The PRC needs a neutral India and this
it hopes to achieve by showcasing that the costs of abandoning
neutrality, which by definition includes continued reliance on Russia
for defence needs, would be severe.

NEW DELHI: Neither the top tier of the Chinese
Communist Party (which elevated him in 2012 to the post of CCP General
Secretary over the claims of Li Keqiang), nor the international
community correctly understood the difference between Xi Jinping and his
party peers. Before taking over the top job in China, Xi had been
content to walk in the shadow of his elders. The anti-corruption
campaigns that he launched prior to his appointment in 2012 had netted
only small fish, or those few in the middle echelons who had fallen out
of favour with higher echelons in the CCP. There were few hints of the
thorough-going changes that Xi would make to both the CCP as well as to
domestic and foreign policy soon after his takeover, or of his emergence
not just as first among equals but as the second CCP supremo after Mao.
What the elders who chose Xi over Li in 2012 failed to factor in was
the fact that in common with Mao Zedong, Xi has a ruthless drive to
promote the Han nationalist concept of where the PRC should be, and what
needs to be done to get it there. In Mao’s case, the effort was mostly
internal. In Xi’s case, the drive for primacy is global. The tactics and
policies of Mao and Xi are in many respects different, yet the
underlying objective remained the same, which was to position Beijing as
the fulcrum of the global order, in much the same way as Washington
emerged in 1945 after the war between the Axis and the Allies. Mao took
care to camouflage this intention behind a smokescreen expertly crafted
by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, going on verbal offensives against the
“hegemony of the United States” to show the PRC’s commitment to an
equalitarian world order. During the period in power of Deng Xiaoping,
“biding time and concealing strength” became the rule, with China moving
away from overt reliance on the military after the 1979 attack on
Vietnam. The Paramount Leader instead turned to the use of diplomacy and
commerce to create the conditions needed for the rise of China within
the post-1945 international order. Mao was clear that this order needed
to change, but concentrated on internal changes in preparation for the
shift. Interestingly, Mao’s expansion of the PRC and Deng’s expansion of
the economy created the conditions that Xi believed he needed to effect
changes globally and in the open. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao
expended vast sums of money in developing a network of friendly contacts
across the world, paying particular attention to the US and to Europe,
and secondly Southeast Asia and Africa. Around two decades ago, India
was identified by the CCP leadership as the only country with the
potential to emerge as a serious competitor to the PRC in Asia. From
that time onwards, the attention paid to India multiplied, and priority
was given to assessing the probability of India getting over its (mainly
self-created) obstacles and better leveraging its immense potential.
The assessment in Beijing was that the institutional structure in India
was too rule-oriented and process-centred to enable a breakout into the
innovative policies needed to generate and sustain double digit growth,
while the political class was too busy seeking individual gratification
to have time to cogitate over the “Big Picture”. Nor in the Chinese
Communist Party view did the political class in India have much interest
in taking on the challenge of changing the governance mechanism enough
to make it responsive to the needs of the 21st century. Self-interest
combined with inertia would prevent such a transformation of the
governance mechanism, according to the CCP, although constant vigilance
was needed to ensure that India remained in a box, unable to break out
and pose a serious challenge to the PRC and its drive for global
primacy.
Another worry within the CCP leadership was the possibility of the
coming together of the US and India, and in this context, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh (unlike Congress President Sonia Gandhi) was considered
an individual who was much too inclined for an alliance of the two
largest democracies in the world for comfort. Hence the silent welcome
given to the sniping against him within India on the grounds that he was
far too biased towards the US. In Cold War 1.0 as well, Moscow had
proved an effective antidote, preventing India from moving to close ties
with the US. This role assumed importance in the changed geopolitical
context of Cold War 2.0, with its open confrontation in several fields
between the two superpowers, the PRC and the US. This role of the PRC’s
most important partner, Russia, has added greatly to its value as a
strategic partner of China.
CHINA WARY OF PM MODI
As Chief Minister, Narendra Modi was open to investment from China
(as to investment in his home state from other countries). Given the
missteps by both Bush and Obama such as the denial of a visa to Modi, it
came as a surprise to Beijing that President Obama gave Modi such a
warm welcome during his first visit to Washington as Prime Minister of
India in September 2014. The expectation had been that the steady
drumbeat of criticism of Modi by those in the Democratic Party who were
historically close to the Congress Party would ensure a tepid welcome.
The welcome given to PM Modi was a warning sign that Washington would go
the extra mile to woo India, and that President Obama had discarded the
G-2 illusions nurtured during his first term by the State Department
under Hillary Clinton. Rather, he had fixed his gaze on the Indo-Pacific
and moved away from the Atlantic, as was made explicit by Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter together with National Security Advisor Susan
Rice. The key strategists embedded in the leadership councils of the PRC
kept a close eye on the rate of growth of the economy under Modi, and
took comfort from the fact that this was on a gentle downward trajectory
since 2015, despite the coming to power of Modi at the Central level.
However, the clear intention of Modi from 26 May 2014 itself to once
again establish the centrality of New Delhi within South Asia resulted
in a wariness about him. A lookout was maintained on efforts during Modi
1.0 to modernize the administrative structure and remove the numerous
bureaucratic obstacles to growth. Reports about the success of startups
launched by ethnic Indians in Silicon Valley added to the attention paid
to the possible breakout of India from its sluggish trajectory. Such
linkages made India and the US natural partners in advanced technology, a
nightmare for the planners in Beijing. Even before President Donald J.
Trump launched a trade war against China in 2017, several companies from
the US, Taiwan and Japan had been looking to shift their operations
outside of the PRC, and close track was kept of those seeking relocation
to India. It was clear to the CCP strategists that only India had the
brainpower, locational advantages and market size to pose a serious
threat to the supply chains based in China. At a time when General
Secretary Xi had fashioned the Belt & Road Initiative to ensure that
Eurasian supply chains located their centre of gravity in China, any
displacement of industrial assets to a potential competitor of the size
and potential of India was unwelcome. Constant watch was therefore
maintained over both policy as well as physical developments in India.
Increased attention began to be paid on how the country could be thrown
off balance, in conjunction not only with Pakistan but other South Asian
powers as well. Efforts at this intensified. It would be a catastrophe
for the CCP if conditions in India ensured a smooth glide path for
enterprises wishing to relocate from the PRC, especially with the advent
of the trade war with the US. Although growth in India was slowing
down, and in fact strains had been visible from 2011 onwards, the
potential for expansion of the second largest democracy in the world
could not be ignored. A decision appears to have been taken around 2016
by the PRC leadership core that GHQ Rawalpindi should be given a boost
in military assistance, not only to hold its own against India but also
to serve as a more effective brake on rapid development of capabilities
by India. This could be achieved by generating a volley of internal
fissures designed to draw attention away from PM Modi’s key objective of
systemic reform and faster growth. From that time onwards, more direct
involvement across Kashmir became a focus area for the PLA, and it began
to openly work alongside GHQ Rawalpindi in attempts to stymie Indian
progress in the union territory. More than generating international
opinion, the calculation in Beijing (nurtured by Islamabad) was that
heightened activity at the UN Security Council would motivate more
Kashmiris to destroy their own futures by taking to violence against
their own country. Thus far, despite repeated efforts by Beijing at
bringing up a moribund issue in the UN Security Council, the unrest
promised by GHQ Rawalpindi has not taken place. This is unlike what took
place in 1990 when V.P. Singh was the Prime Minister, who presided over
the development of a full-blown insurgency in the state. The UNSC was
proving to be ineffective as a motivator for unrest and violence.
Perhaps a reversal of fortune by India on the Sino-Indian frontier would
cause the sparks of ISI-funded unrest in Kashmir to once again convert
to flames. It is very likely that the idea of ramping up border
incursions was suggested to the CMC (Central Military Commission) by GHQ
Rawalpindi, which by now has in effect become almost a Corps of the
PLA. Apart from fear that PM Modi would order the takeover of PoK during
Modi 2.0, frustration with the lack of change on the ground in Kashmir
in spite of prodding the UNSC was probably the genesis of the May 2020
PLA operation of intruding from several points into the territory of
India. Care was taken to ensure that the points selected in this phase
of the operation were manned not by the Indian Army but by paramilitary
forces. Preparations for the incursions began in November 2019 and the
actual intrusions were launched after 3 May 2020.
CMC, GHQ WORK TOGETHER
Given the reality of the Chinese side first working out a
comprehensive Plan of Action and thereafter obsessively sticking to it,
it is unreal to expect that the PLA will withdraw as a consequence of
discussions between the two Special Representatives or the Foreign
Ministers of both sides, much less as a consequence of military-level
talks. GHQ Rawalpindi seems to have convinced the Central Military
Commission that a show of force and resolve against troops in Ladakh
will cause elements nurtured by it to launch a conflagration in Kashmir.
A withdrawal from such a stance would be tantamount to an admission
that the plan jointly worked out by the CMC and GHQ Rawalpindi is
defective. Such an admission would cause the downfall of several “star”
careers in the PLA, which is why the gambler’s instinct has operated in
the CMC of increasing the bid with every failure of build-ups and
thrusts (to ignite passions in the Ladakh and Jammu UTs). On the Indian
side, there seems to be a fixation by some analysts on conventional
modes of thought and operation that fail to factor in the reality that
the Chinese methods of planning and execution, especially under Xi
Jinping, are very different from the western concepts that have freely
been adopted on the Indian side. Any reversal of course by the Chinese
side would be seen as unacceptable until the potential penalties for
holding firm are too severe to justify to the higher leadership of the
CCP. A price that steep can only come about once an alliance structure
is crafted on the Indian side on the lines of the alliance with the USSR
in 1971 that opened the doors to the liberation of Bangladesh. Thus
far, a mutual security pact with the US has yet to take place, to the
relief of Islamabad, Beijing and Moscow. Since 2005, a time when allies
of the CCP had an outsize influence over UPA policy towards countries
such as China and Nepal, the PLA has adopted a policy of changing facts
on the ground to its advantage, then negotiating on the basis of the new
status quo before seizing the next opportunity to change the previously
altered status quo.
TALKS AS DISTRACTION
It is instructive that the public assertion that the Galwan Valley
belonged to China came the day after conciliatory statements by the
Indian side that were designed to lower tensions. By May, it was clear
that the novel coronavirus pandemic was sweeping across India, and hence
presented an opportunity to set in motion plans already made by forces
already in place for weeks. In the coming period, should major unrest
take place in locations across India as a consequence of economic
hardship, as is expected by those opposed to PM Modi, that may present
the PLA an opportunity to make another series of thrusts, this time in
the eastern sector as well. Next year is the centenary of the founding
of the Chinese Communist Party, and the leadership needs a military
triumph to cover up the problems being faced on the economic side. The
possible locations for an effort to generate such a victory would be the
Himalayas, the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. Depending on where
the pickings would be easiest, the move is likely to be made. Should
the Indian economy continue on a downward trajectory and a new Biden
administration backpedal on the Obama-Trump offer of a military
partnership with India, the PLA may judge that their time to move
forward in Kashmir, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh has arrived. The
Chinese side adopts the tactics of the gecko, which is to wait patiently
till its prey comes close, and then swoop on it. During this time of
waiting for the next chance to strike, talks that in the matter of
outcomes go nowhere are welcomed as distractions from the reality of the
ongoing plan to resume overt operations. Covert operations, of course,
would never have stopped.
RELOOK AT POLICY NEEDED
The twin issues confronting Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the
ambience created by the novel coronavirus are the economy and China.
Effective solutions will need to be found to address both, as long-held
perceptions and policy courses do not seem to be making the requisite
progress. The second is related to the first. The Chinese are nothing if
not pragmatic. Should the economy of India begin to grow at speed, and
should the military alliance with the US become a reality rather than an
objective that never seems to be getting achieved, China is likely to
back away from further provoking India as the country approaches its
75th year of Independence. India not going in for hard options will not
lead to a change in behaviour on the other side, only creation of hard
facts and outcomes will. An alteration of tone came after the fighting
spirit shown by the Indian Army during the Galwan clash, and the
unexpected Apps Ban introduced by PM Modi. Incidentally, despite his
rhetoric President Donald J. Trump has yet to banish WeChat from the US.
The reason is that a well-endowed lobby of business interests is trying
to prevent him from doing so, by arguing that such a ban would affect
commercial communications between the US and China. The reality is that
WeChat enables the CCP to access any communication between US companies
and their Chinese subsidiaries, thereby assisting them in ensuring that
domestic champions prevail in a contest with foreign rivals. This far,
WeChat has been banned only in India and not anywhere else, thereby
continuing to give an advantage to Chinese businesses over the
competition. The assessment of the CCP is that Chinese pools of
resources and consequent goodwill will enable the country to weather
temporary shocks and storms and enter calmer seas less damaged than its
rivals. The PLA has already ensured that the degree of control it
exercises over the South China Sea is much higher than what was the case
five years ago. This is the new “status quo” that Beijing would like
the world to accept, which in a practical sense it already has, in that
almost all exploitation of the sea by Vietnam and other countries has
been blocked. Only a kinetic shock that severely unsettles the PLA would
reverse such a progression towards PRC primacy in the Indo-Pacific.
Such a reversal of fate would be aided by coordinated military
activities of multiple partners (including the US, India, Australia,
Vietnam and Japan) across fronts that have been subjected to PLA
intrusions, an outcome that thus far seems distant.
RESILIENCE OF DEMOCRACY
India has the potential of being critical link in the transition of
US, Taiwanese and Japanese supply chains from the PRC, which is why this
country is the object of so much attention by Beijing. Only an
action-oriented group that includes India can ensure primacy in the
Indo-Pacific. The PRC for its part needs a neutral India to ensure its
own progression to that role, and this it hopes to achieve by showcasing
that the costs of abandoning neutrality (which by definition includes
continued reliance on Russia for defence needs) would be severe. The
problem for the planners in the CMC as they parley with GHQ Rawalpindi
is simple. Their strategy of diplomatic and military pressure has failed
in Kashmir and will fail across the rest of India. Democracies have a
resilience and a capacity to overcome not apparent on the surface. What
is needed for this is Smart Policy, and soon.
https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/smart-policy-pm-modi-will-frustrate-pla-designs-border