By M D Nalapat
The post-Wuhan proposal was that President Xi should pay a
reciprocal visit to India early next year, before the Lok Sabha campaign
accelerates in earnest. However, a lobby in Beijing is opposed to such a
timeline, and is pressing for Xi to make a reciprocal visit ‘only after
the polls’.
Lobbies influenced by external interests (principally Pakistan, but
some developed countries as well) are working on overdrive to sabotage
the non-formal Wuhan Accord reached between Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 27-28 April at Wuhan,
China. Wuhan was planned to be followed up by a meeting in India of the
two statesmen early next year, so that the “1 plus 1 Apex” format
between Delhi and Beijing becomes a staple of bilateral diplomacy
between the two most populous countries on the planet. Now that China
has emerged as the second superpower, moving closer each year to
becoming the globe’s biggest economy, the Modi government is engaged in a
complex balancing of relations between itself as well as both the Trump
and Xi administrations. Ideally, Indian diplomacy should ensure both a
strong defence and security relationship with Washington, while at the
same time entering into a robust commercial relationship with Beijing,
on the assumption that tensions between the two superpowers would at no
stage be permitted to end in actual military conflict between the two
sides, as last happened during the 1950-53 Korean War. Another war
between the two biggest (and extensively interlinked) economies on the
planet would create a geopolitical nightmare for the international
community, while inflicting permanent damage to both the countries
involved. However, the relationship between the US and China will remain
fractious for a considerable period of time. In Beijing, key
policymakers say privately that the “Trump trade war” is less about
imports and exports than it is a bid to reduce the annual rate of growth
of the Chinese economy to 5% or less, a level that may exacerbate
social tensions that weaken the “Mandate of Heaven” (or acceptance by
the people) of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule that was first
initiated in 1949 by CCP Chairman Mao Zedong on his comprehensive
military defeat of KMT supremo Chiang Kai-shek. Such tensions are
believed to be worked out by planners in Washington to weaken both the
hold of the CCP on the country as well as the control exercised by
President Xi Jinping over the different components of the CCP, which in
effect is the agency ruling this vast country.
According to this analysis, the “Trump trade war” is just an initial
salvo in what could be a long campaign designed to weaken the Chinese
economy. Even if the Republican Party does poorly in the 6 November
mid-term elections to the US Senate and the House of Representatives,
President Donald Trump will only “double down rather than lower the
intensity of his mercantile assault” on Chinese exports to the US. The
present trade war between Washington and Beijing is expected to be
followed by other steps designed to keep Chinese policymakers off
balance, and “will continue for a long time, including beyond the term
of the current US President”. This being the case, President Xi is
working out a series of measures designed to reduce the impact of
hostile US moves and to cushion their impact on the population. Inter
alia, this involves boosting domestic consumption and scientific and
industrial self-sufficiency, as well as the creation of financial and
commercial supply chains that are independent of the present
US-dominated global supply chains. US sanctions on Iran have provided an
opportunity to the Chinese and their Russian allies to test new
financial networks that do not intersect with those of the US, and which
avoid the use of the US dollar in transactions and accounting. The
anticipated prospect is therefore of a long-term increase in US-China
tensions, reversing the entente between them that got formed after the
1972 meeting between US President Richard M. Nixon and CCP Chairman Mao
Zedong. This has made India much more important as a commercial and if
possible a strategic partner of China.
OLD THOUGHT VS NEW MINDS
President Xi has been engaged in a process of replacing “Old Thought”
with “New Minds”, and several of those who have begun advising the CCP
on India are in their 40s, with some even in the 30s. These geopolitical
planners do not have baggage from the past that weighs down analysis of
relations with India, and which slows down both responses as well as
policy initiatives directed towards Delhi. The Wuhan meeting indicated
the will of both Prime Minister Modi as well as President Xi Jinping to
leap over established paradigms in an effort to create a new framework
for bilateral relations between a country that will soon be the world’s
biggest economy and its neighbour, which is on course to becoming the
third largest on the globe, behind the US but ahead of every other
country barring front-ranker China. However, within the Chinese
establishment (as well as in India), there exist influential lobbies
that continue to peddle nostrums that have clearly been shown by
historical experience to be counter-productive. An example is the
post-Wuhan proposal that President Xi pay a reciprocal visit to India
early next year, ideally during February 2019, before the Lok Sabha
campaign accelerates in earnest. However, a lobby within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) in Beijing is opposed to such a timeline, and is
pressing for Xi to make a reciprocal visit “only after the polls”.
Their argument is that the outcome of such polls is uncertain, so it
would be best to make the visit only after the result gets declared and
the post-poll government settles down. Such a view ignores the need to
institutionalise the Wuhan process by ensuring visits that are
independent of political changes, if any. A second Modi-Xi summit early
next year would assist in ensuring that the “1 plus 1 Apex” format gets
established as a permanent feature of relations between China and India,
while a delay till after the Lok Sabha polls take place may result in
an indefinite postponement of such a reciprocal visit, thereby diluting
the gains of the Wuhan summit.
An example of “Old Thought” in Beijing on Sino-Indian relations is
the effort by some elements in both the Foreign and Defence ministries
in Beijing to continue the policy of blocking India’s accession to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the next meeting of which is scheduled
towards the close of November, and which is almost certain to include in
the agenda the admission of India into the NSG. The “New Thinkers” in
Beijing understand the importance of this issue to future relations, and
are in favour of China supporting both Pakistan as well as India as
members, leaving it to the rest of the group to decide on whether one or
both should get admitted. This would change the present dynamic, which
is a Chinese veto on the entry of India unless Pakistan gets admitted as
well, something the Chinese side knows is impossible in the present
circumstances of control of that country by its nuke-rattling military. A
fresh Chinese veto over India’s entry into the NSG in the November 2018
meeting can be expected to have severe repercussions on other fields,
such as trade and commerce. While the “Old Thought” in Beijing believes
that Indian policymakers will erect a firewall between “difficult
issues” (such as the border or NSG) and other matters such as trade, the
“New Thinkers” are aware that such a separation is unrealistic, and
that Delhi regards Beijing’s support on NSG membership of immense
significance in accepting that Beijing sees India as an “equal partner”
rather than as a “lesser country” than China.
BUSINESS AND BOUNDARY
Chinese business groups are looking to India to make up expected
losses caused as a consequence of restrictions placed on their US
operations. Digital India has become a near-monopoly of US tech giants
such as Google, Facebook and Microsoft. 90% of the advertising revenue
from India in that internet sector goes to Google, with an additional 5%
accruing to Facebook, with the rest having to be shared by dozens of
other (mostly domestic) players. Only Chinese tech players have the
scale to seriously compete with their US counterparts, and should they
be permitted the same freedom of access as US companies have been given
in India by successive governments, they would cut into the monopoly now
enjoyed by US West Coast tech giants in a market that is already home
to much if not most of Facebook users, with Google and Microsoft as well
seeing their overall numbers (and valuation) significantly boosted by
operations in India, at the cost of paying taxes that are relatively
insignificant. Such ease of access would be opposed by several security
experts in India, who however see no problem in the country being almost
wholly at the mercy of US tech giants. The present situation within our
country is that Google may already have the power to discredit almost
any public figure in India, while Facebook could conceivably create
difficult situations on streets in cities across the country, so
powerful is their reach and credibility.
Another sector where India could benefit from China is tourism.
Should, for example, a Buddhist circuit get established in India by
Chinese investors the way the Japanese have already done with such
success, the number of Chinese visitors to India could rise
significantly, given that over a hundred million Chinese go outside
their country for visits each year. A third is infrastructure. While the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (which was strongly endorsed by both
the Foreign as well as the Defence Ministries in the Peoples Republic of
China) is proving to be a loss-maker with intended benefits yet to be
reaped, a China-India corridor would be certain to generate surpluses,
given the rate of growth of the Indian economy despite the prevalence of
conservative fiscal and monetary policies designed to increase short
term collections and bureaucratic control rather than promoting
long-term growth in the manner experienced by China since the 1980s.
“Old Thought” on India in Beijing continues to regard any settlement
of the boundary question with hesitation, and are advising that such
matters be pushed away into the distant future. However, the “New
Thinkers” are aware that a lack of progress on the boundary issue could
affect even commercial ties. In such a context, the Indian side is known
to be proposing that at least the “Middle Sector” of the Sino-Indian
boundary get demarcated as evidence of progress. Added to Chinese
acceptance of India as a member of the NSG, a boundary settlement in the
Middle Sector would give a major boost to relations between Beijing and
Delhi. However, this is being opposed by the “Old Thought” lobby, which
incidentally has very close links with GHQ Rawalpindi. This lobby sees
the Pakistan military as the guarantor of Chinese interests in Pakistan,
which is why Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa was given a talking
to after coming to Beijing following suggestions by the Imran Khan
government that work on the CPEC needed to go through a “pause” of at
least a year. Business groups in Karachi have been complaining that CPEC
contracts have been grabbed by Lahore business groups close to Nawaz
Sharif as well as GHQ Rawalpindi. General Bajwa is learnt to have
promised that Prime Minister Imran Khan would ensure that work on the
CPEC proceeds uninterrupted, of course at great cost to the Chinese
exchequer.
THE DALAI QUESTION
A worry for the Chinese side comes from reports that elements in the
US and the UK are working on installing a small child from Tibet or
nearby provinces as the XV Dalai Lama of Tibet with headquarters in
Dharamsala, should the present Dalai Lama ascend to another dimension.
While the Himachal town has been converted into the effective
headquarters of the XIV Dalai Lama after his moving to India in 1959,
the settling there of a claimed successor would in effect make
Dharamsala not the refuge of the present Dalai Lama but the effective
headquarters of any successor not recognised by Beijing. As it is likely
that a successor would get discovered in Tibet who may take up
residence in the Potala Palace, this would create a situation of tension
that is likely to have long-term consequences on Sino-Indian ties, in
the manner that the 1959 decision of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to
give asylum to the present Dalai Lama has done. These are matters that
can be resolved only in the context of a warming of relations between
Delhi and Beijing and in a substantial increase in the trust level
between the two sides. These were the outcomes sought by President Xi
and Prime Minister Modi at Wuhan, but there remains a considerable
distance before this new era in Sino-Indian relations becomes a reality.
RANKING INDIA
The “New Thinkers” regard India as a country ranking along with
Russia, Japan and the US in the top tier of Chinese interests and
concerns, and it is clear that President Xi shares such a view. However,
this ranking of India as being among the top priorities for China is
opposed by those clinging on to “Old Thought”. To them, India is in
effect a US satellite, and needs to be kept off balance through deft
diplomacy in South Asia. The “New Thinkers”, in contrast, look towards
greater imports from India as well as greater investment into India as
being factors that would promote trust and closeness in Sino-Indian
relations. Some are even considering the option of looking to bring tens
of thousands of Knowledge Industry personnel from India to help Chinese
entities compete with US global giants. At present, while several
hundred thousand such “brain workers” work in the US or for US
companies, only a few hundred are active in China. Both Xi as well as
Modi are expected to meet later this year at Buenos Aires for the G 20
summit, where both trade as well as other matters are certain to be
discussed among two of the Big Four global leaders (the others being
Presidents Putin and Trump). The rewards of close ties are obvious. What
is still uncertain is whether “Old Thought” (and not only in China but
in India) will allow the two leaders to bypass past disagreements and
enter into a synergistic relationship. China will be looking to
sensitivity on matters such as Dharamsala, while India will regard
another Chinese rebuff at the NSG as evidence that “Old Thought” still
prevails over “New Thinkers” within the circle of policymakers close to
Xi. Clearing the way to join NSG and Xi paying a Wuhan-style visit to
India early next year would, on the other hand, help ensure that
Sino-Indian relations transit from rough weather to smooth.