The
2G verdict, when juxtaposed with what seems a contrary SC judgement,
has introduced a further layer of complexity in a practical
understanding of legal system.
The
2012 Supreme Court judgement cancelling 122 telecom licences, including
denying the allocation of spectrum to eight companies, altered the
telecom industry in India, ensuring that a handful of companies would
carve up the market rather than the several dozen that would have
survived, had even a third of the 122 licencees followed through on
their successful applications . Given Comptroller & Auditor General
Vinod Rai’s calculation of “presumptive” spectrum value, it was
politically (and almost certainly legally) impossible for the Central
government to auction spectrum at less than a steep price. As a
consequence, the few telecom companies still left in India’s domestic
market have much less funds to improve their services and
infrastructure, with the consequence that telecom services in India are
way below most other countries in standards. Broadband speeds are at
sub-bullock cart level, a factor that the officials tasked last year to
prepare a roadmap for the demonetisation of currency ought to have
factored in before rushing ahead with such a hugely consequential
measure. They also ignored such issues as the fact that a change in the
size of currency notes would require a time-consuming recalibration of
ATMs, or that the exclusion of cooperative banks from the currency
exchange mechanism would severely hurt the rural sector, where such
banks are found in far greater profusion than standard commercial banks.
After the Supreme Court’s 2G verdict, both domestic as well as foreign
investors realised that any policy would become final only after a
lengthy legal process that might take a decade, if the parties concerned
were lucky, and several decades if not. Of course, the judicial system
in India, manned by some of the finest judges in the world, would still
have the discretion to take a relook at past verdicts, no matter what
the efflux of time. This means that any government policy would have a
legal Damocles sword hanging permanently over its implementation.
When the Supreme Court cancelled the
telecom licences given by Telecom Minister A. Raja, it was assumed by
the public that evidence of misfeasance was discovered. Interestingly,
it would appear from the labours of the CBI that Raja operated with
complete autonomy within his ministry, as neither the then Finance
Minister or Law Minister have figured in CBI or ED investigations. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh has been found to function in a bubble
independent of the PMO, and therefore ignorant of what was actually
taken place within “his” government. Five years after the SC verdict,
the CBI Special Court has come up with the finding that the CBI and the
ED have failed to discover any misdeed by Raja or by anybody else in the
2G matter. Those whose intellectual faculties are below the elevated
level of those at the top of the legal profession—whether such worthies
be on the bench or the bar—are bemused as to how different the CBI
court’s verdict seems from the SC’s, especially because the Supreme
Court is the apex of the judicial structure. The 2G verdict, when
juxtaposed with what seems a contrary SC judgement, has introduced a
further layer of complexity in a practical understanding of the
country’s legal system, to add to the many collectively making the
processes of justice in India more ponderous and complex than any in
other major democracies. It must be said, however, that the CBI judge
has shown his independence from the agency by writing out a judgement
that blames the CBI and the ED for extremely shoddy work, especially
during the past few years, when it was expected that both would function
with greater efficiency than before. Judge O.P. Saini has even pointed
to lapses within the PMO, and in such detail as to make it mandatory for
an investigation to get carried out as to why these occurred. Of
course, it is well known that our agencies are masters at creating
“false guilt” (through concocting and misrepresenting evidence against
those they target) or “fake innocence”, in which they ignore facts that
establish guilt and instead come up with a bag of alternative facts
designed to protect the wrongdoer from prison. Television anchors
routinely holler out that “the CBI must be brought in” despite even such
examples of Keystone Cops-style defective—sorry, detective—work as the
Aarushi murder case, thereby establishing that in India, hope springs
eternal, while experience very quickly gets buried the way facts are in
several investigations.
When the Supreme Court cancelled the telecom licences given by then Telecom Minister A. Raja, it was assumed by the public that evidence of misfeasance was discovered.
BJP spokespersons are distinguished by
their command of the arcana of law, and the culling out of highly
technical legalese to explain situations, especially political and
policy setbacks. They are now pointing out that the CBI court is but a
lowly link in the chain of justice in India, and that appeal after
appeal will follow. However, so far as the 2019 Lok Sabha polls are
concerned, it is unlikely that any other court judgement on the 2G
matter will come before the elections, which means that the corruption
plank the BJP used with such skill against the Congress Party in the
2014 polls has suddenly become much shakier. Narendra Modi has, for
close to two decades been blessed by luck, including since taking over
as PM, such as by the crash in world oil prices. Judging by recent
events, it would appear that some of that good fortune is starting to
migrate to Congress president Rahul Gandhi.
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