Political Loyalties - the Value of Federalism

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

It is a fact of life that a political party or front can secure less than

a quarter of the votes cast and yet come to office. Despite polling

significantly fewer votes than its Hindutva rival, it is the party of

Mulayam Singh Yadav and not that of Kalyan Singh which is in

power in U.P. today. The SJP-BSIP victory confirms the

fragmentation that has come about in the Indian polity, now

divided nationally into four competing streams—the Congress,

the BJP, the Janata Dal and its left allies, and finally the regional

and sectional parties. Each of the four has to compete with the

other three to retain, or expand, its base.

Feudal Roots

With Indian society moving away from its feudal roots to enter

the phase of commercial capitalism, it may not be inappropriate

to use a marketing analogy for the political spectrum and say

that each political party is attempting to increase its ’market

share' at the expense of its rivals. However, just as a marketing

organisation needs a clear picture of its target, Indian political

parties need to recognise the changing realities in the political

market place.

The first change is a loosening of traditional ’brand loyalties',

to use a marketing term again. So far as the national elections are

concerned, this is a process that picked up speed when Indira

Gandhi unilaterally changed the rules of the political game in

1975 by imposing the Emergency and making organised political

structures (including her own) irrelevant. Her preference for

personalised power, as distinct from the consensus-oriented

Congress formula, led to a shift away from her 'brand' that cost

the Congress its hold on power.

The second major change is an increasing pragmatism within 

the electorate, which votes in accordance with the principles of 

enlightened self-interest. It is not abstruse philosophy or universal 

principle that determines voting behaviour, but the price of 

onions or tomatoes. Behind the caste or other sectional appeal of 

parties such as the BSP, the Telugu Desam or the SJP is the 

message that their coming to power will make a positive material 

difference to the lives of the group whose cause they are claiming 

to espouse. 

It is a fact that any society is divided into groups and classes, 

and it is by recognising and cultivating them that the smaller 

political parties build up bases for themselves, usually at the

expense of the mainstream parties that attempt to appeal to

broad aggregates rather than to segments The best example of

such a mainstream party is the Congress, and its recent electoral

history is proof that, just as in marketing the concept of ’niche'

is driving away strategies based on broad-spectrum markets, in

politics the age of the ’niche' electoral segment has finally

arrived. In other words, political parties will now need to

abandon catch-all strategies in favour of more focused messages.

Both the BJP and the Janata Dal are political parties that at

various stages and locations were able to trounce the Congress

by targeting specific segments of the Congress vote bank. In both

these parties, however, there are powerful groups still in the

thrall of the 'mainstream' Congress culture, which would like to

widen the sectional message. In other words, to quit chasing the

niche in favour of the whole. Within the Janata Dal, Ramakrishna

Hegde and Biju Patnaik can be said to represent such a trend,

while within the BJP, the supporters of Atal Behari Vajpayee are

attempting to push the party closer to the mainstream tendency

represented by the Congress.

Unfortunately for such individuals, recent electoral history

confirms the wisdom of the political 'niche marketeers' over

their universalist colleagues. The danger that these marketeers

face, however, comes not from mainstream parties, but from

smaller parties whose sectional messages are even sharper and

more narrowly-focused than their own. While the BJP has thus

far escaped the divisive tendency seen within the Janata Dal, it

is not improbable that hard-line elements may separate from it

and follow their own course.

Small Parties

Does this mean that Indian democracy is fated to witness a

kaleidoscope of small parties, combining and splitting away

from each other? Does this mean that the stability enjoyed by a

single party will soon cease to operate? It need not, provided that

in place of attempting to impose a kind of universality over a

political party, the political leaders favouring a return to the

mainstream see a party not as a homogeneous entity, but as a

group of disparate elements that combine in the manner of a

many-stranded rope. The V. P. Singh formula of a 'federal'

political party, provides an example.

As the largest political party in the country, and one that has

not yet given up its attempts at fashioning a universal message

strong enough to enable it to fend off its 'niche' competitors, the

Congress has a major responsibility in this regard. In the

Nehruvian era, the different units of the Congress functioned

with a wide degree of autonomy, and were therefore able to

formulate policies that were more acceptable to their respective

areas than a broad-spectrum message would have been. Thus the

Congress in Tamil Nadu remained aloof to Hindi while the party

in Uttar Pradesh demanded the spread of the language to all

regions. It was only when Lal Bahadur Shastri imposed uniformity

in 1964-65 and forced the Tamil Nadu Congress government to

take a hard line on the DMK's anti-Hindi agitation that it was

swept out of power in the state in 1967.

More Liberal

Under Indira Gandhi, the 'federal' character of the Congress

disappeared, and the era of nominations arrived with a vengeance.

Rather than come up through the grassroots, the new leaders of

the Congress came from among those who had mastered the art

of wooing the powers that be in Delhi. If one takes the 1971

(garibi hatao) victory as the first successful exploitation of the

materialist tendency then nascent in the Indian voter, it is no

accident that the 1980 victory came at a time when the Congress

was out of office, out of funds and therefore perforce more liberal

in its attitude to the state units.

Two years ago, the long period of 'nomination raj' in the

Congress was brought to an end by holding elections to all

organisational posts. Today there seems to be a return to the

centralised system of the past. In a polity as complex as India, it

is impossible for a single leader to fashion the many subtle

changes in political strategy needed to take account of variations

within the electorate. Rather than a 'high command' decide

whether the Mandalism of a Veerappa Moily or the business-

friendly pragmatism of a Sharad Pawar is more suited to the

political needs of a particular state, it would be better to let the

'market' (i.e. the local party unit) decide.

This is not a call to anarchy. Each broad-based political party

would have a core set of beliefs, allegiance to which would be a

necessary condition of remaining within it. Thus, for example,

belief in secularism would be essential to any member of the 

Congress or the Janata Dal, while a belief in a uniform civil code 

would be necessary for any member of the BJP. However,

outside such 'core' areas, there is scope for freedom of ideological

and organisational choice, and this freedom should be encouraged

rather than curbed.

The Ostrich Option - Ignoring Jabs at Indian Security

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

In school, it is common for those hounded by bullies to seek to

escape the problem by pretending that the offenders do not exist.

Ignoring them, it is hoped, will turn their attentions elsewhere.

Usually, however, the bully gets encouraged by this ostrich

strategy, and continues the harassment till retaliatory action is

taken. Observing the developments in Indo-Pakistan relations

since 1989, it is clear that those who are masterminding—if one

may use such a word—our strategy towards Pakistan have not

learnt any lessons from school. For each assault on India’s

security interests, the response from this country's side is to

reiterate the faded mantra of dialogue.

The reason why 1989 is significant is that it was in that year

that stable majorities disappeared from the Indian political

lexicon. V.P. Singh's tenure, followed by Chandra Shekhar’s

interregnum, and the assumption of office by the minority

government of P.V. Narasimha Rao, have convinced observers

that the era of single party majorities has ended, and is unlikely

to be resurrected. It is no accident that 1989 was also the year in

which the Pakistan—sponsored insurgency in the Kashmir valley

accelerated.

Curbing Insurgency

In every war fought with Pakistan over Kashmir, it has been

clear to Indian commanders that it is crucial that operations not

be confined to that state, but extended along the entire Indo-

Pakistan border. In the same way, it is clear to analysts—

including those within the government—that success in curbing

the fundamentalist insurgency in that state can be achieved only

if the root of the problem—the involvement of Pakistan—is

addressed. So long as Pakistan feels that it will be allowed to get

away with aiding terrorists in the Valley, the problem will

remain. It is only if the costs to Pakistan of such support are

made intolerably high will its assistance to fundamentalists in

the Valley cease. However, at present every escalation in Pakistani

rhetoric and action is met by the (presumably fearsome) expedient

of an official 'protest'. Even the closing down of an entire

consulate has not been sufficient to jolt the MEA.

Within the international community, Pakistan’s attempt at

annexing Kashmir has its most vocal supporter in Turkey. After

that country's repeated expressions of concern over 'human

rights' violations in parts of India, surely it will not be taken

amiss were India to help generate international attention on the

treatment of Kurds by the Ciller regime. India could also host a

delegation of Kurdish leaders from Turkey, who would no doubt

have much to say about the attention being paid to human rights

in that country. Pakistan too needs to be reminded about its

obligations to its religious minorities, its Mohajirs, and its

Ahmediyas. Careful documentation of the discrimination meted

out to these sections could be carried out and made the subject

of an international campaign. India needs to be at least as active

in ’preventing human rights violations’ in Turkey and Pakistan

as these countries are in India.

Turning the other cheek may be the recommended strategy

for religious reformers eager to establish their moral ascendancy.

International relations, however, is not a contest in public school

manners, but a battle of wills and interests. By refusing to

counter the active Pakistani strategy with a similar initiative, this

country is only encouraging Islamabad to continue with its

covert war in Kashmir. The danger in such passivity is that it

may encourage Pakistan's policymakers to intervene not just in

one Indian state but in several. Such a shift may already be

underway, if reports of ISI activity in Thiruvanathapuram,

Hyderabad and Lucknow are correct. Even an open society

needs to defend itself against those who seek to subvert it

through violence. Not taking precautions against such individuals

would be akin to allowing cancer cells to spread. Despite the

evidence in its possession about subversive activities in India,

the Union home ministry has been coy about sharing this

knowledge, whereas it should be made freely available to the

public. The Indian administration’s long association with the

former Soviet Union has evidently resulted in several key

ministries functioning as though they were in Brezhnevite

Moscow rather than in democratic New Delhi.

Subversive Activities

Popular support is essential for public policy to succeed, and

such support can come only if the public is briefed about

secessionist activities. In this, the government has failed, almost

as much as it has in the international sphere, where it is more

India's economic potential rather than an appreciation of the

justice of its position that has prevented most countries from

supporting the Ankara-Islamabad line. During the time of the

Pakistan army’s war against the population of the then East

Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent envoys around the

word with full details of the genocide. In comparison, present

efforts to educate world opinion about Pakistani support to

terrorism in Kashmir are anaemic. Not, of course, that much

more can be expected of an establishment which permits its

foreign secretary to greet the expelled staff from the closed

Karachi consulate with the familiar hope that there will soon be

talks with Pakistan.

Indeed, the low-key stance adopted by the Indian government

about major technological achievements such as Prithvi and

Agni fuel suspicions that these may be sacrificed. A country has

no need to feel shy about defending its vital security interests,

and yet the manner in which the PMO and the MEA have been

reacting to Agni and Prithvi suggests almost a feeling of apology,

rather than pride. While supporting any steps to prevent cross

border dissemination of strategic technologies, India should

resist efforts to stifle technological development within. In the

coming millennium, India, Japan and China will compete with

the United States and Russia in developing and deploying

strategic technologies, provided there is no sabotage at home.

India which has suffered numerous invasions and enslavements

in its long history, has particular need to be self-sufficient in

defence. The development of Agni and the deployment of

Prithvi will improve the security environment significantly and

act as a deterrent to Pakistani adventurism.

Separatist Impulses

What is even more disconcerting—viewed from the standpoint

of international security—is that influential circles in the United

States and the European Union are flirting with a policy of

’accommodating’ fundamentalist trends. Such an approach was

first tried out in Afghanistan, where the Reagan administration

created an army of religious extremists, who (after having

effectively demolished the Afghan state) are posing threats to

unity in India, Egypt, Algeria and other countries. Within the

U.S. and the EU foreign policy establishments, various formulae

for 'peace' in Kashmir are regularly churned out, almost all of

which presuppose that the state will detach itself from the Indian

Union. The underlying rationale for this presupposition is that

a 'Muslim’ state has no business being in India. This implicit

fragmentation of a polity on the grounds of religion can pose a

threat to stability not just in this country, but eventually in the

West as well. There are significant Muslim populations in

Germany, Britain, France and even the United States, who

would, by the logic being followed by some western analysts in

Kashmir, be justified in demanding autonomy, if not

independence. The fact is that the detachment of Kashmir from

India would trigger an intensification of religion linked separatist

impulses in many other parts of the globe, a step that would also

affect the security interests of the West.

Rather than be abject and apologetic, India needs to make

clear that its security interests will be vigorously safeguarded. In

particular, that its integrity as a multi-religious state will be

maintained. By its muffled response to jabs at Indian security—

whether in the form of intervention in Kashmir or demands that

crucial strategic programmes be aborted—the political leadership

in this country is encouraging fresh assaults on Indian sovereignty.

Sonia's Game Plan: Can the 'Dynasty' Make a Comeback?

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Since December 1980, when Rajiv Gandhi was given an office in
the Prime Minister’s House and began to be groomed as his
mother's successor, Sonia Gandhi has played a silent role in
governance. An early sign of her influence was the advisory role
given to her brother-in—law Walter Vinci (then married to Sonia’s
elder sister Annouschka) by a blue-chip company. This was
despite Vinci's lack of significant formal qualifications.
Subsequently, an export firm was set up to send abroad Indian V
handicraft. Although allegations were often raised about "art
treasures" being sent out through this route, the charges were
never pursued.

The abrupt transfer of Jose Valdemoro, then married to Sonia
Gandhi’s younger sister Nadia, reflected the new power equations 
after Sanjay Gandhi’s death in a plane crash in June 1980. The
Spanish diplomat was shifted from Lima, Peru to New Delhi by
his government. Subsequently, he too began to devote attention
to economic relations between India and other countries. Along
with a friend from Turin, Ottavio Quatrocchi, he had impressive
success in persuading the India government to see the merits in
the products of companies approved by them. Snam Progetti
and CASA were prime examples.

Despite the Indian government’s expensive presence in over
a hundred world capitals, it has not thus far been able to trace
the whereabouts of Quatrocchi who is wanted for questioning by
the CBI in Bofors, hawala and other cases. As for Vinci and
Valdemoro, both disappeared from the scene after P. V.
Narasimha Rao, strangely, began giving preference to his own
relatives rather than to those of Gandhi. Coincidentally, this shift
in prime ministerial affections was marked by a cooling-off of
relations between Sonia Gandhi and Narasimha Rao, Since
1993—when the then Prime Minister finally shook off the coils
of the past—Sonia Gandhi has seldom hidden her distaste of the
man.

While much of the Indian media has treated Sonia Gandhi
with kid gloves, individuals close to her have revealed what they
claim are details of her political thinking. That Sonia Gandhi is
keenly interested in politics is apparent from her visitors’ book.
Especially during the past three months, she has talked to a
variety of politicians, almost all of whom have given details of
the alleged interactions to their confidants. Piecing together
some of these recollections, and talking to individuals known to
be close to her, the contours of what these sources claim to be the
"Sonia Gandhi game plan" emerge:
(1) The first stage would be the removal of P. V. Narasimha
Rao as the leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party.
In this, all techniques are deemed as fair, ranging from
the allegations of corruption against Rao and his allies
to moves to bring back Rao-baiters into the Congress
party. While Sharad Pawar is now an ally of 10 Janpath,
the preferred choice to replace Rao is Manmohan Singh,
according to these sources.
(2) After installing a Sonia-friendly CPP leader, the next
step would be to intensify the public attacks on the Deve
Gowda government, simultaneously winning over the
TDP, the TMC, the DMK, the SP and influential
individuals inside the Ianata Dal. After a few months,
the time would come for implementation of the second
stage, which is the replacement of the Deve Gowda
government with one headed by the new CPP leader.
(3) Such a government would hold office for around 18
months, during which time Sonia Gandhi would emerge
from her purdah and campaign for the Congress. This,
according to her admirers, would suffice to whip up a
wave of popular enthusiasm for the Congress that
replicates 1971 and 1984. A fresh election would be
called, in which three-fourths of the Congress tickets
would be given to new entrants judged to be responsive
to the wishes of 10 Janpath. After the election, a young
and "dynamic" individual would emerge as the Prime
Minister. If our sources are correct, the first preference
is for Madhavrao Scindia.

There is, of course, a final stage, which is the emergence of
a scion of the Nehru family as the understudy of the Sonia-
friendly Prime Minister. After one or perhaps two terms in office,
he would make way for a better qualified individual, either
Rahul Gandhi or Priyanka Gandhi. Thereafter, India would once
again make stupendous progress, just as it did between 1947-64,
1966-67 and 1980-89.

If our sources (who were so careful to maintain anonymity
that some of the sessions took place in off peak times in public
parks rather than in homes or restaurants) are to be believed,
there is a carefully-crafted strategy behind the sphinx-like silence
of Sonia Gandhi. According to them, the plan is on the lines
sketched above, with the rough timetable for the fall of Rao being
January 1997, and the installation of the new government
following some four months from then. Not entirely accidentally, 
individuals close to Sonia Gandhi have reportedly been briefing
mediapersons on the "imminence" of the fall of the Gowda
Government.

While Sonia Gandhi, following the example of Rao, refuses
to communicate with the media, there are others who do so ably.
Apart from Scindia and Arjun Singh, another politician known
to be close to her is P. Chidambaram. Amitabh Bachchan — whose
clout was recently demonstrated during the Miss World contest
in Bangalore — is another close associate. In addition, there are
the numerous trusts and other institutions controlled by her,
which together add up to an impressive public presence. Also,
there is little doubt that many Congress office-bearers have a
reflexive servility to her. This was clear, for example, during last
year’s trip to Amethi, when top politicians such as Digvijay
Singh and N. D. Tiwari waited by the barricades in the hope of
attracting a smile from her. However, there are three reasons
why the game plan contoured above may fail;
(a) The first reason is Sitaram Kesri. The AICC president is
a wily survivor who has at last escaped from
subordination to others. He is unlikely to mortgage this
new-found freedom to any individual, including Gandhi,
and therefore may follow his own game plan.
(b) The second obstacle is P. Vi Narasimha Rao. Despite the
blows he has suffered, he retains substantial strength
within the Congress Parliamentary Party. Thus, while it
is possible that he may have to step down, the
replacement may not be a Sonia nominee but a Rao
favourite such as G. Venkatswamy, a Dalit and former
minister. Should this take place, the desire of the Sonia
camp to install a Congress-led govemment may receive
a setback.
(c) The final obstacle will be Deve Gowda. His rustic
exterior and "humble" mien hides a fierce ambition and
a willingness to do battle that Narasimha Rao has
seldom displayed. The Prime Minister has built a career
out of being under-estimated, and may yet surprise his
foes. Despite the confidence shown by the Sonia camp,
the game may be far from over.

Supping with the Devil - Fundamentalists must be Shunned

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Pulp fiction overflows with tales of young ladies seeking to

reform rakes, drunkards and general never-do-wells. Similarly,

leaders of several countries adopt a "reformist" approach to

ideological opposites both in their own and in other countries,

either avoiding the fact that differences exists, or hoping that

sweet words will diminish them.

Such is the minuet being played out between several moderate

states and fundamentalists. Even where the motive was less to

reform than to embarrass an enemy (as in the case of the US

policy in Afghanistan in the l980s), the argument that friendly

contact will temper rough ideological edges is commonly used.

Within countries, leaders whose outlook can be expected to be

secular often don fundamentalist colours, again in an ostensible

effort at lowering the temperature of rebellion against democratic

conduct by endorsing such tendencies rather than opposing

them.

The problem is that such under-playing of the (pardon the

pun) fundamental differences between democratic conduct and

extremist behaviour usually works in favour of the latter, giving

it respectability and legitimacy and enabling it to widen its base

of support. Unless the leaders of democratic parties stress the

contradiction between social calm and militancy, large segments

of the public will be at risk of looking upon such fringe

organisations as legitimate participants in a democratic discourse.

Two Incidents

Two incidents will serve to illustrate this. One was the Muslim

Women's Bill, promulgated by Rajiv Gandhi eight years ago as

a reaction to the Shah Bano judgment. Instead of pointing out

that the judgment, far from being against a particular religion,

merely attempted to protect the rights of women, and that in any

case the proper response for its opponents would have been to

take legal steps to annul the judgment, the Union government

amended the law under fundamentalist pressure. As a

consequence, the moral authority of the regime to fight

fundamentalist tendencies in the majority community got eroded.

The second event was the destruction of the Babri Masjid.

Displaying (an almost unbelievable) naivete in accepting the

promises of a state government whose national masters were

openly calling for the pulling down of the structure, the Union

government declined to take effective steps to protect the

monument, and as a consequence the faith of religious minorities

in its ability—and indeed willingness—to protect their interests

got eroded. Although in secrecy-riddled India, the public is not

privy to the confabulations that preceded the decision to repose

such faith in Kalyan Singh, the argument must have been

advanced that friendly and supportive contact with the then U.P.

government would perhaps reduce the influence of the

'extremists' within the Sangh parivar.

Indeed, this is a common argument that a fundamentalist

organisation is divided into 'moderates’ and ’extremists', and

that support to the former will enable them to eliminate the ,

latter. Such arguments miss the point that the aim of both are

usually the same, and that the differences are present only in the

nuances. Both the ’reasonable’ Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

and the Iranian ’hardliners’ want to make Teheran the political

hub of a world religious movement. Both the ’moderate’ Pakistan

Peoples Party as well as the 'hawks' of the Jamaat-e-Islami are

united in their zeal to enforce religious laws in Pakistan.

U.S. Policy

The United States is another country that has displayed a

propensity to forge alliances with religious extremists. This was

done, for example, in Afghanistan where weapons and manpower

financed by the U.Si are now exported for advancing the

fundamentalist cause in third countries. This is being done in the

case of Pakistan, where the American policy is to support the

'moderate’ Benazir Bhutto to prevent the risk of take-over by

extremists. As a consequence, the denial of rights to minorities

within that country is ignored.

The U.S. - unlike France or Germany - does not as yet face

an internal threat from fundamentalist groups. However, Turkey

does, and it is ironic that one of the strongest supporters of the

terrorists in Kashmir is that country. Evidently, by playing along

with the ISI mujahideen, Tansu Ciller hopes to make herself

more acceptable to the religious fringe, forgetting that not just

her survival but that of Kemalist Turkey depends on the shrinking

rather than the buttressing of this dangerous fringe. However, a

government that swiftly chokes off an Urdu-language broadcast

to reward violent fanatics in Bangalore has little moral authority

to cast stones at her. 

To take the case of Pakistan again, it is in the interests of the

political class in that country to weaken the dominance of the

army over the state. Until this is done, political leaders there will

in effect survive on the mercy of the men in uniform, being

constantly under the threat of being discarded undemocratically

as Bhutto and then Nawaz Sharif recently were. However,

forgetting their common interest in keeping the generals out of

the secretariats, when a Bhutto is unfairly dismissed, a Sharif

exults, only for a Bhutto to repay the compliment when it is her

rival who gets the boot. So long as the political class in Pakistan

takes the help of enemies of democracy in its internal quarrels,

the generals will continue to have the last word, as is evident, for

instance, in the fact that in the ’free’ Pakistan press, criticism of

the army is perforce absent.

The snub administered by president Rafsanjani to this

country—by the last-minute cancellation of his trip—should

make clear the absurdity inherent in a policy of fighting

fundamentalism with the help of fundamentalists. With its

quirky concepts concerning its religious role, Iran is one of the

last countries that should be encouraged to give its views in an

internal matter of India, which is Kashmir.

Indeed, there is a basic contradiction between the Indian

government’s official stand that Kashmir is a domestic dispute,

and its very public efforts at mobilising support within the UN

against Pakistan. Logically, India's public stand should be that

as Kashmir is a domestic issue, the passage of international

resolutions is not relevant. By claiming a 'victory' through

organising the shelving of a particular Pakistani resolution, India

could be exposing itself to the danger of inviting intervention

should another resolution be introduced.

Overt Efforts

Another self-defeating action taken by this country is its overt

efforts at persuading the U.S. to declare Pakistan to be a terrorist

state. Such a step openly acknowledges the American 'right' to

certify a state as being terrorist or democratic, a right that is not

obvious to most. Rather than a reactive strategy that focuses

exclusively on countering Pakistan’s efforts, India needs to work

out a positive strategy of systematically educating international

opinion about the ground realities of terrorism in Kashmir. Proof

of foreign involvement should be freely made available, as also

any facts concerning alleged misbehaviour by Indian troops.

However, rather than evolving out of compulsions based on

ground realities within the state, government policy towards it

appears to be formulated as a response to external or

fundamentalist pressure. A government with a commitment to

defending secularism does not need to be apologetic to the world

outside about the defence of its vital interests in Kashmir. Such

a defence may, for example, involve the use of helicopters to

track down foreign mercenaries operating in the state.

From Ciller to Clinton, the list of democratic leaders believing

in the virtues of alliance with segments of the fundamentalist

fringe is depressingly long. They forget that such a blurring of

the ideological and tactical divide between democracy and its

enemies usually works to the advantage of the more fanatic side.

If the Iranian snub convinces at least some in India of this

dictum, it would have served a purpose.

A Misstep on the Brinks of Victory

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

While the "full-blown" version of the Kashmir insurgency erupted 

in 1990, the seeds were sown in 1984. That was the year Valley 

youth began going across the border for training. "Perhaps 

because it thought that a small dose of militancy, would help its 

leverage with Delhi, the National Conference government took

no action against such crossings", a state police officer claimed.

The National Conference, as also the Congress, the Janata
Dal and the CPM, are dominated by the Valley Sunnis, who also
head the pro—militant JKLF, Hurriyat Conference, People's
Conference and People’s League. Since 1947, care has been taken
to ensure that the Valley Sunnis fill most of the government jobs.
Rather than attempt to craft a base separate from the NC, the
state unit of the Congress has also followed the same policy.

Another policy that unites the Congress and the NC is
corruption. According to a senior official, "the Kashmir
administration is even more corrupt than those in the North-
east." Reliable estimates are that less than a third of the Rs.
1,00,000 crore that has been spent by the Centre on Kashmir since
1947 has gone to the intended beneficiaries. The bulk has been
pocketed by politicians, officials and middlemen.

That has been one of the fuses priming the insurgency.
Another is the encouragement given to religious extremism by
the so-called "secular" governments in the state. "During
Congress rule in the 1960s, a chain of religious schools was
encouraged to be set up, in which youngsters were taught to
regard themselves as different from the 'unbelievers' around
them. Subtly, these schools spread a separatist message," said A.
S. Jamwal, a social analyst.

In 1977, soon after the victory of his party in the assembly
polls, Sheikh Abdullah adopted a policy of appeasement of
religious extremists. The essentially secular nature of
"Kashmiriyat” was eroded, and in its place was established a
culture that had much in common with Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. However, thanks to the NC’s concentration on its
Valley Sunni base, the other Muslim groups—Shias, Gujjars and
Baltis—were left unaffected by this indoctrination. As a
consequence, to this day these groups have refused to join in the
insurgency, which is overwhelmingly a Valley Sunni
phenomenon. 

While the Hindus of Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh
have been opposed to the cry for azaadi of the militants, what is
not so well known is that even in Kashmir proper the Valley
Sunnis are outnumbered by the Gujjars, Shias, Baltis and Hindus.
None of these groups is in favour of “autonomy", which they
interpret as the continuation of Valley Sunni domination. A few
weeks ago, the Shia leader Mohammeddin-Cheetah resigned
from the NC, saying that he opposed its demand for autonomy.
Interestingly, the Saudi and Pakistani-funded Jamaat-i-lslami
evokes no response from either the Gujjars or the Shias.

Just as militancy in Punjab proved a boon to criminal
elements, who indulged freely in smuggling because the attention
of the police was focused on antiterrorist steps, the insurgency
in Kashmir has benefited some. One reason has been the drying-
up of tax payments from the Valley. As against Rs. 77 crore
collected as sales tax from Jammu this year, the Kashmir Valley
contributed only Rs. 12 crore, all of which came from public
sector companies. Income tax collections were almost zero in the
Valley, though normal in Jammu. "It is almost as though we are
being penalised for being loyal to India, while those who subvert
the country are rewarded," said Ram Sahai, president of the
Jammu Chamber of Commerce.

A senior officer in the state administration, who spoke on
condition of anonymity, said that the situation "got out of
control in 1990, when V. P. Singh was the Prime Minister". After
home minister M. M. Sayeed's daughter Rubaiya was kidnapped,
"the minister had two options", the officer said. "He could have
l acted as the custodian of the nation’s security and refused to deal
with the abductors. Or he could have resigned and appealed as
I a father to the Kashmiri people to force the terrorists to release
his daughter. He did neither, instead, the government
surrendered", the officer said.

A senior police officer based in Srinagar pointed out that “ the
credibility of a government is an important factor in controlling
an insurgency. When azaadi euphoria erupted in the Valley after
the Rubaiya fiasco, the state government asked for just six
battalions of CRP to face the mobs. This request was denied by
the VP Singh government. The advice from Delhi was to avoid
any attempt to prevent the azaadi mobs from controlling the
streets. This hesitancy convinced the people of the Valley that
within months the central government would surrender Kashmir
to the militants".

Gulam Sheikh, an apple grower from Sonamarg, claimed
that "most Kashmiris supported the militants because we were
sure they would win, and so if we did not help them, they would
arrest us once they came to power". Karim, a militant from
Rajouri, was succinct: "We were told by our friends in Pakistan
that India would run away from Kashmir the same way the
Russians ran away from Kabul". 1990 saw the flowering of a
Mazhabi Junoon - religious fanaticism in the words of Merajud-
Din, a former militant resident in Srinagar. "We saw ourselves
as part of a new order that would stretch from Kashmir to
Turkey".

By 1991-92, the bulk of the Valley’s Sunni intellectuals-
lawyers, journalists and officials—had got onto the azaadi
bandwagon. The process got a further boost after the destruction
of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992. "It was no accident that
1993 was a particularly bad year", said S. S. Bilowria, additional
chief secretary, Jammu and Kashmir. According to adviser to the
governor Goswamy, "the Kashmir police had by then become
ineffective".

However, that was the year that Pakistan overplayed its
hand. In a bid to speed up the timetable of secession, large
numbers of Afghans, Sudanese and Pakistanis were infiltrated
into the Valley. These "guest fighters" imposed themselves on
the Valley, commandeering food, lodging and on occasions,
women. Taxes began to be levied "to finance the liberation war,"
and to wipe out secular infrastructure, schools were destroyed.
Soon, as the state began to resemble Afghanistan, local enthusiasm
for the "freedom struggle" began to wane.

Diplomatic Dinosaurs - Left Behind in a Changing World

(Originally appeared in the 1990s in the Times of India, as published in M. D. Nalapat's book "Indutva", Har-Anand Publications, 1999)

Ten years ago, a young Indian diplomat in a European capital

briefly let fall his mask of official politeness. "Most of our work

is looking after VIP guests", he groused, "our promotions

depend on this, and not on how well we understand the country

and suggest responses useful to India". And because most VIP

visitors would sooner go to floor shows or supermarkets than to

experts in trade or terrorism, a career-minded diplomat quickly

finds out all that is necessary about such locales in order to

entertain a dignitary from home. lf in the process the "training"

of a diplomat resembles a course in hotel management (the guest

is always right), that is bagatelle when compared to the satisfaction

of dozens of VH’s who saunter out of the guest houses that go

by the name of Indian embassies abroad.

In the corporate world of the past, the production departments 

had primacy, with marketing being almost an afterthought.

Today the creation of a need through professional manipulation

of tastes is at the core of the business process. The practitioners

of this skill are usually highly-trained and well-paid, often more

so than those in other disciplines. If we considered that the job

of Indian diplomats is similarly to identify ways in which this

country's capabilities can cater to the perceived needs of other

countries while bringing benefits to India, then it is evident that

the ministry of external affairs is still in the pre-market era,

where form has primacy over substance.

Diplomats' Promotion

Had the criteria for career "progression been based on 

achievements like, for example, an increase in the import of

goods and services from India or changes in a country" policy

in a manner beneficial to Indian interests, many of our diplomats

would perhaps have been tempted to abandon the role of escorts 

and innkeepers for VIP guests. However, the diplomat’s

professional skills are seldom judged relevant when deciding on

promotions. They are done arbitrarily, often a diplomat who has

been given what is termed a "hardship" posting is posted to a 

comfortable western country like Austria or Belgium to

recuperate. If the diplomat’s inability or lack of desire to execute 

his duties has made the country where he is posted currently 

indifferent or even more hostile than before to India's concerns, 

then his promotion to a "soft” assignment is hastened.  

While the pace of change is accelerating the world over, in  

the selection committees for choosing new officers "crass"  

individuals from the world of commerce, journalism or public  

life, are effectively kept out and at best are permitted token  

appearances between the closed ranks of soon-to-be-retired, just-  

retired or long-retired diplomats. Much discussion takes place ,

over the number of prize missions that have fallen to political  

appointees. Naturally any officer with an iota of loyalty to his  

profession will strive to ensure that such appointees trip up and  

eventually fail, so that they can be replaced by civilised persons 

who are well-versed in the use of the appropriate cutlery and the 

choice of the right wine. 

No Reason 

Despite their snooty disdain for "organised labour", most  

administrative fraternities function most effectively in a trade  

union mode, not subject to accountability. This country should  

adopt a system of encouraging movement from fields like   

marketing and communications to die diplomatic corps with  

highly trained professionals working as diplomats for three to   

five year terms. This would help create a diplomatic system 

more relevant to current priorities: enhanced trade and security.  

There is no reason why a "political appointee" should necessarily   

be a politician. He or she could be a scientist (in a country with 

which technological cooperation is significant) or a marketing 

professional (where enhanced trade is sought) or from the 

communications industry (where a change in perception needs  

to be introduced). What is urgently required is a network of  

genuine specialists down the line, serving within the diplomatic 

corps for specified periods or even permanently. Just as war is 

too serious a business to be left to generals, diplomacy is far too

crucial a field to be monopolised by foreign service officers. 

The standard response to most suggestions for substantive 

change is that things are proceeding perfectly at present. Those 

in charge of external relations point with pride to the "improving" 

relations with practically every country. That most such 

"improvements" are a consequence of continuous concessions to 

external susceptibilities is, of course, glossed over. Thus troops

in Kashmir are unable to use helicopters to pursue mercenaries

from Pakistan, Sudan and Afghanistan, because to do so would 

hurt the feelings of these three countries. India has to play down

major technological achievements in the rocket field, because

enhanced activity there would lead to frowns from capitals that

regard bullock carts and camel rides as being more "natural"

fields of activity for a ”backward" country than the launching of

satellites or rockets. Thus the so-called "regional bully" has to

watch meekly while terrorists in our northern states get trained

in Pakistan, and insurgents in north-eastern states get support

from Bangladesh. 'The diminishing significance of India in its 

own backyard is clearly underscored by the fact that two

neighbours are able to foment insurgency at their will in this

country and even countries like Thailand harbour Indian citizens

who are engineering insurgency here by remote control.

There is a clear correlation between the declining effectiveness  

of Indian diplomacy and the increase in externally-backed 

insurgency within our borders. Had this country followed the 

example of China, and developed its defences openly and 

energetically, it would arguably have witnessed an improvement 

in its security environment at a much lower cost than it is 

incurring at present. To accept the western argument that the 

rolling back of India's nuclear and space programme will lead to 

a peace-oriented response from our western neighbour is to

ignore the instability that permeates this region. 

In 1972 major concessions were given to the late Zulifikar Ali

Bhutto in order to prop up a "democratic alternative" to the

Pakistani army. This strategy failed and the concessions went to 

‘ waste, just. as Indian forbearance did in 1948 when the army was

prevented from liberating the whole of Kashmir by Jawaharlal

Nehru. Should Benazir Bhutto make promises that Pakistan will

roll back strategic defence programmes, the situation within that

country makes it probable that she will be ousted by one or  

another fundamentalist group or the army, which will soon 

renege on such promises. In the meantime, India would have lost  

a lot of crucial time.  

Secular Forces 

By flirting with the fundamentalists, Bhutto has strengthened a 

force that has the potential to topple her. Whether in Pakistan, 

Afghanistan or many of the CIS states, there is a need to buttress

secular forces and prevent the movement towards

fundamentalism. A more active Indian diplomacy within this

region—stressing this country’s economic base and secular

traditions—is called for in place of the present passivity. Such a 

policy needs we backed by a credible deterrent force that will

prevent any other spillover of fundamentalist violence into 

India.

In the face of the instability in our neighbourhood, it is 

astonishing that even the proposed national security council has 

not yet been formed. As for introducing basic changes in the 

training and composition of our diplomatic corps, this may 

prove beyond the vision of our MEA that saw nothing wrong 

with functioning without a political head for over a year. The 

price for the present will be paid for by the future.