Manipal, India — When Iran’s Assembly of
Experts chose Ali Khamenei as the country’s Supreme Leader on June 4, 1989, it
was because he was seen as a "consensus" man. After a decade under
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader – a title he created to
ensure that the clerics would dominate Iran – people were fatigued by the
austere leader's style and his air of near infallibility.
The country had been through the cauldron
of war with Iraq and was bleeding and in disarray. Earlier, as president of
Iran, Khamenei had impressed many with his willingness to consult a wide range
of people and to give precedence to the views of experts over those of the more
impulsive clerics.
Indeed, he was not even an ayatollah – he
was given the title only after Imam Khomeini passed away. Even so, several of
the country's grand ayatollahs opposed the move, pointing to Khamenei's lack of
significant theological contributions and to the fact that his role had been
largely political.
These were ignored by the Assembly of
Experts. They needed a Supreme Leader who would allow them the freedom to make
the country functional again. In particular, Khomeini’s men rallied behind
Khamenei, pointing out that the Imam had himself appointed Khamenei to lead
Friday prayers in Tehran toward the second half of 1989.
For nearly a decade the new Supreme Leader
kept a low profile, in contrast to his predecessor. He allowed the elected
government a genuine say in the administration of Iran, and reined in clerics
who were eager to resume the dominance they enjoyed under Grand Ayatollah
Khomeini.
However, Khamenei remained committed to
certain core principles, including a consistent policy of opposition toward the
United States, and the refusal to allow the country's minority Sunni population
the same rights enjoyed by the majority Shiites.
It was Khamenei who rejected former
President Mohammad Khatami's plan to build a Sunni mosque in Tehran; he saw the
city as the redoubt of Shiite Islam. He has also been uncompromising in his
advocacy of the destruction of Israel, and has given significant backing to
armed groups throughout the region that target Israel.
The current Supreme Leader of Iran has a
grim view of the world. He sees a range of countries implacably opposed to
Iran; facing such enemies calls for a high degree of internal police control to
maintain unity and prevent chaos.
It was the shocking victory of a moderate
cleric, Mohammad Khatami, in the 1997 presidential elections that brought the
Supreme Leader out of the shadows and onto the center stage of policy. He
repeatedly applied the brakes on Khatami's ambitious plans for internal reform,
including granting more rights to religious minorities and women.
Using the limitless powers available to
him, Khamenei ensured that powerful segments within the bureaucracy rebuffed
Khatami's efforts to create a diplomatic opening to the West. Although the
modern mercantile class in Iran was in favor of such a change in stance – and
remains so – the immense network of state companies had grown comfortable in
their regulation-created profits and feared competition from outside.
Then and now, this government-industrial
bureaucracy enjoys the patronage of Khamenei, who has thus far prevented any
serious reform of the unwieldy and corrupt superstructure that acts as a drain
on the country with its high costs and poor record of delivery.
Aware that continuing this situation would
condemn Iran to perpetual economic stagnation, some of the country's younger
professionals are in favor of reforms, including better relations with the West
and backing away from confrontation over the nuclear program.
It was the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
in the 2004 elections that allowed Khamenei to come into his own. Although many
speak of the younger man as the more dominant of the pair, in reality
Ahmadinejad has been content to serve as Khamenei's enforcer and spokesperson,
repeating the hard-line rhetoric that is a staple of the Supreme Leader's
worldview.
From 2004, the last internal checks to
"Khameneism" disappeared. Since then the Khamenei men have begun to
assert themselves over the groups that owed their rise to Grand Ayatollah
Khomeini. Today, the once all-powerful Imam Khomeini has been all but ritually
forgotten in official Iran, where the only voice that counts is that of
Khamenei and those personally loyal to him – most for reasons of expediency.
The government-industrial complex has
agreed to subordinate itself to the clerical group surrounding Khamenei, with
the result that efficiency has plunged even farther than in 2004. Today, the
Iranian state system is unable to deliver the reasonable essentials of life,
forcing the majority of the population to rely on their own meager resources
for sustenance. Many of the welfare projects touted by Ahmadinejad exist only
in state media; their delivery is patchy at best and often non-existent.
It is small wonder that the country is
seething. Interestingly, the lead in the current protests against the results
of the recent presidential elections has been taken by followers of Grand
Ayatollah Khomeini, who have pitted themselves against the Khameini men.
The fierce repression now witnessed in Iran
indicates that the Khameini team has launched an all-out war against Khomeini
loyalists opposing Ahmadinejad. If they succeed in extinguishing the protests,
Khamenei will acquire the same power that Khomeini had during his decade in
power – 1979-1989.
However, aware that the crackdown is being
conducted on behalf of a dysfunctional setup, several tens of thousands of
people, including some in the security system, are reluctant to use the force
demanded of them. The already frayed links between the Khomeini people and
Khamenei have broken down and ultimately, the superior numbers of the former
can be expected to prevail in the contest of wills now being played out across
Iran. Indeed, the crackdown is daily creating not just martyrs but activists,
ensuring the formation of a coalition that will make business as usual
impossible in Iran until justice is done.
Meanwhile, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stands ready
to carry out the wishes of the Supreme Leader, aware that he owes both his 2004
and his 2009 victories to him. But Khamenei may find that in protecting
Ahmadinejad, he has put at risk not just his legacy but his title.
-(Professor M.D. Nalapat is
vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and
professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
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