, nothing worked. The Sri Lankan Army continued its offensive until the end. Q: Did Prabhakaran try to escape during those final days? A: Yes. On 13 May he decided to escape into a nearby jungle and from there, try and sail away to safety in a small craft. Two days later, he and a few bodyguards and associates tried to escape from their bunker. However, the Sri Lankan Army pickets were too numerous, and they could not break through. From then on, his only hope was that the Europeans and Delhi would force Colombo to agree to a ceasefire. But that never happened. Q: What was the last day like? A: I do not know. Each hour I used to get a call from the remaining satellite phone, but the previous day, Pottu Amman had told me that if the interval (between calls) was more than an hour, it would mean that there was nobody left. I got his last call at 6 p.m. on 18 May 2008. After that, silence. http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/some-tn-leaders-wanted-eelam-in-india

Sri Lanka enjoys peace dividend (PO)

By M D Nalapat 
Since 2011,the Sri Lankan army has organised an annual conference that highlights its work and its viewpoint to invitees from across the globe. This year’s conference is being held in Colombo’s Galadari Hotel, and more than a hundred overseas guests have been invited to participate in the discussions, including military personnel from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,the US and several other countries. The theme of the 2012conference is “Towards Lasting Peace and Stability”,and while the focus last year was how the victorious war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was won,this year it is about the Sri Lankan military’s efforts to win the peace by gaining the trust and affection of the Tamil population of the northern areas (where the LTTE ruled for decades)

In 2009, the Sri Lankan military annihilated the LTTE and its supremo,Velupillai Prabhakaran, known as “Pirabha” to close friends. The fate of Prabhakaran and his organisation shows what happens when the leader of an armed and violent movement believes his strength and his chances to be much better than they are. Several times in the past,including during the initial year of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first term, the LTTE leader was offered peace terms that would have made unchallenged his control over more than a fifth of the country,and in some negotiations,even as much as a fourth. However,he would have had to accept the legal fiction that the land he administered was part of Sri Lanka,albeit “autonomous”. Prabhakaran would have none of this.He wanted an independent “Tamil Eelam” both in fact as well as in law. In this stand,he overlooked the fact that after 9/11,tolerance for violent attempts to overthrow authority were frowned upon by the then dominant NATO powers,who changed their stand and switched in favour of violent groups (in Libya and now in Syria) only in 2011, two years after the LTTE fell. Second,he brushed aside the reality that New Delhi would see as a threat to its own stability an independent Tamil state just minutes away from its shores,that advertised itself as a “Tamil homeland” and which had substantial capability in acts of violence. Methods that could easily have been adopted in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu,once Prabhakaran got his “eelam” ( homeland) in northern Sri Lanka. An independent state of the dimensions possible at the time when the LTTE was at the peak of its strength (in the 1990s) would have lacked viability,and could not have survived without forging close ties with Sri Lanka itself. However,Prabhakaran was blinded by the delusion that European countries would come to his assistance and force Colombo to abandon its northern districts,the way Serbia was forced to surrender Kosovo and Indonesia withdraw from East Timor. Since the collapse of the USSR, the LTTE took seriously the widespread thesis that the world was seeing the “end of history” and the resumption of an indefinite period when Europe and countries run by those of European ethnicity would dominate the world.Till then,the LTTE had focussed in its diplomacy on Tamil Nadu,building up coalitions of politicians who backed its demands (on Colombo) even after the LTTE killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Unfortunately for Prabhakaran, Colombo got support from India for the continuation of its unitary status, as well as forging close links with Beijing and Islamabad. Although to the last,countries such as Norway sought to pressure the Rajapaksa government into making concessions that would in effect legitimize LTTE rule over defined swathes of Sri Lanka, such pressure was ineffective. President Rajapaksa ignored advice to declare yet another cease fire with the LTTE,opting instead to order his military to finish the job, not flinching even when LTTE cadres surrounded themselves with nearly three hundred thousand civilians.These were used as human shields,to be shot and killed should they seek to escape the LTTE’s grip. While the Sri Lankan military has been given much credit for its success against what was one of the most deadly militant organisations in the world,with its own navy and air force,the fact is that it was the political will demonstrated by President Mahinda Rajapaksa that ensured the elimination of the Tamil Tigers Thanks to this victory,Sri Lanka has changed. The checkpoints that used to dot Colombo and the highways are gone,while concerts take place in the open air,with hundreds attending. In the past,residents of Colombo were afraid even to go out during the evenings,afraid that they would get caught in a terrorist incident. Several thousand lives were indeed lost in such acts of violence. Since 2009,however,the atmosphere has changed,although there are still those who seek a repeat of the 1983-2009 armed struggle. These are two few to have their wish fulfilled,and thus far,the Rajapaksa government has taken care to avoid the mistakes made by earlier regimes,that ignored the sentiments of the Tamils. Should the process of reconciliation continue,Sri Lanka will emerge as a major investment destination. Should many more modern educational institutions get set up,both public and private,the talented people of the island would become a valuable resource to those interested in setting up manufacturing facilities. Indeed,all that is lacking in Sri Lanka is greater attention to the English language. Should a program of making the entire population literate in English get launched, having a common language would promote unity in Sri Lanka the way it has in India. Already,growth is chugging along at 8%. A peaceful Sri Lanka can emerge as a tourism and manufacturing hub, thereby once again proving that violence will not pay.
http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=168787

Taiwanese Radio Interview

http://english.rti.org.tw/programalertinfo.aspx?tid=A5AC0F8D1E3EDBE2 Bilateral relations between Taiwan and India have improved significantly since 1990s.  Taiwan and India have signed a number economic cooperation agreements including  the agreement on double taxation avoidance and customs cooperation. Both sides are  now looking into the feasibility of a bilateral free trade agreement.  Prof.Madhav Das Nalapat, a professor at India’s Manipal University  said the FTA is likely to be signed by the end of the year. President Ma Ying-jeou’s stopover in Mumbai, India, on his way to Africa in April  reflects substantial progress in Taiwan-India relations. India seems willing to  enhance relations with Taiwan even though it remains unchanged in its “one-China” policy. To find out more, listen to this week’s On the Line as Prof.Madhav Das Nalapat  shares with us his views on Taiwan-India relations. Prof.Nalapat is a professor of  geopolitics and international relations at Manipal University in Southern India.  He also holds the UNESCO Peace Chair.

The terrorist’s best friend and its perfect enemy (Sunday Guardian)

ROOTS OF POWER MADHAV NALAPAT www.sunday-guardian.com/profile/m-d-nalapat

Trucks carrying supplies for NATO troops cross into Afghanistan from Pakistan at Tor Kham last week. REUTERS or a super-expensive military alliance in search of an excuse to keep squandering taxpayer cash, "Al Qaeda" seemed the perfect enemy. Overall, even 9/11 qualifies only as a pinprick on the international economic system. New Yorkers recovered as smartly from the blow as Mumbaikars do from the more frequent attacks on that metropolis. Given bombardment of the Taliban and ample supplies of weapons and cash by the US, the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban out of Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. It seemed so easy that the US and its NATO partners decided that they could finish off the job themselves. Since 2005, the alliance began to systematically remove the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance elements from the state structures created after the fall of Mullah Omar, replacing them with candidates recommended by those trusty allies, the ISI. Unsurprisingly to any except NATO, their Pakistani allies ensured both directly and through their long-term buddies the Saudi secret service that (anti-Taliban) Northern Alliance elements would get replaced with the ISI's picks. By 2008, this process had bitten deep into the Hamid Karzai government. The new entrants — what we may term the Closet Taliban — busied themselves funnelling assistance to their friends in the overt segment of the Taliban, enabling that group to harry NATO and to deny the alliance military and political success. Paraphrasing Churchill, we may say that never in human history has so much been spent on so few by so many and with such a meagre result as NATO's war on the Taliban. Conspiracy theorists would argue that NATO needs an "Al Qaeda" to justify its huge budgets and the lack of rational correlation between expense and effect. Certainly in Iraq as well the US and its Sancho Panza, the UK, provided the nutrients necessary for the growth of Al Qaeda in a country that had not known religious extremism ever in its long history. The swagger of the presumed conquerors, best exemplified in Paul Bremer and his combination of suits and boots, drove thousands of otherwise moderate Iraqis to acts of violence against their occupiers. Instead of staying out of sight as they wisely do in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, US and UK forces, helped by a sprinkling of personnel from countries mainly in Europe, made themselves as conspicuous as possible. Such displays of fealty toasted the John Wayne model of warfare failed to deter extremists, but they created fear in the minds of ordinary Iraqis, many of whom were shot down simply for raising their voices while responding to the barked query of one of their "liberators". Smug analysts have written about the "immense success" of the just-concluded elections in Libya. This was a transparent farce, involving a minuscule number of voters, and those elected have near-zero influence within the country, which has today been partitioned between numerous militias. In the process, they have made large parts of Libya a safe haven for terror groups that are planning attacks on other states, just as soon as they settle scores with the hated Alawites and Christians of Syria. If the Taliban was regenerated in Afghanistan by NATO, it has been given life in Iraq, Libya and now Syria. For many decades, beginning with the assault on Turkish supremacy in the initial years of the previous century, strategists in Europe and then their clones across the Atlantic have seen religious extremism in West Asia as a plus. Because of the degraded skill levels that education systems based on Wahhabi ideology generate, whole populations are prevented from emerging as challengers in the modern marketplace. Instead, they become drones, dependent on their traditional masters for technology, goods and services. More than 83% of the income earned by West Asian states goes to economies that are members of NATO, with only China now emerging as a competitor. Religious extremism was thought to inoculate local minds against the nationalism that was sought to be spread by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Ahmed Ben Bella. However, these days, the costs of extremism are proving to be far higher than the geopolitical benefit. But unless a comprehensive reform of the education system takes place in the region, that would enable one of the most innately talented pools of humanity — the Arabs — to repeat their success a millennium ago in becoming a knowledge powerhouse, the future looks bleak. Very soon, there will be enough hydrocarbon discoveries across other regions (including India) to eliminate dependence on West Asian crude. And once the money dries up, so will the attention span of NATO. However, by its policy errors, that alliance will leave behind a human cauldron of extremism and violence that may seethe for decades. http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/the-terrorists-best-friend-and-its-perfect-enemy