To Believe or not to Believe in Uncle Sam

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's style of functioning is based

on consultation and consensus. After a progress of consultation,

the Prime Minister gently steers the different players into

accepting a consensus that ideally incorporates the strong points

of both sides while avoiding the pitfalls. If this process has not

worked in the all-important issue of relations with the Clinton

administration in Washington, it is because the views of the

opposing players are too contradictory to reconcile.

On one side—which at present seems to be the stronger

one—stand the principal secretary to the Prime Minister,

A. N. Verma, the finance secretary, M. S. Ahluwalia, and a few

elements of the scientific community such as Dr. VS.

Arunachalam, tipped for an important post in the government.

This group has been the object of sometimes uncharitable

comment on account of their alleged propensity to 'toe the

Washington line'. However, officials close to the trio affirm that

they are motivated not by extra-national considerations but by

a genuine belief that in today’s unipolar world, it is in India’s

best interests to accommodate the US. In the present context, this

would imply effective (as distinct from open) acceptance of the

American demand that India’s nuclear and missile programmes

be capped and then rolled back.

In contrast, the opposing group - which comprises the heads

of the country's defence and scientific establishment - wants

these two programmes to go ahead so that operational systems

can be in place by the end of the decade. They argue that one of

the few high-tech fields in which India has attained world

class - thanks to the support given by lawaharlal Nehru and

Indira Gandhi - should not be throttled under US pressure. In

particular, they are against the reported advice of the first group

to accept the US proposal for bilateral capping agreements in the

nuclear and missile fields.

This second group points out that the US wants to curb 'not

just activities in these two fields, but also capabilities developed

over four decades'. They point to the deterrent effect of high-

technology weapons and claim that if these had been fully

operational and deployed, 'Pakistan would not have dared to

wage a proxy war with India in the Kashmir theatre'. Further, it

is pointed out that Pakistan's nuclear programme is 'clandestine,

rudimentary and based on borrowed and stolen technology',

whereas the Indian one is 'transparent and indigenous'.

This group claims that the Americans are hyping up the

Pakistani programme 'to convince the Indian public that a

capping of both would be an even-handed measure, rather than

directed against India, which is the factual position'.

Analysts within the commerce and planning bodies of the

government of India too are sceptical of US promises, this time

of economic concessions in exchange for throttling our nuclear

and missile programme. They point out that the Union finance

ministry has, during the past three years, unilaterally dismantled

most of the protective devices sheltering domestic industry, and

has given foreign companies an access to Indian markets and

companies ’unprecedented even in the West'. And yet, 'despite

such a unilateral set of concessions to western interests, India has

not been given a single tangible concession in return. Indeed, the

pressure is increasing for yet more concessions.

These economic policy analysts point out that the US

administration has to contend with a protectionist US Congress

in giving concessions to India. They point out for example that

the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act prohibits the US

administration from giving access to certain high technologies to

countries such as India that have not signed the NPT or accepted

full scope safeguards. Signing a regional pact, while it would

have immediate effects on our nuclear programme, would

therefore not automatically guarantee access to top-quality

American technologies in sensitive spheres. They also point to

protectionist measures such as the 1988 US Omnibus Trade

Competitiveness Act to reinforce their claim that the Clinton

administration's dangling of (obviously unspecified) carrots is a

mirage.

Scientists in the nuclear establishment point to Tarapur as a

reason for not relying on US assurances. They point out that the

Americans not only backed out of the Tarapur agreement long

before its period ended in October 1993, but also refused to take

back the spent fuel, as they were obliged to do. Further, the US

has till now even prevented India from reprocessing the spent

fuel itself. As for analysts in the economic ministries - barring

finance - they point to the post-Marrakesh revival of Special 301

and Super 301 by the US administration to illustrate their

contention that the US has one standard for itself and another for

countries perceived as being weak.

Experts within the strategic defence establishments point out

that the US has itself generated tensions in the Indian defence

neighbourhood, by arming Afghan Mujahideen who are now

infiltrating Kashmir, by arming Pakistan which is engaged in a

covert war with this country, and by permitting the sale of

advanced aircraft and technology to Taiwan and, now perhaps,

China. Indeed, these analysts claim that it is the US defence

industry that is behind the Clinton administration's pressure to

cap and roll back India's nuclear and missile programmes, 'so as

to increase the market for US armaments and to nip future

competition in the bud'.

Officials connected with the negotiations on GATT that have

taken place over the past five years claim that 'too much was

conceded too soon in the very beginning'. They give as an

example India's agreeing in April 1989 to allow the GATT

Uruguay Round package to include not just goods but also

services, norms, standards and 'intellectual property'. This

concession gave western countries a significant bludgeon against

labour-abundant economies such as India’s. They say that the

Indian system of leaving such negotiations to officials should be

dispensed with, and Parliament consulted in all crucial stages.

These officials deny that they have a 'confrontationist' agenda

on lndo-US relations. They say that they are simply against the

present policy of making concessions without clear quid pro

quos, and are also against throttling programmes that will give

a future economic superpower its own protective strategic

umbrella. However, some of their allegations - about

'international arms dealers' and such other unsavoury types

influencing government policy - seem to verge on the fanciful.

One man, and one man alone, will have to decide which of

these two sets of options to plump for in the tough negotiations

that will take place next week in Washington. Life must be lonely

these summer days in 7 Race Course Road.