Manipal, India — If we take away the
near-automatic, and usually fallacious, identification of a country with its
government, and use the views within an elected Parliament as a better guide to
opinion, then there is a majority against the George W. Bush-Manmohan Singh
nuclear deal that crosses 70 percent.
Regrettably for India's ruling Congress
party, Sonia Gandhi gave up her struggles with formal education very early, and
since her marriage to a scion of the Nehrus has lived a life as cocooned as any
royalty. She chose as prime minister an individual as unschooled in the actual
rough-and-tumble of politics as herself. Manmohan Singh was pitchforked into
politics by former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992, and after a disastrous
showing in the "safe" and urbanized New Delhi constituency in 1996,
has refused to enter an electoral contest.
Small wonder that both misread the
chemistry of the country and went ahead with a nuclear deal that does India the
"favor" of being accepted as low caste rather than an outcaste, as
the country has been treated under the leadership of the United States, China
and the European Union since its first nuclear test in 1974. "Low
caste" in the context of the nuclear sector can be held to refer to
countries that have been given the privilege of supervised and limited access
to nuclear technology, a category that includes most countries in the world.
Countries such as Germany and Japan may be
termed "medium caste." These have the right to not merely act as
receptacles for outside technology, but undertake specific functions such as
the reprocessing of spent fuel on their own. These are what Bush has termed as
"donor countries" in his proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,
as opposed to "recipient" countries denied this privilege.
The "high caste" includes of
course the five declared nuclear weapons powers under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Although the nuclear deal accepts the
reality of India's being a nuclear weapons state, the contours of the
cooperation proposed within its ambit have been drawn on the implicit premise
that a steady diminution of India's indigenous capability would be in the
international interest. Once the deal becomes operational, an intrusive regime
of inspections would kick in, and the limited re-processing that would be
permitted under the terms of the "123 Agreement" and the
India-specific Hyde Act passed by the U.S. Congress last year would be at a
facility that would in effect be under international control.
Over time, almost all of India's nuclear
capability would come under the inspections regime of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and efforts at developing an indigenous energy program based on
thorium would have to be given up. Costs would rise substantially, as most
foreign technologies are based on "high" rather than "low"
enriched uranium, the price of which is shooting up even more than broader-term
trends for oil.
Both Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh have
consistently been opposed to the vigorous nuclear program favored by the Indian
strategic establishment over four decades. They, as well as their predecessors,
limited and slowed the Indian program, which despite such official retardation
has developed into a self-sufficient basket of technologies that would find
ready and profitable markets, were some exported.
Neither Gandhi nor Singh has thus far dared
to challenge the communist parties in India over economic policy, almost always
succumbing to their bullying even on key policies related to reform. In
contrast, and for reasons that are opaque, both appear willing to stake the
very existence of their three-year-old government on getting the nuclear deal
administratively approved, despite the parliamentary majority against it. This
is the kind of error that is seldom committed by elected leaders, even those
who received a helping hand from the Supreme Court.
India is indeed rising, and this despite
its government. Among those under 30, especially, there is a confidence about
the future of the country that is palpable to most visitors. The new Indian
regards herself or himself as the equal of citizens of any other major power,
including the United States. Hence, they reject a concession that appears
incredibly generous to U.S. policymakers who implicitly regard Indians as
different from the natives of Europe.
This includes diplomats such as
Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who must no doubt have spent numerous
pleasant holidays at "home" in Europe. Burns, however, is more
liberal than other under-secretaries such as Robert Joseph, who apparently
backs the Bush attempt to monopolize nuclear technologies in the hands of those
of European (or regrettably, Chinese) origin. They see the nuclear deal as a
way of getting India to retreat from its 47-year quest for strategic equality
with the major European powers, a drive manifested not only in the bomb
program, but in the space missions being undertaken by the country.
Singh, with the backing of Sonia Gandhi,
has reportedly agreed to limit development of the Indian missile system to a
range no higher than 5,500 kilometers, uncaring of the effect that this would
have on the space program and the quest for developing rockets that can compete
with China and the European Union in the profitable space launch business.
Singh and Gandhi are delighted at their
"promotion" from nuclear outcastes to nuclear lowlife
("receipent states," in Bush terminology). The majority in India's
Parliament disagrees with them, and it is a no-brainer that a policy that does
not have the support of the majority of members of Parliament cannot have the
force of law. Should Gandhi and Singh choose to go down rather than listen to
the majority and renegotiate more acceptable terms, the present nuclear deal
will soon follow them.
A successor government is likely to work
out a deal with close ally Russia rather than spend time persuading the U.S.
Congress that the world's fast-growing and only democracy with a billion-plus
population deserves to be treated at least the way Britain and France are. By
highlighting U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge Indians as being the equals of
their major European partners, the nuclear deal has become an obstacle to,
rather than the symbol of, the India-U.S. partnership that is the present era's
geopolitical imperative.
-(Professor M.D. Nalapat is
vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and
professor of geopolitics at Manipal University.)
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