(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)
In this age of the cable, when soaps are just a button away, few
can be unaware that one of the rules of romance is to play hard
to get. Should the maiden reveal her feelings prematurely, the
swain is likely to take her for granted and, consequently, neglect
her. This is what appears to have happened in the case of India
and the United States.
Nowhere did the collapse of the Soviet Union come as a
greater shock than in Havana and New Delhi. Cuba, at least, had
the excuse of being far away. India and the erstwhile USSR were
neighbours. .However, even when the putsch against Mikhail
Gorbachov took place, one of the few embassies to cosy up to the
team of tired apparatchiks that had temporarily taken over the
Kremlin was the Indian one. After the collapse, India appears ,
anxious to enter into yet another comfortable security relationship,
this time with. the United States. Hence the flow of conciliatory
gestures to that country.
Henry Kissinger, in his book Diplomacy makes clear the U.S.
perspective on unilateral concessions. These, says Kissinger, are
to be taken as signs of vulnerability, and the effort should,
therefore, be to squeeze out yet more concessions, rather than
reward such naivete by positive gestures. As the book had not
yet come out in l991-93 we may perhaps excuse the authors of
the many unilateral concessions this country gave to the U.S.
Alas for them, this policy was reciprocated by renewed American
pressure on sensitive issues like defence technology and Kashmir.
Security Curtain
Earlier, in 1963, this country had come close to entering into a
security curtain provided by the U.S. S. K. Patil, at that time a
Cabinet minister, had said that there had been informal high-
level discussions within the Congress leadership on working out
security ties with western countries in response to the Chinese
invasion of 1962. "However, both the British and the Americans
then started pressuring us to make concessions to Pakistan on
Kashmir, and as a result the idea got dropped". Three decades
later another move for security ties with the United States had
begun to wither in the face of a renewed U.S. tilt towards
Pakistan. The recent statements of a U.S. under-secretary for
defence that implied that relations with India were conditional
on Pakistani approval, has at last, led to an Indian reaction. The
Indian defence secretary's visit to Washington has been
"postponed".
The interlude not just from 1991 but from 1989 to the present
may be seen as one when India neglected its security systems
and, slowed down the development of missile and other
technologies in order to placate Washington. Ironically, it is
American policy and allies of the U.S. that have been creating
security concerns for this country in the form of fundamentalist
terrorism. Afghanistan is the obvious example. During the 1980s,
U.S.-funded network of terrorist's was created that is now
active as a mercenary force around the globe. Bolstering the ISI,
which focused on religion as a means of generating morale and
fighting spirit during the Afghan war, led to substantial sections
of the Pakistan army coming under the spell of fundamentalism.
Its utility as an anti-fundamentalist fighting force is today —
questionable.
Fundamentalist Forces
The significance of this transformation is that should a government
take office in Pakistan that lays stress not on conflicts but on
business, fundamentalist elements could well induce the armed ,
forces in Pakistan to intervene and crush attempts at secularising
that country's polity. Secondly, should there be an upsurge in
any of the major Gulf countries on the lines witnessed in Iran
when the Shah was to led, the Gulf sheikhdoms would no
longer be able to count on Pakistan to provide a counterforce.
The cry of jihad raised so often by Benazir Bhutto has the
potential to destroy the cohesiveness of her country.
Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are financing and supporting
fundamentalist organisations on a much greater scale than the
other theocracy in the region, Iran. In the process, their ruling
elites may be in the process of nurturing a monster that will
eventually devour them. As for the U.S., just as it supplied arms
to Iran in the Shah’s time, it is doing so in Saudi Arabia and
would probably like to in Pakistan, but for Congress. In contrast
to the economics-oriented policy pursued by the Clinton
administration in most of the world, in the case of the Gulf and
Pakistan, little U.S. pressure seems to exist to make the ruling
elites of these countries give precedence to a civilian
administration over the military. In the case of Pakistan, in
renewing a military alliance with that state, the U.S. may be
sacrificing not just the possibility of a strategic alliance with
India, but also stability in Pakistan. Any injection of arms there
will lead to a response from this country, thus triggering off an
arms race that will debilitate the Pakistani economy far more and
far quicker than it can India's.
However, this does not appear to be clear to the individuals
at the policy planning centres in the Clinton administration.
Watching them at work, one is reminded of those who steered
to the U.S. into the Vietnam war. All the calculations were right but
most of the conclusions wrong. In the decade ahead, the U.S. is
likely to enter into a conflict against a fundamentalist enemy
nourished in the past by American policy errors. Should Benazir
Bhutto have taken a stand against anti-secular laws, and choked
off the irregular war against India in favour of economic
cooperation with this country, she would have earned the
epithet bestowed on her by Clinton of "moderate". Today, this
is far from the truth. By ignoring the financial support given by
Saudi Arabia to fundamentalist organisations and the military
help given to them by Pakistan, the U.S. is acquiescing in
cultivating an enemy not just of stability in the subcontinent but
of itself.
U.S. Sanction
In the case of Iran, by attempting at quarantine ignored even by
the United Kingdom—the U.S. is reinforcing the siege mentality
propagated by the religious zealots, thus weakening among the
Iranian people the only counterjforce to theocracy, the bazaaris.
Another country where sanctions "have lasted beyond a reasonable
stage is Iraq, which unlike Saudi Arabia or Pakistan has attempted
to craft a secular (though repressive) polity. While India has
refused to follow the U.S. lead on Iran, in the case of Iraq too this
country needs to be more assertive within the international
community in calling for an end to sanctions. A generation
should not be allowed to form in Iran and Iraq that sees major
democracies as tyrannies out to strangle their national existence,
or else future terrorist organisations may find rich pickings
within these states.
To predicate New Delhi's policy on the dictates of a country
that has repeatedly shown extreme myopia in its dealings with
Asia is folly. Should India neglect to create defences against the
fundamentalism being propagated by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan
and others, this may prove fatal to its existence. Policy has to be
formulated not to meet the political demands of those in
Washington but to answer the security needs of the region in
which this country is situated.