Today, the Indian economy is in far worse
shape than it was when he took office in 2004, with government spending out of
control, a doubling of the tax burden and a raft of restrictions on private
initiative and enterprise.
Why, despite Singh having implemented a
"communist lite" program as prime minister, are the two communist
parties so anxious to defeat his government and thereby block further progress
on the nuclear negotiations begun with the George W. Bush- Manmohan Singh
statement on U.S.-India nuclear cooperation on July 18, 2005? After all, the
two parties are openly pacifist, having opposed the country's nuclear weapons
program since its inception in 1985, and the agreements now being discussed
would significantly limit India's freedom of action to build an arsenal capable
of responding against a nuclear attack.
Contrary to the reports and commentaries
now appearing in the Indian media, the change in stand of the Communist Party
of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of India has little to do with
nuclear weapons or energy. It is based on what is perceived – despite ritual
denials by the United States and India – to be the principal reason behind the
July 18, 2005 accord: the integration of India into the defense architecture of
the United States, in the manner of Japan.
Such an outcome would require massive
transfusions of U.S. equipment and technology to India, something that thus far
has been prevented by the dense web of technology sanctions imposed on India
after the country's first nuclear blast in 1974. Unless this Gordian knot be
cut, the extent of interoperability of the Indian and U.S. defense forces would
be severely restricted, in view of differences in equipment.
Although India would like to buy U.S.
defense equipment worth at least US$6 billion immediately, rising toward $20
billion in five years, at present U.S. laws restrict the sale to the world's
largest democracy of sophisticated weapons systems such as the F-22 fighter
aircraft, or undersea platforms and missile systems. Should the nuclear-related
barriers be knocked down, it would be a matter of months before the United
States were to emerge as a serious competitor to Russia in the sale of defense
equipment to India.
It is this that worries China, for Beijing
is well aware that a primary motivation behind the warming of ties between New
Delhi and Washington is a shared concern over the growth of the People’s
Liberation Army. An India that evolves into as close a strategic partner of the
United States as Japan presently is would be a nightmare to Chinese military
planners – hence the imperative of derailing the nuclear deal.
Should the IAEA and the NSG begin to
consider the Indian proposal for a qualified exemption from the restraints
barring countries with advanced nuclear technology from trading with it, China
would have no option but to go along, lest it antagonize both India and the
United States. Small wonder that the CPM and CPI have been vociferous in
demanding that India not go before the NSG and the IAEA, and withdrew their
support to the Manmohan Singh government on July 7, the day the IAEA was
formally approached by India to consider an exemption.
Beijing had apparently calculated that the
prime minister would prefer to remain in office rather than risk defeat over
the deal. However, Manmohan Singh seems willing to risk all in a throw of the
dice that will be decided on July 22, the day of the trust vote.
By opposing the nuclear deal, the two
communist parties have landed in the same corner as the largest opposition party,
the BJP, which seeks not to scrap but to renegotiate the agreement on terms
more favorable to India. The BJP favors a robust triad of nuclear weapon
platforms, on land, sea and air, unlike Manmohan Singh, who has long been
ambivalent about nuclear weapons and who, as finance minister from 1991-96, cut
spending on the nuclear and missile program.
Rather than the defense relationship –
which is what excites the BJP – Singh looks at a closer relationship through
the prism of economic development. The United States has become the largest
trade and technology partner of India, as well as the favored destination for
Indian students. Indeed, the multiplying links between the two powers are
creating a grassroots momentum for an alliance.
If U.S. laws are amended to facilitate
hi-tech collaboration, in the coming decade India and not China may evolve as
the location for the manufacture of selected aerospace and other components.
Small wonder that China’s leaders are hoping their communist allies in India
will be able to prevent more cozy ties between the world's two most populous
democracies.
However, even in the unlikely event of a
government defeat on July 22, the process of an India-U.S. partnership will
only have been delayed, not abandoned. Except for the communist parties – which
have continually demonstrated an admirable loyalty toward first the Soviet
Union and now China – almost every major political party in India favors a
closer relationship with the United States. This is not surprising in probably
the only country in the world where George W. Bush still enjoys a 60 percent
favorable rating.
-(Professor M.D. Nalapat is
vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and
professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)
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