Seshan's Hidden Ally - Vanishing Tolerance for Misfeasance

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Revolutionaries are often less the creators of events than the

beneficiaries of circumstances. Had Russia not been bled of its

human and material treasure by World War I, it is difficult to

conceive of the Bolsheviks capturing the state. It was only when

the other organised forces dissolved that a small, fanatical group

of individuals was able to wrest—and hold on to—authority.

Similarly, the rise of Adolf Hitler in 1922-33 Germany can only

be understood in the context of the twin blows of national shame

over its defeated status (a status repeatedly emphasised by,

among the victors, the French) and a collapsed currency. Had the

Weimar republic dealt with statesmen rather than political

pygmies in Paris and London, it may have survived the Nazi 

party.

Such thoughts come to mind when discussing the "revolution"

in Indian elections that has been wrought under a Chief Election 

Commissioner not at all awed by politicians and their trappings.

Going by the spirit rather than the letter of the law, T.N. Seshan 

has been the cause of a significant reduction of election

expenditure. The steady explosion in the costs of waging a

campaign has been smothered, so much so that in many parts of 

the two states where assembly elections are due to take place, life

is almost normal apart from the odd banner or campaign vehicle.

Praise for Seshan

While Seshan deserves praise for taking at face value the

moralistic pretensions of the political class, and threatening

sanctions should they deviate from them, a considerable part of

his victory may be due to the steadily increasing accountability

which the Indian voter is demanding from the candidates. For

decades, in election after election, voters would obey their

sarpanches or their caste heads and vote for a symbol selected for

them. It was only a quarter century after freedom—in 1971 to be

exact—that large groups of voters broke away from such tutelage

and, in the secrecy of the polling booth, returned to power Indira

Gandhi with her garibi hatao programme, only to defeat her in

1977 when she focused less on abolishing garibi than on

Incarcerating her opponents.

Although the post 1971 elections showed that a full war

chest did not necessarily translate into political success—both

the Janata party, which won in 1977, and the Congress, which

returned to power in 1980, spent far less in the campaign than

its major opponent—the message did not register at the rarefied

level of the political leader. Perhaps more for reasons of personal

advantage than due to a careful calculus of electoral outcomes,

many politicians in power spent vast amounts of time collecting

funds. However, to take the state of Karnataka as an example,

such collections did not save Gundu Rao's Congress in 1983 or

Ramakrishna Hegde’s Janata Dal in 1989, the same year in which

Rajiv Gandhi's well-financed national campaign ended in a rout.

Lower Tolerance

The explanation behind these and similar defeats is the lower

tolerance of the Indian voter to financial misdemeanours. A

political party that spent huge amounts of money in a campaign

would generate questions as to the source. At some point,

increases in spending would turn away rather than attract votes.

However, like the ghostly sensation in a limb even after it has

been amputated, candidates who could raise resources freely,

spent them. It has taken the warning of Seshan to persuade them

about the reality of the amputation of expenditure from result.

Thanks to the supposed fear of action by the Election

Commission—an ‘action’ that can have only a very flimsy legal

foundation—most candidates, even from parties as well-heeled

as the Congress and the BJP, have cut down their campaign

expenditure.

It is clear from experience that had there not been a widening

voter revulsion against lavish election expenditure, the political

class would have scoffed at Seshan’s edict in the same manner

that they ignored all past limits to expenditure. As Narasimha

Rao's spectacular victory at Nandyal showed, even the Election

Commission is sometimes selective in the pursuit of violations,

Even if it were not, it still would have to rely on local officials

for confirmation of breaches of its orders, and not all these

officials may share the Chief Election Commissioner’s enthusiasm

for polls not vitiated by money power.

It has been—and is—fashionable to deride the print media,

most notably the English language press, as reaching only a

handful of individuals, and thus exercising scant influence over

electoral outcomes. Such theorising neglects to take into account

the fact that while a newspaper may be read by ’only’ a few

hundred thousand people, opinions expressed in it will frequently

filter through to non-readers. Thus the total number of individuals

accessing the views expressed in a newspaper would be several 

times greater than the sum of its actual buyers. Such a process

took place between 1987 and 1989 when corruption swept to the

top of the national agenda—a process that had its origin in 

newspaper headlines and which resulted in the assumption of 

office by a politician identified in the public mind with the

morality crusade, V.P. Singh. It was only after his moral veneer

became frayed that many of his colleagues grew bold enough to

dethrone him.

The print media is one of the few major industries in this

country that has remained almost wholly private. This implies

that for its constituents, a healthy bottom line is a prerequisite for

survival, there being no budgetary subsidy to draw from. The

market being the prime determinant of the bottom line, the print

media needs for its survival to address the needs of its ’market'

i.e. the reading public. In the main, this is the putting in place of

a system of government which is administered impartially and

transparently. Thus, for their own survival—if not for nobler

motives—the print media will need to energetically point out the

defects and deficiencies in the way the system is being run.

Those segments of it which do not will soon find the market

shifting away to others.

Print Media

Hence the 'playing up' by the print media of perceived fighters

for transparency as Khairnar and Seshan. Such 'over-exposure'

has the further benefit of camouflaging a less than wholehearted

diligence on the part of the media in uncovering instances of

political and other misfeasance. However, in the course of this

decade, even the faint-hearted and the public relations-oriented

will need to inject both bluntness and investigative depth into

their coverage in order to retain relevance for the reader. That

’newspapers play up only negative news' is a lament frequently

heard by editors and publishers. However, the political leaders

making it forget (or pretend to) that the genesis of much that

they do which is positive is the fear of the publicity given to that

which is negative. Also, if it really has been the creation of a

public opinion less tolerant of misfeasance that has aided Seshan

in his drive to reduce election expenditure, it is the same opinion

that has made the print media more adventurous in its exposes.

However, although its head may be in favour of such a

course, the heart of the print media still beats for the ancient

regime. How else to explain the continuing preoccupation with

such "heavyweights" as Arjun Singh, Sharad Pawar and

N.D. Tiwari as possible prime minister despite their somewhat

"conventional" political past as opposed to the patently more

"clean" politicians like Manmohan Singh and A.K. Antony? Why

are these two considered political lightweights? Is it because

they have no scandals weighing them down? If so, it is a telling

commentary not on our society - which has evolved substantially

since 1947 - but on our political class and the media which

project it.

Playing Possum - Wishful Thinking on Strategic Issues

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Recently, an analyst very popular on the seminar circuit wrote

an essay on why India should abandon its nuclear deterrent. His

theory was that if the country were to roll over and play dead,

it would be too non-threatening for the Chinese to bother about.

As for the Pakistanis, once they were confronted with the other

cheek, the urge to strike would be replaced with a desire to kiss.

Our hero did not reveal the source of his confidence that India’s

two rivals would behave in this Gandhian way, nor was there

any comment on what would happen if they did not.

Same Complacency

The analyst in question has spent long years in the United States,

though one has yet to come across an article by him condemning

that country for entering into an arms race with the former Soviet

Union rather than playing possum. Nor has he ventured to

reveal why New Delhi should behave differently from

Washington when it comes to safeguarding strategic interests.

Clearly, just as in the society of his birth, there is a caste system

among countries as well. Hence the effort on snuffing out the

minuscule Indian programme, rather than eliminating the gigantic

threat to human life from the stockpiles of the five other declared

nuclear weapons states.

The analyst's thinking is of a piece with that of those who

supported the Nehru-Mountbatten move to take the Kashmir

issue to the United Nations. During the 1950s, Nehru neglected

the eastem defences, confident that the Chinese would behave as

our modern hero expects them to behave: spinelessly. In 1962,

the Chinese proved him wrong. Nearly three decades later, the

same complacency has once more infected strategic thinking

about Beijing.

These days, the media in the major democracies (including

India) is filled with reports about the flowering of "democracy"

in China, about how "free elections" are being held at the local

level, and the daring shown by critics who actually condemn

Chairman Mao. Had these persons condemned Chairman Jiang

in the same language, there may have been some reason to

believe that changes are afoot in the Chinese Communist party's

style of functioning. However, in China the new emperor has

always welcomed abuse of his predecessors. And as for "free"

elections, those who report them are apparently too mesmerised

to realise that all the candidates come from an "approved" list

that has been carefully vetted by the Communist party. Only

those who have passed such scrutiny are allowed to contest.

Despots all over the world have conducted such "democratic

exercises" to give a veneer of legitimacy to their rule.

However, there is an alternative scenario, just as there was

in 1962. 'This is that by 2012-50 years after defeating India in

NEFA and Ladakh—the regime in Beijing discovers that it is

faltering on the economic front. Thanks to the use of the English

language, and to the adoption of western systems of justice,

India has become a much more popular destination for foreign

investment than China. The Congress has stopped its Jinnah-

style rhetoric that assumes minorities to be under threat in India,

while the B]P has moved from a single-religion focus to a

broader vision that covers all citizens. Both have adopted

moderate nationalism, and the country now has a two-pole

system of alliances centred around either the Congress or the

BJP. The Left parties form a separate (and small) segment of the

political spectrum, and the fanatics within the Hindu, Muslim,

Sikh and Christian communities have formed four religious

parties that constitute the right wing. Fortunately, their appeal

is minimal. Despite pressure from officials and politicians keen

on a return to the black-money generating era of the past, tax

rates have remained low, and coverage and compliance have

risen sharply, as has revenue.

Anti-India Platform

In defence, opponents of a nuclear deterrent have had their way,

and the missile and bomb programme has been scuttled. True,

instead of spending one rupee on deterrent systems, the country

is spending five on battling the subversion that its softness has

encouraged China and Pakistan to foment. However, increasing

employment in India and the absence of domination by any

single religious, caste or linguistic group over the others has led

to a fall in the "fanaticism quotient", so that expenditure on

generating insurgency is yielding diminishing returns. However,

both Pakistan and China are persevering in their efforts. Islamabad

has succeeded in establishing another puppet regime in Dhaka.

More worrisome has been Beijing’s success in forming a hardline

version of the Communist party in Nepal, and its take-over of

power there on an anti-India, anti-monarchy platform. just as

missiles and their warheads have been transferred to Pakistan,

China has begun stationing strategic units in Nepal.

The emergence of an India-Japan-Korea partnership has led

to a slowdown in China’s export growth. This has led to

agitations in major cities, leading the regime to form the view

that India has to be crippled economically so as to wipe out the

threat to Chinese goods. Rather than do this directly. Beijing calls

upon a willing Islamabad to hype up its religious rhetoric. A

fresh jihad is announced, and tens of thousands of "volunteers"

are sent across the Line of Control in Kashmir. However, Indian

forces once again defeat them. A new twist is needed.

Nuclear Blackmail

This is provided by Nepal, where the China-controlled regime

announced the "severing" of all ties with Beijing, and the

expulsion of Chinese staff manning strategic sites. Of course,

enough domiciles of Shanghai or Hong Kong remain behind as

"Nepalese citizens". The Kathmandu regime announces its

support for the "toiling masses" of Kashmir and warns New

Delhi that it will unleash nuclear arms unless Indian troops

retreat from that state. China, despite the ostensible rebuff

implied in its "expulsion" from Nepal, announces that it will

veto any move in the Security Council to intervene in what it

claims is an "internal matter for the South Asian states to resolve

among themselves". Both Pakistan and Nepal move Chinese-

supplied nuclear-tipped missiles to the Indian border, and give

New Delhi 48 hours to withdraw from Kashmir or face action.

Hopefully, by 2012, New Delhi will have a deterrent

significant enough to prevent such nuclear blackmail. That is, if

the politicians base their plans on experience rather than wishful

thinking.

Acknowledging the Reality: India's Emergence as a major Power

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

It was Regis Debray who wrote that the past remains as a

constant companion to the present. Analogously, we may argue

that perceptions about countries change slower than the reality.

By the early 1970s Japan was already a major economic power,

and yet it took a decade more before that was reflected in the

standing of Japan in the international community. Today Russia

has lost its coherence as a state; the security system and much of

the economic base has become an anarchic jumble. And yet, the

memories of the superpower-that-was generate a mist that

prevents such a harsh assessment of the Russian situation from

becoming accepted. Even—or perhaps one should say

particularly—within the Indian foreign policy establishment,

Russia is still regarded as a major world player.

India and China

There is an irony in this, because the latest entrants to the ranks

of the major powers are India and China. Both are experiencing

a period of rapid economic growth through an unshackling of

private initiative. They have built up the essential foundation for

growth, which is a large body of trained manpower. Despite

fissions and frissons, both have managed to keep the diverse

elements in their multicultural society from breaking loose and

triggering a Yugoslav-style chain reaction. And both have thus

far resisted pressures directed at lowering their external security

cover through abandoning the option of developing strategic

weaponry.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has led to the United States

winning the 'superpower war' by default. Washington is,

therefore, enjoying its moment of glory on the world stage,

preening as the arbiter and arbitrator of the fortunes of different

countries. Its objective is to prolong this moment of glory by

preventing other countries from equalling it in strategic power

and economic prowess. Thus, using the pretext of ensuring

global disarmament, Washington is seeking to throttle the missile

and nuclear programmes of India and China. It is also seeking

to improve its own economic performance by using its political

strength to get trade concessions from other nations.

It would be unfair to blame the United States for such a

policy. Any country in similar circumstances would have acted

in the same way, perhaps with greater ruthlessness. The contrast

between western and eastern Europe is proof that America has

been a much more benign Big Brother than the former Soviet

Union. Indeed, unlike European nations such as Britain and

France—which ruthlessly bled their colonies—the Americans

realised that a prosperous economic hinterland gave better

returns to the mother economy than an impoverished one. And

thus was born the Marshall and other plans. In the strategic

sphere, the United States was supportive of British and French

efforts at crafting an independent deterrent.

Such support has been in contrast to the stand taken by the

United States on the emergence of India as a strategic power.

Despite the reality of India having exploded a nuclear device 20

years ago, the United States has blocked efforts at admitting this

country as a full member of the nuclear club, and has sought-

these days with greater finesse—to 'persuade' India to give up

the option of a strategic deterrent, using as a rationale the

'danger' of Pakistan emerging as a nuclear power. Numerous

books and articles have surfaced to flash out this concept of

Pakistan as a threshold nuclear state, ignoring the reality: that

the indigenous Pakistani programme is as yet years away from

producing a serviceable nuclear weapon, and is moreover based

on technology stolen from the West.

If the United States is nowadays less shrill about imposing

sanctions on India, it is not because the fundamental aim of

forcing this country off the nuclear track has been given up, but

because of the realisation in Washington that the Indian

programme is an indigenous one that outside sanctions may

delay but not cripple. The strategic establishment in Inndia,

despite opposition from within the country expressed through

underfunding, has become viable on its own, and consequently

has the strength to resist 'murder’ (through international

sanctions). Which is why it is being pressed to commit ’suicide’

(i.e. shut itself down), not just by the United States but also by

a lobby within this country.

Strong Security Cover

This lobby, perhaps because of its external cultural and intellectual

underpinnings, grossly underestimates the mood within India

for a strong—and indigenous—security cover. In large part this

mood is the result of the memory of a thousand and more years

of servitude, to Afghans, to Persians, to the European powers. To

expect a nation that has undergone such torment—and over such

a prolonged period—to set aside the option of developing a

security umbrella that incorporates the world’s most effective

system of deterrence is to forget history and abandon

common sense. Only after the world follows Jawaharlal Nehru’s

vision and becomes wholly nuclear-free, can India abandon the

strategic option. But not before this, not when external pressures

and threats are continuous and powerful. Any government that

is seen as compromising on the country's essential need for

external security will soon be voted out of office. 

War is no longer confined to the clash of tanks and troops in

set-piece battles. Guerrilla war is equally lethal, as first the

French and then the Americans discovered in Vietnam. Using

this criterion, Pakistan has been in a state of war with India for

at least the past five years, ever since it began sending armed

men into the Kashmir Valley on a scale reminiscent of 1947-48.

If it has not expanded this war into the conventional channel as

well, it is probably because of fear of the Indian strategic

deterrent. Seeing the post-Pokhran unwillingness of Pakistan to

enter into a conventional war with India, a strong case can be

made out that the speedy development and deployment of Agni

and Prithvi will diminish (rather than make inevitable) the

prospect of conventional war between India and Pakistan.

'Coming of Age'

The United States needs to become more 'contemporaneous'

with current reality: 1994 is a significant distance away from

1984, and 2004 will be very much more different. If present

trends continue, that year may well see the ’coming of age of the

latest major power, India America needs to adjust itself to this

emerging reality to acknowledging that India and China have as

much right to their own strategic defence systems as Britain and

France have. The Euro- centric world view of the east coast

establishment of the United States has to give way not to the west

coast’s Asia-centred view, but to a recognition that Asia and

Europe have already become equal strategic partners, deserving

of the same treatment. In particular, China and India should not

be judged by yardsticks different from those used by America

for Britain and France.

While the British may have been tardy in acknowledging the

new reality, the largest power in Europe has not. Foreign

Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany made plain that his country

welcomes a permanent seat for India on the Security Council.

Unlike Britain, which follows the US State Department line with

an embarrassing fervour, the Germans have been much more

understanding of India’s need to protect itself against cross-

border terrorism. Neither the British nor the Americans appear

to be giving sufficient weightage to the effect on international

security that a Yugoslav-type break-up would have on India’s

880 million people. If the fundamentalist elements in Kashmir

did not get encouragement from American expressions of concern

over 'Kashmiri rights' (as though these were different from the

rights of other Indians), an end to the insurgency there would be

swifter.

In sum, the 'unipolar' world of today will in the decade

ahead change into a 'tripolar' world, with America, Europe and

Asia as the three nodes. As for the present sole superpower, the

United States, it needs to recognise that India and China are at

least as responsible and relevant as its traditional allies, Britain

and France. Double standards are no longer an acceptable

medium of dialogue between countries.

Political Loyalties - the Value of Federalism

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

It is a fact of life that a political party or front can secure less than

a quarter of the votes cast and yet come to office. Despite polling

significantly fewer votes than its Hindutva rival, it is the party of

Mulayam Singh Yadav and not that of Kalyan Singh which is in

power in U.P. today. The SJP-BSIP victory confirms the

fragmentation that has come about in the Indian polity, now

divided nationally into four competing streams—the Congress,

the BJP, the Janata Dal and its left allies, and finally the regional

and sectional parties. Each of the four has to compete with the

other three to retain, or expand, its base.

Feudal Roots

With Indian society moving away from its feudal roots to enter

the phase of commercial capitalism, it may not be inappropriate

to use a marketing analogy for the political spectrum and say

that each political party is attempting to increase its ’market

share' at the expense of its rivals. However, just as a marketing

organisation needs a clear picture of its target, Indian political

parties need to recognise the changing realities in the political

market place.

The first change is a loosening of traditional ’brand loyalties',

to use a marketing term again. So far as the national elections are

concerned, this is a process that picked up speed when Indira

Gandhi unilaterally changed the rules of the political game in

1975 by imposing the Emergency and making organised political

structures (including her own) irrelevant. Her preference for

personalised power, as distinct from the consensus-oriented

Congress formula, led to a shift away from her 'brand' that cost

the Congress its hold on power.

The second major change is an increasing pragmatism within 

the electorate, which votes in accordance with the principles of 

enlightened self-interest. It is not abstruse philosophy or universal 

principle that determines voting behaviour, but the price of 

onions or tomatoes. Behind the caste or other sectional appeal of 

parties such as the BSP, the Telugu Desam or the SJP is the 

message that their coming to power will make a positive material 

difference to the lives of the group whose cause they are claiming 

to espouse. 

It is a fact that any society is divided into groups and classes, 

and it is by recognising and cultivating them that the smaller 

political parties build up bases for themselves, usually at the

expense of the mainstream parties that attempt to appeal to

broad aggregates rather than to segments The best example of

such a mainstream party is the Congress, and its recent electoral

history is proof that, just as in marketing the concept of ’niche'

is driving away strategies based on broad-spectrum markets, in

politics the age of the ’niche' electoral segment has finally

arrived. In other words, political parties will now need to

abandon catch-all strategies in favour of more focused messages.

Both the BJP and the Janata Dal are political parties that at

various stages and locations were able to trounce the Congress

by targeting specific segments of the Congress vote bank. In both

these parties, however, there are powerful groups still in the

thrall of the 'mainstream' Congress culture, which would like to

widen the sectional message. In other words, to quit chasing the

niche in favour of the whole. Within the Janata Dal, Ramakrishna

Hegde and Biju Patnaik can be said to represent such a trend,

while within the BJP, the supporters of Atal Behari Vajpayee are

attempting to push the party closer to the mainstream tendency

represented by the Congress.

Unfortunately for such individuals, recent electoral history

confirms the wisdom of the political 'niche marketeers' over

their universalist colleagues. The danger that these marketeers

face, however, comes not from mainstream parties, but from

smaller parties whose sectional messages are even sharper and

more narrowly-focused than their own. While the BJP has thus

far escaped the divisive tendency seen within the Janata Dal, it

is not improbable that hard-line elements may separate from it

and follow their own course.

Small Parties

Does this mean that Indian democracy is fated to witness a

kaleidoscope of small parties, combining and splitting away

from each other? Does this mean that the stability enjoyed by a

single party will soon cease to operate? It need not, provided that

in place of attempting to impose a kind of universality over a

political party, the political leaders favouring a return to the

mainstream see a party not as a homogeneous entity, but as a

group of disparate elements that combine in the manner of a

many-stranded rope. The V. P. Singh formula of a 'federal'

political party, provides an example.

As the largest political party in the country, and one that has

not yet given up its attempts at fashioning a universal message

strong enough to enable it to fend off its 'niche' competitors, the

Congress has a major responsibility in this regard. In the

Nehruvian era, the different units of the Congress functioned

with a wide degree of autonomy, and were therefore able to

formulate policies that were more acceptable to their respective

areas than a broad-spectrum message would have been. Thus the

Congress in Tamil Nadu remained aloof to Hindi while the party

in Uttar Pradesh demanded the spread of the language to all

regions. It was only when Lal Bahadur Shastri imposed uniformity

in 1964-65 and forced the Tamil Nadu Congress government to

take a hard line on the DMK's anti-Hindi agitation that it was

swept out of power in the state in 1967.

More Liberal

Under Indira Gandhi, the 'federal' character of the Congress

disappeared, and the era of nominations arrived with a vengeance.

Rather than come up through the grassroots, the new leaders of

the Congress came from among those who had mastered the art

of wooing the powers that be in Delhi. If one takes the 1971

(garibi hatao) victory as the first successful exploitation of the

materialist tendency then nascent in the Indian voter, it is no

accident that the 1980 victory came at a time when the Congress

was out of office, out of funds and therefore perforce more liberal

in its attitude to the state units.

Two years ago, the long period of 'nomination raj' in the

Congress was brought to an end by holding elections to all

organisational posts. Today there seems to be a return to the

centralised system of the past. In a polity as complex as India, it

is impossible for a single leader to fashion the many subtle

changes in political strategy needed to take account of variations

within the electorate. Rather than a 'high command' decide

whether the Mandalism of a Veerappa Moily or the business-

friendly pragmatism of a Sharad Pawar is more suited to the

political needs of a particular state, it would be better to let the

'market' (i.e. the local party unit) decide.

This is not a call to anarchy. Each broad-based political party

would have a core set of beliefs, allegiance to which would be a

necessary condition of remaining within it. Thus, for example,

belief in secularism would be essential to any member of the 

Congress or the Janata Dal, while a belief in a uniform civil code 

would be necessary for any member of the BJP. However,

outside such 'core' areas, there is scope for freedom of ideological

and organisational choice, and this freedom should be encouraged

rather than curbed.

The Ostrich Option - Ignoring Jabs at Indian Security

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

In school, it is common for those hounded by bullies to seek to

escape the problem by pretending that the offenders do not exist.

Ignoring them, it is hoped, will turn their attentions elsewhere.

Usually, however, the bully gets encouraged by this ostrich

strategy, and continues the harassment till retaliatory action is

taken. Observing the developments in Indo-Pakistan relations

since 1989, it is clear that those who are masterminding—if one

may use such a word—our strategy towards Pakistan have not

learnt any lessons from school. For each assault on India’s

security interests, the response from this country's side is to

reiterate the faded mantra of dialogue.

The reason why 1989 is significant is that it was in that year

that stable majorities disappeared from the Indian political

lexicon. V.P. Singh's tenure, followed by Chandra Shekhar’s

interregnum, and the assumption of office by the minority

government of P.V. Narasimha Rao, have convinced observers

that the era of single party majorities has ended, and is unlikely

to be resurrected. It is no accident that 1989 was also the year in

which the Pakistan—sponsored insurgency in the Kashmir valley

accelerated.

Curbing Insurgency

In every war fought with Pakistan over Kashmir, it has been

clear to Indian commanders that it is crucial that operations not

be confined to that state, but extended along the entire Indo-

Pakistan border. In the same way, it is clear to analysts—

including those within the government—that success in curbing

the fundamentalist insurgency in that state can be achieved only

if the root of the problem—the involvement of Pakistan—is

addressed. So long as Pakistan feels that it will be allowed to get

away with aiding terrorists in the Valley, the problem will

remain. It is only if the costs to Pakistan of such support are

made intolerably high will its assistance to fundamentalists in

the Valley cease. However, at present every escalation in Pakistani

rhetoric and action is met by the (presumably fearsome) expedient

of an official 'protest'. Even the closing down of an entire

consulate has not been sufficient to jolt the MEA.

Within the international community, Pakistan’s attempt at

annexing Kashmir has its most vocal supporter in Turkey. After

that country's repeated expressions of concern over 'human

rights' violations in parts of India, surely it will not be taken

amiss were India to help generate international attention on the

treatment of Kurds by the Ciller regime. India could also host a

delegation of Kurdish leaders from Turkey, who would no doubt

have much to say about the attention being paid to human rights

in that country. Pakistan too needs to be reminded about its

obligations to its religious minorities, its Mohajirs, and its

Ahmediyas. Careful documentation of the discrimination meted

out to these sections could be carried out and made the subject

of an international campaign. India needs to be at least as active

in ’preventing human rights violations’ in Turkey and Pakistan

as these countries are in India.

Turning the other cheek may be the recommended strategy

for religious reformers eager to establish their moral ascendancy.

International relations, however, is not a contest in public school

manners, but a battle of wills and interests. By refusing to

counter the active Pakistani strategy with a similar initiative, this

country is only encouraging Islamabad to continue with its

covert war in Kashmir. The danger in such passivity is that it

may encourage Pakistan's policymakers to intervene not just in

one Indian state but in several. Such a shift may already be

underway, if reports of ISI activity in Thiruvanathapuram,

Hyderabad and Lucknow are correct. Even an open society

needs to defend itself against those who seek to subvert it

through violence. Not taking precautions against such individuals

would be akin to allowing cancer cells to spread. Despite the

evidence in its possession about subversive activities in India,

the Union home ministry has been coy about sharing this

knowledge, whereas it should be made freely available to the

public. The Indian administration’s long association with the

former Soviet Union has evidently resulted in several key

ministries functioning as though they were in Brezhnevite

Moscow rather than in democratic New Delhi.

Subversive Activities

Popular support is essential for public policy to succeed, and

such support can come only if the public is briefed about

secessionist activities. In this, the government has failed, almost

as much as it has in the international sphere, where it is more

India's economic potential rather than an appreciation of the

justice of its position that has prevented most countries from

supporting the Ankara-Islamabad line. During the time of the

Pakistan army’s war against the population of the then East

Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent envoys around the

word with full details of the genocide. In comparison, present

efforts to educate world opinion about Pakistani support to

terrorism in Kashmir are anaemic. Not, of course, that much

more can be expected of an establishment which permits its

foreign secretary to greet the expelled staff from the closed

Karachi consulate with the familiar hope that there will soon be

talks with Pakistan.

Indeed, the low-key stance adopted by the Indian government

about major technological achievements such as Prithvi and

Agni fuel suspicions that these may be sacrificed. A country has

no need to feel shy about defending its vital security interests,

and yet the manner in which the PMO and the MEA have been

reacting to Agni and Prithvi suggests almost a feeling of apology,

rather than pride. While supporting any steps to prevent cross

border dissemination of strategic technologies, India should

resist efforts to stifle technological development within. In the

coming millennium, India, Japan and China will compete with

the United States and Russia in developing and deploying

strategic technologies, provided there is no sabotage at home.

India which has suffered numerous invasions and enslavements

in its long history, has particular need to be self-sufficient in

defence. The development of Agni and the deployment of

Prithvi will improve the security environment significantly and

act as a deterrent to Pakistani adventurism.

Separatist Impulses

What is even more disconcerting—viewed from the standpoint

of international security—is that influential circles in the United

States and the European Union are flirting with a policy of

’accommodating’ fundamentalist trends. Such an approach was

first tried out in Afghanistan, where the Reagan administration

created an army of religious extremists, who (after having

effectively demolished the Afghan state) are posing threats to

unity in India, Egypt, Algeria and other countries. Within the

U.S. and the EU foreign policy establishments, various formulae

for 'peace' in Kashmir are regularly churned out, almost all of

which presuppose that the state will detach itself from the Indian

Union. The underlying rationale for this presupposition is that

a 'Muslim’ state has no business being in India. This implicit

fragmentation of a polity on the grounds of religion can pose a

threat to stability not just in this country, but eventually in the

West as well. There are significant Muslim populations in

Germany, Britain, France and even the United States, who

would, by the logic being followed by some western analysts in

Kashmir, be justified in demanding autonomy, if not

independence. The fact is that the detachment of Kashmir from

India would trigger an intensification of religion linked separatist

impulses in many other parts of the globe, a step that would also

affect the security interests of the West.

Rather than be abject and apologetic, India needs to make

clear that its security interests will be vigorously safeguarded. In

particular, that its integrity as a multi-religious state will be

maintained. By its muffled response to jabs at Indian security—

whether in the form of intervention in Kashmir or demands that

crucial strategic programmes be aborted—the political leadership

in this country is encouraging fresh assaults on Indian sovereignty.