MANIPAL, India, Aug. 31 (UPI) -- Since
the mid-1980s, there has been a vigorous campaign by academics in the United
States and Europe to say that a "high" risk of nuclear war exists
between Pakistan and India. Most of these scholars are "South Asia
experts", a school formed in the crucible of the Cold War, when
Soviet-allied India ranged itself politically against the United States, while
Pakistan did the opposite, as did post-Deng China.
Since the beginning of economic
liberalization in the mid-1990s, the rate of economic growth in India has risen
from 2 percent during the Jawaharlal Nehru
period to nearly 9 percent under Narasimha Rao.
Today, because of the inefficiency of the
Vajpayee government, the rate of growth has fallen to 5 percent. India can
easily achieve a double-digit growth rate, given a better government.
During 2001 several conferences on
international investment pointed out that India was emerging as a better
investment destination than China.
The reasons given were that: 1 -- more
than 200 million Indians spoke English; 2 -- the country was a democracy with a
Western legal and educational system; and 3 -- culturally the Indian people
belonged to the same Indo-European family as the West.
The fact is that investment into India
began to increase, from $1 billion five years ago to nearly $4 billion now.
This is still far below China's huge totals, collectively estimated at $300
billion.
Were India to get even a fifth of such foreign investment, the country would generate tens of millions of new jobs and emerge as another regional powerhouse, together with Japan and China.
Were India to get even a fifth of such foreign investment, the country would generate tens of millions of new jobs and emerge as another regional powerhouse, together with Japan and China.
Enter the military regime in Pakistan,
which has thus far not been accused of a bias in favor of India.
The generals there have, for the past six
years at least, been threatening India with a nuclear attack. This has
understandably generated headlines internationally and energized a slew of
"peacemakers" ranging from Secretary of State Colin Powell to British
Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Each visit by such do-gooders resulted in
fresh attention being drawn to the "imminence" of nuclear
conflict."
As a result, the country's inherent
advantages for foreign investment have been blown away and billions of dollars
have been lost.
That such an outcome does no harm to
Pakistan -- an economy into which there is hardly any rush to invest -- perhaps
is seen as encouraging by the generals in Pakistan. It certainly does nothing
to dissuade them from fresh war rhetoric whenever the atmosphere calms down.
In this way, Pakistan ensures that China
faces no competition from India in attracting foreign investment.
Panic measures such as the quickly
withdrawn travel advisory issued by the United States, Japan and the European
Union against visits to India have achieved the same result.
How realistic is the scenario of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan?
There is probably less chance of a
nuclear war between India and Pakistan than once existed between the Soviet
Union and the United States.
Despite threats and rhetoric, no
government in Pakistan would launch a nuclear attack on India. And, unlike the
case of the United States and the Soviet Union where the two sides had roughly
equal forces, there is a huge difference between the nuclear capacities of
India and Pakistan.
Some analysts say what China has given
Pakistan is not a nuclear weapon small enough to be loaded onto an aircraft on
placed on a missile but a much cruder nuclear device.
Such a "bomb" needs to be
encased in nearly five tons of concrete and cannot therefore be loaded on to an
aircraft or a missile. It is good for a display of nuclear machismo like what
was seen in Chagai, Pakistan, in 1999 but useless in war.
If it is assumed Pakistan has 25 nuclear
weapons -- the upper limit given in the more frenzied media reports -- this is
a much smaller arsenal than the reported 95-strong Indian stockpile.
Were Pakistan to attack India, 26 million
people, at worst, would die or be incapacitated. At most, five of India's 36
major cities could be affected.
With a population of 1 billion, this
would leave 974 million people to continue with life and 31 of the country's
important cities would be unaffected.
Even assuming Pakistan possesses a usable
bomb -- which I do not believe they do -- the damage to India would be much less,
proportional to population, than what the Soviet Union suffered in World War
II: 27 million people out of a population of 180 million dead.
By contrast, the Indian response to a
Pakistani nuclear attack could wipe it out.
All nine of the important cities in
Pakistan could be destroyed and 65 million people would be dead or
incapacitated. As a country Pakistan would cease to exist. This analysis is
known to must of the generals in Pakistan, which is why one may reasonably
assume they would never launch a first strike against India.
Militarily, the use of such weapons is
justified only in situations when the armed forces or the territory of the
country is about to be conquered.
Since the 1980s, Indian military doctrine
has moved away from the seizure of Pakistani territory in recognition of the
less significant role played by landmass in modern estimates of strategic
strength.
Not only does India does not have any
territorial ambitions on Pakistan, the principal secretary to the prime
minister is reported to have told officials in London, Paris and Washington
that his government was prepared to permanently concede Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir to Islamabad, and would accept the "Line of Control" in
Kashmir as the international boundary.
It is a commentary on the susceptibility
of the media to manipulation that even responsible publications and journalists
keep repeating the myth that there is a chance of nuclear war between India and
Pakistan.
In reality there is no such possibility.
Of course, both the generals in Pakistan and the apparatchiks in China must be
laughing at the way in which a prospective economic rival of the PRC has been
rendered harmless.
As for the million-dollar
"industry" devoted to "nuclear risk reduction in South
Asia," the funds from foundations continue to pour in with each threat and
counter-threat by two of the more foolish establishments on the planet.
Professor M.D. Nalapat is director of the
School of Geopolitics, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India and
consulting editor to the Indian Defense Review.
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