Talks with Pakistan - India should Mix Firmness with Conciliation

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

The landslide victory of Nawaz Sharif and the statesmanlike

support given to him by Benazir Bhutto to enact legislation that

would return power to elected representatives rather than to

Army appointees generated optimism that Pakistan would join

the ranks of the full democracies. However, it appears that the

Pakistan Prime Minister is unable to assert his primacy over non-

elected power centres. Very quickly, he has moved away from

a focus on trade and people-to-people contact and back towards

the Pakistan Army hard line that India should agree to a

plebiscite in Kashmir before Islamabad can agree to enhance ties.

This is akin to an individual saying that he can be friends with

another, provided the latter hands over his sister to him.

Asking for the handover of a sister is not indicative of a

friendly mindset. In like fashion, the efforts to push India into a

path that has the potential — if conceded — of opening the

Pandora’s Box of states' integration show that, despite his

victory, Sharif is very much the junior partner in government. If

indeed he is a partner at all. Clearly, Pakistan will continue to

foment insurgencies in India. Equally clearly, it cannot be given

any strategic concession until it halts this.

While hoping for a change in the power equations in

Islamabad, so that the elected representatives of the people set

rather than merely carry out policy, New Delhi needs to avoid

the Pollyanna syndrome of cheerful optimism about the good

intentions of others. Instead, it needs to craft policies that take

account of the factual situation in Pakistan.

The first step would be to substantially increase contacts

with the different segments of Pakistani society: businesspeople,

religious groups, NGOs and others. Such individuals should be

encouraged to visit India and interact with groups here, to make

them realise the advantages of a secular structure in which all

religions and regions are treated equally. In this connection,

Gujral’s visa liberalisation is welcome.

Second, New Delhi needs to openly articulate its concern for

human rights. There have been massacres in Karachi of MQM

supporters. There has been under-representation of Sindh in the

Pakistan Army. Within the civil service, Baluchis and Shias have

been given short shrift. These and other issues need to be taken

up by New Delhi, in view of the need to build constituencies

among such groups in the event of a fissioning of Pakistan into

Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Pashtunistan. Sadly, as the lack

of attention shown to building up an Indian diplomatic presence

in north Afghanistan has shown, New Delhi responds to a

situation only after it has evolved into a chronic sore. In line with

a policy of promoting democratic values, India needs to monitor

and express its concern over the plight of Shias, Ahmadiyas, non-

Punjabi Sunnis, Christians, Hindus and other disadvantaged

groups in Pakistan. At the same time, it needs to be understood

that when President Leghari and others point to alleged atrocities

in India. Pakistan has a right to express concern about

developments in India, just as India has a similar right towards

Pakistan.

Third, this country needs to reverse the neglect that has gone

on since 1984 of Indian defence capability. The core of this

country’s defence has to be its missile systems, whether located

on land, air or sea platforms. Rather than throw money away in

purchasing outdated equipment — as was done with the Bofors

gun and now may take place with a new aircraft carrier — this

country needs to improve its missile capability and the familiarity

of its armed forces to the computer as a force-multiplier.

Fortunately, the Deve Gowda government appears to have

moved away from the past policy of throttling strategic

development in India. However, much work needs to be done to

undo the neglect of the past twelve years.

Equally important, this country needs to clearly articulate its

core interests, and specify that these are non-negotiable. No

Indian government would survive mass hanging for treason

were it to concede Pakistan's agenda on Kashmir. Yet, except for

Prime Minister Deve Gowda, there appears to be a coyness

among other VIPs to make explicit the reality, that India will not

agree to a re-opening of the accession of Kashmir, no matter

what the pillow talk may have been during the time of the

Mountbattens’ sojourn in the Viceregal Palace. Unfortunately,

the halting of operations in 1948 before Kashmir was freed of the

invaders, the giveaways at Tashkent and Shimla, and the one-

sided agreement on river waters, have not yet convinced India's

Pollyannas of the futility of strategic concessions (such as on

Siachen) to an Islamabad still in the grip of the military. Such

concessions can be made only after South Asia forms a common

market, visas get abolished and each currency becomes freely

usable in all the other SAARC countries.

New Delhi needs to operate a two track policy: firmness on

strategic issues, conciliation on trade and people-to-people links.

If this country can benefit from Pakistani imports, such items

should be allowed. If representatives of segments of the Pakistani

people wish to visit India, they should be encouraged. What

needs to be discouraged — through the avoidance of strategic

concessions — is the shadowy coterie of feudals, druglords and

armymen that is slowly pushing Pakistan to its next division. So

long as Nawaz Sharif lacks the will to confront this, he will be

unable to prevent this slide. Only democracy can preserve

Pakistan.

While for Pakistan its obsession with India is central to its

policies, for New Delhi the gyrations of its western neighbour are

becoming less important with time. Intra-regional cooperation

within SAARC; diplomacy with China, Russia, France, Germany

and Japan; keeping open the option of future strategic cooperation

with the US; links with ASEAN states such as Singapore,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea; and cultivation of the Gulf, CIS

states and Iran all rank much higher than adjustments with a

country that is diminishing in clout daily. Recently it was said

that "60 per cent of the MEA's attention" was devoted to

Pakistan. Six per cent would be a more desirable figure.